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Abstract
Both Benin and Ghana are amongst Africa’s most celebrated examples of democratic
success, but there is growing divergence in the capacity of their state institutions to act
as effective agents of development. Why? This dissertation argues that modes of
party financing are integral to understanding patterns of patronage-based recruitment
to public office, and that these patronage practices have consequences for the broader
developmental capacities of the state.
The first part of the dissertation shows that leaders use political patronage not only
as a means of “buying” votes,” but more fundamentally as a means of exerting control
over the state’s resources. How leaders choose to access and control these resources
depends on the size of the private sector and the strength of party organizations, both
of which vary considerably across African countries. Where party organizations are
strong and the private sector large, patronage is likely to be concentrated primarily at
the elite level to facilitate the exchange of contracts for financial support to the party.
Conversely, where private capital is more scarce, leaders will concentrate patronage at
the public service level, enabling political supporters to access state revenue and rents
for their party.
These varying patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmental capacities of the state. Elite level patronage leads to more stability and cohesion
in the executive which, among other things, strengthens commitment to development
programs over time even in the face of serious implementation challenges. High levels
of public service patronage, by contrast, heighten organizational problems including
technical deficiencies amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance of state
resources for political use and excessive control over bureaucratic agencies. This latter environment is particularly challenging for the implementation of development
programs.

The argument is developed by combining comparative case analysis of Benin and
Ghana with medium-N cross national analysis on a broader set of African countries.
The case analysis draws on three principal sources of data collected in both countries,
including 1) a comprehensive database containing appointment and biographical information on all cabinet ministers from the early 1990s through 2013, 2) an original
survey of over 500 civil servants in each country and 3) interviews with approximately
60 political and state actors. Together, the data allow for a novel empirical strategy
that considers patronage across both elite and public service levels of the executive apparatus, and lends considerable support to a party-financing based explanation of the
relationship between multi-party politics, patronage and state institutional capacity.
Although the neopatrimonial perspective in African politics often leads us to believe that patronage is both ubiquitous and uniformly detrimental to African states,
this project shows otherwise. Instead the dissertation’s findings suggest the need to
consider not only how much patronage, but which jobs are distributed and to whom. In
so doing, the project moves away from monotonic conceptions of the relationship
between democracy and state capacity, asking instead how multi-party politics interact with neopatrimonial forms of authority to produce variation in state institutional
capacity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Much like the wave of independence that swept across sub-Saharan Africa1 in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, episodes of protest and political reform in the 1990s raised
hopes for a more stable and prosperous future. In his opening speech at Benin’s February 1990 National Conference, the first of its kind in Africa, President Mathieu Kerekou
declared that this historic event would “in one word, involve the elaboration and adoption of a Charter of national unity for democratic renewal and the economic, social and
cultural development of our country.”2 In the midst of a prolonged and arduous
economic downtown in which many previously well-to-do Africans experienced the
“trickling up of poverty” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 100), it is not surprising that
the rhetoric of social and economic transformation came to be strongly associated with
political change.
More than half of all African countries underwent some form of political liberalization during the 1990s, the results of which have varied considerably from one country
to the next.3 Although many of these countries have achieved considerable success
in institutionalizing elections and constitutional rule (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Posner and
Young, 2007), there remains wide variation in the extent to which even the most liberal
and longstanding democracies have successfully pursued social and economic change.
Whereas countries like Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania have managed to maintain
consistently high economic growth rates over the past decade, the trends are much
1

Hereafter I use the term Africa to mean sub-Saharan Africa
This section of the speech is excerpted in Banégas’ (2003: 149) detailed account of Benin’s transition
to democracy and translated by the author. Unless otherwise specified, translation throughout the
dissertation is by the author.
3
For an overview of political reforms in African countries during this period, see Bratton and van de
Walle (1997); Diamond (2002, 2010); Lindberg (2006).
2

1

Ibrahim Human Development (Detrended)

Figure 1.1: Ibrahim Human Development Scores 2000-2013
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different for Benin, Cape Verde and South Africa whose economic growth has been far
less stable.4 Likewise, there is considerable variation in the performance of Africa’s
democratic countries in achieving human development goals (See Figure 1.1).5 As
Gyimah-Boadi states, “the jury is still out on the long-term prospects of the reform
movement” (2004: 2).
Despite these mixed records of developmental success, much of the literature on
the effects of political liberalization in Africa remains focused on the search for clear
monotonic relationships, with some scholars maintaining that multi-party democracy
serves as an important gateway to development and many others expressing skepticism
about its transformative prospects. At the heart of this debate are questions about the
4

Based on annual rates of growth in real per capita GDP, obtained from African Economic Outlook
(2003-2013).
5
The plots in Figure 1.1 are based on data that were detrended for all African countries by plotting the
residuals from a regression of the Ibrahim Human Development score on year for the period covered. This
technique removes trends that affect all African countries such as international interventions, changes
in technology, etc., thereby giving a more accurate picture of the trends that are specific to country-level
factors.
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relationship of multi-party politics to Africa’s “neopatrimonial” states. While general
theories suggest that multi-party political competition ought to lead to better governing
outcomes, many Africanist scholars, in particular, conclude that political competition is
likely to reproduce, or even worsen neopatrimonial behaviors, such as patronage, that
undermine the state’s capacity to accomplish their development goals. In his landmark
study of Nigerian democracy, Joseph encapsulates this perspective by asking: “how
can a thoroughgoing multi-party democracy be sustained in Nigeria when full political competition only generates patterns of political mobilization and conflict which
threaten the very integrity of the nation itself?” (1987: 185).
This project moves away from monotonic conceptions of the relationship between
democracy and state capacity, asking instead when and why political competition can
produce stronger states. In an effort to unravel the relationship between democracy,
patronage and state capacity, I examine the varying ways that multi-party politics
shape the composition and functioning of the state’s executive institutions at both elite
and public service levels.6 In focusing on Benin and Ghana, two of Africa’s most
competitive democracies, multi-party political competition is held constant in order
to build and eventually test a theory of when and why political competition leads to
more capable and effective state institutions. It neither accepts nor rejects the notion
that neopatrimonialism necessarily limits the state’s developmental capabilities, but
rather identifies the ways that multi-party politics interact with neopatrimonial forms
of authority to produce varying state capacity outcomes.
The central argument of the dissertation is that modes of party financing are integral
6
A definition of state capacity is provided below. I use the term executive institutions to mean the
presidency, the cabinet and the state bureaucracy. In Chapters 4 and 5, however, I make a distinction
between executive capacity and bureaucratic capacity, which I explain in more detail below. I also use
the broad term ‘public service’ rather than the more specific term, ‘civil service.’ This reflects a layered
system that is common in many African bureaucracies, whereby organizations staffed by individuals
outside of the official ‘civil service’ proliferate as a result of politicians’ or donors’ efforts to bypass weak,
unresponsive, or politically captive civil service institutions. The focus throughout the dissertation is
squarely on central government institutions.
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to understanding patterns of patronage-based recruitment to public office, and that
these patronage practices have consequences for the broader developmental capacities
of the state. I show that leaders use political patronage, defined narrowly as the
distribution of state jobs in exchange for political support,7 not only as a means of
“buying” votes, but more fundamentally as a means of exerting control over the state’s
resources. How leaders choose to access and control these resources depends on the size
of the private sector and the strength of party organizations. Where party organizations
are strong and the private sector large, patronage is likely to be concentrated primarily
at the elite level to facilitate the exchange of contracts for financial support to the
party. Conversely, where the private sector is less developed, leaders will concentrate
patronage at the public service level, where political supporters can directly access
state revenue and rents to benefit the ruling party. This explanation underscores the
importance of asking not only how much patronage, but more specifically which jobs are
distributed and to whom.
These varying patronage practices have consequences on the broader developmental capacities of the state. Patronage at the elite level leads to more stability and cohesion
in the executive which, among other things, strengthens commitment to development
programs over time even in the face of serious implementation challenges. High levels
of public service patronage, by contrast, heighten organizational problems including
technical deficiencies amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance of state
resources for political use and excessive control over bureaucratic agencies. In this environment, even if the executive leadership was able to clearly articulate and commit to
a particular development program, it is considerably less likely that the public service
could effectively implement that program.
7
Broader definitions include the exchange of other types of goods and services for political support. See, for example, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007). Also, I distinguish patronage from ‘tribute’
or ‘prebends’ in the traditional senses of these terms, although as Lemarchxnd notes, “the boundaries
between patronage, tribute and prebends are frequently effaced by empirical realities”(1988: 154)

4

This argument is supported with three main sources of data collected in Benin and
Ghana during eleven months of field research conducted between 2012 and 2014. A
comprehensive database of minister biographies covering all appointees from the early
1990s through 2013 provides the basis for an innovative and reliable approach to the
measurement of elite-level patronage. An original survey of over 500 public sector
employees in each country examines not only the patterns of patronage-based hiring
of public servants, but also perceptions about the effects of multi-party politics on
organizational performance. Finally, interviews with approximately 60 political and
state actors provide additional evidence of variation in party financing, and provide
insight into the logics of political management of the bureaucracy. Together, the data
allow for a novel empirical strategy that considers patronage across both elite and
public service levels of the executive apparatus, and lends considerable support to a
party financing-based explanation of the relationship between democracy, patronage
and state institutional capacity. To assess the potential generalizability of the argument,
I also conduct a preliminary medium-N test of the argument on a broader set of African
countries.
In this introductory chapter, I begin by describing the problem of developmental
capacity in African states. I then provide a brief overview of the major theoretical perspectives linking political competition to state capacity, emphasizing the mediating role
of patronage in this relationship. I outline the principal argument(s) of the dissertation
and their implications in Section 4, followed by a discussion of the empirical strategy
in Section 5. The chapter concludes with a roadmap of the dissertation.

1.1

Capacity in Africa’s Neopatrimonial States

Capable and effective state institutions are relevant, and often central, to theories of
economic development, democratization, and political stability. Research on African
politics is particularly rife with concerns about state capacity, as researchers frequently
5

invoke weak state institutions as pre-eminent causes of low levels of development
(Englebert, 2000; Kohli, 2004; van de Walle, 2001), questionable progress in democratic
reform (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997), and the frequency of civil conflict (Bates, 2008;
Fearon, 2003; Reno, 1999). Understanding the nature and origins of states’ capacities is
therefore essential to broader theorizing about the role of the African state in economic,
political, and social change.
Like Skocpol (1985), I define the state as the set of compulsory administrative, legal,
extractive and coercive organizations in a given territory.8 These organizations are
what Fukuyama (2013) calls “power-deploying” institutions, a category he suggests
ought to be differentiated from institutions that are designed to constrain power.9 It
follows, then, that the capacity of the state reflects the extent to which these institutions
are able to effectively achieve official goals (Sikkink, 1991).
Although contemporary states serve many functions, their potential roles as facilitators (or impediments to) development are particularly salient in African societies. Both
citizens and observers tend to view African states in terms of their developmental successes or failures, a pattern that reflects not only the statist approaches to development
pursued by many of Africa’s post-independence leaders, but also the widespread view
that economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s resulted from states’ mismanagement of
their economies (Bates, 1981; Chabal and Daloz., 1999; Médard, 1990; Sandbrook, 1986).
As Mkandawire observes, “the state, once the cornerstone of development, has become
the millstone around otherwise efficient markets” (2001: 293). Given the primacy of
development in the study of African states, I limit the focus to those institutions most
directly responsible for the coordination and implementation of development programs, broadly defined. This includes, principally, coordinating bodies such as the
8
This definition is, arguably, more concrete than that of Weber, which emphasizes the coercive means
by which states exercise their power over society, which they do by claiming “the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1948: 78).
9
Fukuyama actually defines these institutions more narrowly than Skocpol as “the executive branches
and their bureaucracies” (Fukuyama, 2013: 347).
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Presidency, cabinets and national planning offices; central management agencies including those that administer public finance and personnel administration, as well as
sector ministries and their branch offices tasked with the implementation of development programs.10 Although this approach necessarily excludes some important state
functions that are likely to affect prospects for development, such as maintaining order
or raising revenue, it permits a more focused assessment of how and why some states
pursue developmental goals more successfully than others.
Much of the literature on African states has sought to describe and explain their inability to effectively govern society, especially when compared to states in other regions
of the world. For example, some works have argued that African countries are simply
more difficult to govern than those of other places in the world. For example, low
population density and geographically challenging terrain (Alesina et al., 2011; Herbst,
2000) make it difficult for central states to reach and exercise control over their territories. A second variation of this argument suggests that African societies are unusually
“strong” (Migdal, 1988) compared to their weakly institutionalized state structures,
thereby forcing rulers to seek legitimacy through the clientelistic distribution of goods
and services (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz., 1999). Another body
of work emphasizes the “incomplete” or exploitative nature of colonialism in Africa
and its effects on institutional development(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Ake, 2001), local
economic and political structures(Lemarchand, 1972; Mamdani, 1996) as well as educational systems (Kohli, 2004). According to these perspectives, the colonial project in
Africa was particularly destructive in the way it left countries and state offices bereft of
any legitimacy, thereby forcing post-Independence leaders to use patronage to establish
their legitimacy (Englebert, 2000; Médard, 1990). Still another strand focuses on the
patterns of state-society relations resulting from particular economic circumstances,
10
This focus, while certainly broad, excludes both coercive and legal institutions. For practical purposes, I also limit the inquiry to the central government apparatus, though at times questions or data
about local government are difficult to filter out.

7

such as the prominence of resource-based economies, economic extroversion (Bayart,
1993), high levels of inequality, the enduring effects of the slave trade(Robinson, 2002)
or large amounts of foreign assistance (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; van de Walle, 2001).
Finally, some influential works have emphasized the timing of state formation in Africa
vis-á-vis the existence of strong norms of sovereignty and an international environment
that allows weak states to survive (Clapham, 1996; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986).
Underlying many, if not all, of these perspectives is a common view that the
persistent weakness of African states is a function of their patrimonial foundations.
Patrimonial states, according to Weber’s (1978), are rooted in traditional authority
and combine the personalization of power and the interchangeability of political and
economic resources. Neopatrimonialism combines powerful personal rulers exercising
control through patron-client relationships with modern state structures (Jackson and
Rosberg, 1982; Médard, 1991; Sandbrook, 1986).11 The personalized nature of power
in neopatrimonial states means that, despite the existence of formal bureaucratic structures and political differentiation, there is little distinction between the public and private spheres, and that rulers’ power rests in part on their ability to distribute resources,
broadly defined, to clientele.12
Describing a “negative synergy” between capacity and neopatrimonialism, van de
Walle writes that
low state capacity has facilitated various rent-seeking and corrupt practices.
Corruption is easier to sustain when tax inspectors have not been paid in
several months, the ministry archives have not been maintained, various
statistics are poorly kept, and the government lacks trained auditors. In
turn, state agents who wish to undertake these practices have a clear interest in weakening the state’s administrative capacities. The absence of
transparency, public information, or economic data is often designed to
11

For an earlier articulation of the concept of neopatrimonialism, see Eisenstadt (1973), and for a
description of neopatrimonialism in democratic contexts, see Bratton and van de Walle (1997).
12
Resources need not be tangible. As Scott (1972) and Lemarchand (1972) explain, clientele may pledge
support to the ruler for the perceived prestige that comes with the association.

8

protect abuses by state elites, and in turn serves to diminish the ability of
state agents to enforce rational-legal norms. Leaders might in theory prefer
a higher degree of state capacity, but in practice they choose not to invest in
it. (2001: 135)
In short, the persistence of patrimonial power in African state institutions undermines
their capacity for development by corroding bureaucratic rationality (Sandbrook, 1986),
facilitating rent-seeking and corrupt practices (Clapham, 1982), at times threatening
national integration (Lemarchand, 1972) or, in extreme cases, empowering warlords
capable of undermining the state’s coercive power (Reno, 1999).
As useful as the neopatrimonial perspective is for understanding how African states
differ from those of other regions, it also tends to cloud our ability to understand variation in state capacity within Africa, both over time and across countries. “To be sure,”
Van de Walle writes “state capacity varies enormously across the states in the region
and the different tasks of government...Along with egregious abuses and incompetence,
there have also been examples of excellence in the public and parastatal administration
in most countries of the region” (van de Walle, 2001: 132-3). But, by and large, this variation has gone unrecognized in literature on African states.13 As Mkandawire (2001)
notes, the literature tends to make an “invidious comparison between African states
in crisis and idealised and tendentiously characterised states elsewhere” (2001: 290),
ignoring that “some African states clearly exhibit greater weakness than others, even
though they all share common underlying factors such as dependence on the global
system or a similar colonial legacy” (1988: 4). In studying the origins of the relative effectiveness of Côte d’Ivoire’s state institutions, for example, Crook (1989) notes that this
question cannot easily be tackled if the “neopatrimonial model is accepted uncritically.”
(1989: 206).14
13

For exceptions, see Crook (1989); Leonard (1991). Also, Levy and Kpundeh (2004) document variation in the success of capacity-building reform programs.
14
Instead Crook notes that the Ivorian state’s success in promoting agricultural development was a
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Attention to the patrimonial foundations of African states became especially prominent as the destabilizing effects of economic downturns in the 1970s and 1980s became
readily apparent. While new African states in the period directly following independence (1960s) were frequently able to expand government, offer university graduates
civil service jobs, and make good on promises to provide goods and services to their
populations (Barkan, 1975; Mkandawire, 2001; van de Walle, 2001), declining commodity prices in the 1980s combined with growth-impeding policies caused public revenues
and salaries to drop drastically. These trends effectively heightened competition for patronage resources, which drove away the more educated public servants, and loosened
politicians’ control of the bureaucracy (Bates, 2008; Chabal and Daloz., 1999; Grindle,
1996; van de Walle, 2001). As Bräutigam writes, “brain drain, wage erosion, indiscipline, low morale and lack of accountability” were all growing problems (Brautigam,
1996: 81). Describing the gutting of the state in then-Zaire, Young (1984) notes that
“the pathology of decay is expressed in three processes: shrinkage in the competence,
credibility, and probity of the state.15
In addition to the damaging effects of international economic crises, the destabilization of African states in the1970s and 1980s is often associated with the increasingly
autocratic political regimes of the period. The shrinking political arena of one-party
or no-party regimes that materialized during this period meant that chief executives
took greater control of the agencies that managed state revenues. By many accounts,
they used this control to benefit a relatively small pool of elite politicians. Political
exigencies, according to Bates (2008), led to rapid declines in public sector revenues,
which further weakened state institutions, as state agents’ began to work fewer hours
product of the emergence of ‘agency ideologies’ within the context of a neopatrimonial institutional
environment.
15
Van de Walle makes a similar observation, writing that “there is much evidence that the capacity
of African governments to design, implement, monitor and evaluate policy actually declined between
the early independence era and the 1990s, despite this dramatic change in skills available to governments...‘Almost every African country has witnessed systematic regression of capacity in the last thirty
years; the majority had better capacity at independence than they now possess”’ (van de Walle, 2001: 130).
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in public office while taking up jobs outside the public service (Kpundeh, 1995). In the
absence of democratic constraints, as Bates (2008) explains, poorly reimbursed public
servants became more predatory (Bates, 2008: 104-5) while patronage-based machines
that developed in many countries in the more prosperous period directly following
independence, gave way to a “kind of free-for-all system in which local officials, military men and security spooks are given a blank check to use their prerogatives (and
weapons) as they deem fit”(Lemarchand, 1988: 155). Both the exigencies of the ruling
class and the deteriorating economic system became the targets of popular rebellions
and military defections, further compromising the state’s ability to maintain control.
With the decline in state institutions widely seen as resulting, at least in part, from
years of authoritarian rule, it is not surprising that political liberalization brought with
it hopes that democratic states would and could act as more effective agents of development. But although state building projects have resumed in many democratic
African countries, many of these efforts remain, in Gyimah-Boadi’s words, “highly
incomplete” (2004: 14), raising questions about the effects of political liberalization on
the state. While some studies suggest that democracy is leading to improved developmental governance (Alence, 2004) and increased capacity to deliver national social
programs (Carbone, 2012), many other studies argue that state institutions in African
democracies have largely retained the deficiencies that developed under authoritarian rule (van de Walle, 2007). Figure 1.4 charts trends in state capacity amongst the
countries that Diamond (2010) identifies as liberal or emerging democracies, showing
no clear pattern among this group of countries following the transitional period of
the 1990s.16 The next section delves more deeply into the the theorized links between
democratization and state capacity.
16
The measure used in Figure 1.4, developed by Hanson and Sigman (2013), is the only measure
that has consistent coverage for all African countries from 1960 through 2010. Further discussion of
quantitative measures appears below.
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State Capacity (Hanson and Sigman)

Figure 1.2: State Capacity in African Democracies 1984-2008
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Democracy, Patronage and State Capacity

Questions about the relationship between political regimes and the state have long
puzzled scholars of comparative politics. Prior to the “Third Wave” of democratization
(Huntington, 1991), general theories predicted that competitive democracy would not
survive in the absence of strong state institutions (Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1968; Linz
and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell, 1993). State bureaucratic infrastructure, they argued,
was necessary to administer free and fair elections (Tilly, 2007) and to carry out the
redistributive promises made during democratic transitions (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006). To the surprise of many, however, a number of African democracies with
relatively weak state apparatuses have shown considerable resilience in terms of the
regularity of elections (Lindberg, 2006) and the institutionalization of constitutional
rule (Bratton and Chang, 2006; Posner and Young, 2007).
Such resilience has caused some scholars to wonder whether political competition
12

might actually build more capable and development-oriented states. Indeed, some
studies have shown an empirical link between democratization and state building.
Recent research tends to describe this relationship as j-shaped, whereby levels of state
capacity decrease as countries move from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones,
but subsequently increase as levels of democracy rise even further (Bäck and Hadenius,
2008; Montinola and Jackman, 2002). This type of dynamic makes intuitive sense, since
the destabilization inherent in a regime transition is likely to have short-term adverse
impacts on state institutions. As seen in Figure 1.4, however, the rise and proliferation
of multi-party politics has led neither to uniform processes of state building nor to
the continued decline of state capacity. Why? The following discussion outlines
four existing explanations for varying effects of democracy on the capacity of state
institutions.

1.2.1

Historical Sequencing Explanations

Advanced most famously by Martin Shefter (1977; 1994), this argument focuses on
the sequencing of state consolidation and mass inclusion to understand why parties
employ patronage strategies as a mobilization tool. In its simplest form, the theory
suggests that patronage politics are likely to persist when mass inclusion precedes
the institutionalization of merit-based selection rules in the state’s administrative institutions. This particular sequence of events is likely to inhibit the development of
merit-based bureaucracies.17
Shefter’s thesis, like other theories of patronage, is potentially useful for under17

To my knowledge, Shefter himself does not draw the connection between patronage and capacity
more broadly. Seeing that the work of Rauch and Evans (2000), who find that state bureaucracies based
on rational-legal principles as defined by Weber perform better than those influenced by patrimonial
principles, is widely accepted in literature on state capacity, for example in works by Geddes (1994);
O’Dwyer (2006); Taylor (2011). To some extent, this dissertation questions whether or not this assumption
travels to Africa, where administrative institutions share both rational-legal and patrimonial attributes
(Ekeh, 1975; Hyden, 2013). For the purposes of this discussion, however, I accept the widely accepted
perspective that associates patrimonial bureaucracy with low capacity.
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standing why the persistence of patronage politics may be more common in African
democracies than in other parts of the world. Since the colonial experience in Africa
produced state structures that were both less institutionalized and less legitimate than
in most other parts of the world (Englebert, 2000; Kohli, 2004; Young, 1994), the lack
of institutionalization of merit-based systems is a likely explanation. However, even
if there were differences in colonial state-building projects, for example between the
French systems of direct rule and the British methods of indirect rule, the widespread
breakdown of meritocratic systems beginning in the 1960s with the ‘Africanization’ of
public services questions whether this perspective is usefully applied to understand
variation within Africa.18 Post-Independence leaders undertook aggressive “Africanization” programs that effectively dismantled merit-based systems of recruitment and,
eventually, eroded public confidence in the civil service.19 The Africanization programs
laid the groundwork for the fiscal crises that ensued in the 1970s and 1980s, further depleting the capacity of the state apparatus. By the time of political liberalization in the
1990s, many bureaucratic systems did not necessarily resemble their colonial structure,
evidence of which is widely available in country studies such as those by (Grindle,
1996) and Leonard (1991) on Kenya and by Price (1975) on Ghana. Additionally, some
African leaders continue to dismantle the merit-based systems that were once in place.
The relevant sequencing question for African countries, then, is not so much about the
timing of state consolidation and mass inclusion, but rather why some leaders have
more aggressively dismantled the merit-based systems that were once in place.
18
Moreover, as Mamdani (1996) and others have theorized, the varying forms of colonial rule had
similar effects, since colonial administrators presiding over territories had to empower local leaders in
order to rule effectively. Thus, in both direct and indirect systems, local leaders became empowered as
a result of colonial forms of government.
19
For an overview of Africanization programs, see Goldsmith (1999).
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1.2.2

Party System Explanations

Explanations based on the structure and intensity of party competition may help to
answer the question of why some leaders are more likely to interfere in merit-based
bureaucratic institutions. This perspective sees well-balanced or “robust” competition
as a necessary antidote to politicians’ impulses to distribute state jobs for their own
political or private benefit (Geddes, 1994). Where competition levels are high, one
side could derive an advantage from taking a reform-oriented anti-clientelistic stance,
though Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) suggest that a demand-side change, for example
in the economic wealth levels of voters, would also need to be present. A variation on
this argument is advanced by Grzymala-Busse (2007) in the context of post-communist
democracies, arguing that a real threat of being replaced provided the rationale for
party leaders to erect institutional barriers that effectively limited successive ruling
parties to exploit state resources for their political benefit.20 Although compelling, the
competition-based arguments are, as O’Dwyer (2006) notes, insufficient for explaining
why competition does not uniformly lead to lower levels of exploitation, specifically
party patronage. Well-institutionalized ruling parties, he argues, are under less pressure to undertake patronage-driven party building while well-institutionalized opposition parties are stronger monitors of the incumbent regime. The result, he finds, is
that patronage is much more constrained in the presence of well-institutionalized party
systems, in turn leading to more productive state building outcomes.
Whether or not these theories apply to African states, however, remains questionable. As discussed above, the legitimacy of African leaders depends on the provision
of patronage, and other goods and services. Kopecky (2011) finds, for example, that
despite their varying party systems, both South Africa and Ghana maintain generally
20

A similar argument forms part of Pitcher’s (2012) study of privatization reforms in Africa: that higher
levels of competition are important for constraining the ability of leaders to engage in rent-seeking or
otherwise manipulate the the privatization process for their own benefit.
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high levels of public sector patronage.21 Additionally, given high levels of poverty and
persistent demands for patronage, it is not entirely clear that party system arguments
would be sufficient to explain varying effects of multi-party politics on the developmental capacities of the state. Nonetheless, as recent research has affirmed, there is much
variation in Africa’s emerging party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; LeBas, 2011;
Lindberg, 2008; Riedl, 2014) and this hypothesis warrants serious attention.

1.2.3

Economic Explanations

Economic explanations come in several varieties. One of the most common perspectives suggests that higher levels of wealth amongst voters makes the costs of “buying”
votes too high for politicians (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012),
causing them to eschew patronage-based appeals in favor of more programmatic ones.
Larger-N cross national support for this type of logic is evident in work by Charron
and Lapuente (2010) who find that, contrary to Bäck and Hadenius (2008), democracy
only increases state capacity at higher levels of development. Thus, as long as societies
remain relatively poor, politicians will continue to use patronage as an electoral mobilization tool. The persistence of high levels of poverty and unemployment in many
African countries makes the continued exchange of patronage jobs an appealing option
for politicians looking for an electoral edge.
Applied to African countries, this argument encounters two problems. First, for the
most part, the economies of African countries were equally depleted at the outset of the
period under study and, yet, some have had more success than others in re-building
their state institutions. Second, as economies in Africa tend to be resource-dependent,
meaning that economic growth is more likely to benefit a small proportion of the
21
In his research, Ghana has higher levels of competition than South Africa, but also has higher levels
of competition. Arguably, both have relatively well-institutionalized party systems but the strategic
patterns of party interaction are more regular in Ghana, where the political landscape is dominated
by two main parties, as opposed to South Africa where the ANC is contested by a number of smaller
opposition parties.
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population, and, in the absence of an already strong state, unlikely to alleviate poverty
in any meaningful way. The persistence of poverty in the face of economic growth,
means that patronage-based electoral appeals would also persist.
Another variant of economic approaches focuses on the sources of government revenues. If a government raises large proportions of revenue from non-tax sources such
as international trade, natural resource rents or foreign aid, they will have less incentive
to develop the administrative institutions necessary to track and tax their populations
(Brautigam et al., 2008; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Chaudhry, 1997; Lieberman, 2002).
One study found only very scant support for this hypothesis in African countries
(Prichard and Leonard, 2010), however, suggesting that the extent to which improvements in tax collection lead to broader capacity gains may depend on the nature of tax
reforms themselves.

1.2.4

Electoral Institutions

Electoral institutions shape the structure of political competition (parties) and the composition of government, in turn creating dynamics that affect the ability of state institutions to achieve their goals. Pioneered by Lijphart (1977) this approach tends to
focus on the types of cleavages that emerge from electoral competition, and the effects
of these cleavages on the stability and productivity of governments. Although there is
no strong consensus about the capacity effects of any particular electoral system, a considerable proportion of the evidence suggests that majoritarian (or pluralistic) systems
of voting tend to produce more stable governments, because their party systems tend
to be more stable (Taylor and Herman, 1971), but that these effects may be more muted
in presidential systems (Mainwaring, 1993).
Any analysis based solely on formal institutions is likely to have limited applicability
in Africa. Despite a range of voting systems in contemporary Africa, party and coalition
dynamics vary widely in a way that does not map on to the theoretical expectations
17

developed in other contexts (Mozaffar et al., 2003). As van de Walle (2003), Manning
(2005) and Fomunyoh (2001) have noted, the political landscapes in many African
countries contain a dominant party surrounded by many small opposition parties,
irregardless of the formal electoral institutions in place.22 Additionally, given the
controlled nature of democratic transitions in many African countries, the selection of
electoral institutions is likely to be endogenous to longstanding political configurations.

Summary
Two key points stand out from this overview of theories connecting multi-party politics to state capacity. First, attention to the question of when and why multi-party
politics leads to stronger states focuses, to a large extent, on the mediating role of
patronage-based electoral mobilization. In general, these perspectives suggest that
where patronage-based linkages between politicians and voters remain strong, capacity is likely to suffer. This perspective fits neatly within the neopatrimonial approach
that sees the persistence of patronage and weak states as part and parcel of the same
phenomenon. But these perspectives are generally limited in their ability to explain
variation in state capacity, where patronage systems are the norm. In essence, they ignore evidence that capacity can vary in the presence of neopatrimonialism despite many
studies suggesting this possibility(Crook, 1989; Grindle, 1996; Grindle and Hilderbrand,
1995; Mkandawire, 2001). Under certain circumstances, political patronage may even
serve as a force for national unification (Lemarchand, 1972) or the maintenance of
professional values (Crook, 1989).
Second, these patronage-centric theories focus, to a large extent, on the distribution
of jobs in exchange for votes. The role of money, though central to earlier theorizing
about the formation and maintenance of patronage networks, remains largely outside
22
More recent work has documented a wider variety of party configurations but, as I show in Chapter
6, they still do not correlate with whether or not electoral institutions are majoritarian/pluralistic or
proportional representation.
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the purview of this literature. Where competition is high and jobs are limited, additional resources are required to sustain clientelistic linkages. In addition to offering
jobs, politicians must publicly distribute money, food, other goods to signal that their
(re)distributive intentions, because that is what voters will expect from them once in
office (Nugent, 2007). As such, patronage practices are likely to depend not only on
calculations about buying votes or attracting particular voting blocs to the party, but
also on the need to obtain and distribute party resources, many of which are controlled
by the state. How parties, especially ruling parties, access and manage resources,
moreover, is likely to impact the workings of the state’s executive apparatus.

1.3

Argument: The Role of Party Financing

The dissertation develops a party-financing based theory of the relationship between
multi-party political competition, patronage and state capacity. I start from the premise
that it is necessary to distinguish patronage from other forms of clientelistic exchange.
Unlike the provision of money, schools, hospitals, electricity or roads, patronage jobs
often come with the potential for ongoing access to state resources, especially in contexts of weakly institutionalized administrative laws. Whereas most of the theories of
patronage presented above emphasize its importance as a vote-buying strategy, I argue
that leaders also use patronage to control the use of state resources for party financing
purposes. Varying modes of party financing lead to divergent patronage practices, not
necessarily in terms of how much patronage, but in terms of which jobs are distributed
and to whom. The second part of the dissertation argues that elite-level patronage facilitates the state’s pursuit of developmental goals by producing more stable and cohesive
governments capable of more effectively defining and communicating their developmental programs as well as sustaining commitment to the implementation of those
programs. By contrast, higher levels of party patronage in public service recruitment
further undermines the ability to effectively implement development programs.
19

In most African countries parties, especially incumbent parties, depend principally
on state resources for sustenance. In competitive contexts, however, leaders may be
constrained in their ability to access funds for their parties due to fear of retribution
once out of power, thus forcing them to access state money in more diffuse ways.
How exactly incumbents make this happen, however, depends on where money is
available and who can be trusted to handle it in the party’s interests. Whether parties
raise funds by awarding contracts to businesses in exchange for financial support for
the party, or by accessing money from rent-seeking bureaucrats, affects the types of
patronage strategies that leaders employ once in office. Though both fundraising
strategies depend on state resources, the former requires coordination of party elites
placed strategically in the executive apparatus, thereby leading to higher levels of party
patronage at the elite level. The latter fundraising strategy, driven by a relative dearth
of private sector organizations and a highly fluid party landscape, shapes leaders’
decisions to eschew elite-level patronage and provide public service jobs directly to
supportive voting blocs, the most loyal of whom are placed in state ministries where
resources or rent-seeking opportunities are particularly abundant. As alluded to above,
these modes of party financing are themselves shaped by the size of the formal private
sector and the strength of party organizations, both of which vary considerably across
African democracies.
The second part of the dissertation examines the implications of these varying
patronage practices, and the party financing dynamics that give rise to them, on the
broader capacities of the state. How does the tendency toward elite patronage affect the
state’s executive capacity? Likewise, how exactly does widespread patronage-based
hiring of public servants affect the professionalism and performance of public organizations? To answer these questions, the dissertation goes beyond theories that equate
patronage with weak state capacity, considering instead how state capacity varies in
neopatrimonial contexts. I argue that the prevalence of patronage at the elite level,
20

as seen in Ghana, produces more stability and cohesion at the apex of government,
providing the consistency and coordination necessary to garner stronger executive
commitment to a set of more clearly defined developmental goals. This higher level of
executive capacity is essential to sustain the development and implementation of national programs over time, and even aids governments in making good on clientelistic
promises of distribution. Benin’s cabinets, in contrast, are dominated by a mixture of
personal loyalists, co-opted opponents and technocrats with little political experience.
This latter composition translates into high levels of information asymmetry that, in
turn, produce less stable and cohesive executive institutions: a governing environment
that makes the pursuit of developmental policies more challenging.
Patronage practices in Benin, concentrated more frequently at the public service
level, further compound problems of effective policy implementation by, among other
things, debilitating professional cultures in public organizations. High levels of public
service patronage heighten organizational problems including technical deficiencies
amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance of state resources for political use
and bureaucratic paralysis from fear of political retribution. In this environment, even
if the executive leadership was able to strongly commit to a particular developmental
vision, it is unlikely that public agencies could effectively implement programs to
achieve that vision.
In effect, the analysis identifies two equilibria that result from varying interactions of
economic structure and party organizations. The two paths are presented in Table 1.1.
The party financing logics produced by these interactions shape the patronage strategies
employed by political leaders which, in turn, further reinforce the varying trajectories of
the private sector and party systems. As these dynamics become increasingly engrained
in competitive political landscapes, so too do varying patterns of political-bureaucratic
relationships that affect the trajectories of state institutions.
The party finance approach developed in the dissertation has both theoretical and
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Table 1.1: Argument Summary
Ghana
Party Finance Contracts

Benin
Bureaucrats

Patronage

Elite

Public Service

Capacity

Higher

Lower

empirical implications. First, the arguments challenge the idea that patronage practices
are uniformly detrimental to states’ capacity for development. As I show in the case of
Ghana, party patronage at the elite level can strengthen the capacity of the executive,
and reduce incentives for political interference in the civil service. Second, the research
reminds us of the importance of studying intra-party dynamics to understand governing outcomes. While much of the literature and practice in the fields of democracy
and governance focus on competition as a means of improving both the quality and
effectiveness of governing institutions, the study shows that internal party logics are
also likely to shape the behavior of the ruling party and the ways in which they harness
the power of the state to achieve their goals.

1.4

Empirical Strategy

I develop and test the party finance explanation by combining structured case comparison with medium-N cross-national analysis. The case work itself combines both
comparative and within-case methods by analyzing decisions of key actors in contexts
characterized by similarly high levels of political competition but varying conditions
of economic structure and party organization. These contrasting conditions form the
departure point to investigate decisions made primarily by elite actors at three points
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in the hypothesized causal chain: how to obtain party funds, how to employ patronage and whether or not to pursue development programs. I also examine the broader
unintended consequences of these decisions that further contribute to divergent capacity outcomes. The analysis focuses principally on the period beginning with the
first multi-party elections of the current democratic era, which were held in the early
1990s, and continues through present day. Although the circumstances and processes
under investigation are surely rooted more deeply in the historical experiences of the
two countries, something I discuss at more length in Chapter 6, the transitional period
of the early 1990s provides a particularly useful starting point since the immediately
preceding crises generated economic and political conditions that were similar across
most African countries.

1.4.1

Cases: Benin and Ghana

To explain variation in both patronage patterns and state capacity, the dissertation
compares Benin and Ghana, two of Africa’s most competitive democracies. The cases
represent “most similar” cases, with convergence on important background conditions
but divergence on the independent variables of interest: modes of party financing.23
Both countries were amongst Africa’s first to transition to multi-party politics in the
early 1990s, their electoral cycles since this time have gone uninterrupted by either
extra-constitutional transfers of power or major episodes of violence, they have both
experienced two peaceful inter-party transfers of power, and their elections have been
characterized by high levels of political competition. A summary of key attributes of
23

The two countries were initially selected based on variation in party system institutionalization
- reflecting this project’s original goal of examining the relationship between party systems and state
capacity. In so doing, the importance of economic structure and party financing became more apparent
and the project evolved to investigate the effects of party financing on the state’s executive institutions.
It’s probably also worth noting that at the time of case selection, I was not aware of the variation in
patronage patterns that became apparent as a result of my field work. Subsequently, interviews pointed
me towards greater attention to variation in economic structure, modes of party financing, as well as the
mediating effects of patronage on bureaucratic institutions.
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the two countries is provided in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2: Case Descriptions

# of Elections (since 1991)
Turnovers (since 1991)
Turnover Years
Competition
Eff. Number of Parties (2000)
Party Organization
Priv. Investment/GDP (1996-2008)
1990 GDP per capita (constant USD)
Electoral Institutions
Colonial History
Population (2010)
Land Area
Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina et al)
Pol. Relevant Ethnic Groups (Posner, 2004)

Benin
4
2
1996, 2006
High
10.4
Weak
12%
$598
MMD/PR
Fench
10.32 mil.
112,760 sq. km
.79
.3

Ghana
5
2
2000, 2008
High
2.6
Strong
16%
$775
SMD/FPTP
British
25.9 mil.
238,535 sq. km
.61
.44

As I describe at greater length in Chapter 2, parties in the two countries employ
different modes of party financing because of constraints generated by the size of the
formal private sector and the strength of party organizations. Benin’s party system is
amongst the least institutionalized in Africa. Party organizations tend to form around
candidates in advance of an election and there is little investment in the party organization itself. Instead, elites bargain to attract support from other elites, garnering
enough resources and followers to be able to bargain with more powerful actors. Both
before and after elections, candidates shift coalitions and alliances, further changing
the party landscape. Parties generally have offices in the capital and in the cities in
which they originate, but most parties have minimal presence throughout the country
in election cycles, and none at all in-between elections. The number of parties competing in both legislative and presidential elections grew two-fold between 1991 and
24

2006, from thirteen to twenty-six, and over 100 parties are said to compete in legislative elections. Additionally, data on parliamentary elections compiled by (Lindberg,
2008: 235) provides evidence that parties contesting legislative elections in Benin have
trouble winning additional seats after the initial successes of their candidates, lending
further evidence to the volatility of the party landscape.
The situation is much different in Ghana where two major parties - the National
Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - have consolidated
power over the course of the six elections. Their voting bases are well established,
enabling them to effectively strategize for national elections. Their organizations are
also well-established, internally democratic, bound by party constitutions and present
throughout the country. Party organizations in Ghana extend down to polling place
(i.e. precinct) level, across legislative districts and regions. Both parties have withstood
major primary battles that produced serious divisions among party factions.
Economic structures also vary considerably across the two countries. First, Ghana’s
economy is more diverse with a long history of trade in both cash crops and mineral
resources including, among other things, cocoa and gold. While the state exercises
some control over these resources, leaders associated with the traditional Ashanti
Kingdom have managed to maintain a large stake in these industries, generating an
important business interest that is not dependent on the state. Benin’s economy is
dominated by the less-lucrative cotton sector, while the port of Cotonou provides an
important secondary source of economic activity, especially for transporters carrying
goods to Nigeria, Niger and its other neighbors. Both the port and the cotton sector
have remained firmly under the control of the state for most of the post-colonial period,
while the transport industry also maintains a high degree of informality.
Though both countries in the period immediately preceding their democratic transitions were under the control of military leaders with Marxist-Leninist leanings, Ghana’s
ruling regime in the 1980s more speedily abandoned these principles to adopt IMF-led
25

structural adjustment reforms, a decision that according to Arriola (2012) freed capital
from the grips of the state and enabled the development of effective oppositions coalitions. The reforms further enhanced the position of the business community relative
to the state, a tradeoff that J.J. Rawlings saw as necessary to escape economic crisis
and avert threats to overthrow his regime (Herbst, 1993). The decision to liberalize
the economy arguably helped Rawlings to maintain power in the midst of a growing
wave of protests and regime breakdowns in Africa in the early 1990s. Rawlings, largely
by his own volition, called for the development of a new constitution and multi-party
elections in 1992, from which Rawlings emerged victorious.
In Benin, by contrast, Kerekou in the 1980s resisted abandoning his Marxist-Leninist
leanings. By many accounts, this resistance led to fiscal and banking crises so severe
that the groundswell of protest caused him little choice but to organize a National
Conference in 1990 to decide the future of the country.24 During the National Conference, Kerekou sought to curtail efforts to allow multi-party political competition, but
eventually capitulated. He lost the 1991 elections, but was re-elected as President in
both 1996 and 2001.
It is, of course, impossible to control for all potential confounding variables. Of particular concern are Benin and Ghana’s varied electoral institutions and colonial histories. It is possible, for example, to argue that Ghana’s first-past-the-post single-member
district electoral system constitutes an important part of the reason why Ghana’s two
main parties have become increasingly strong and well-organized since 1992, thereby
enabling them to pursue the specific party financing strategies described in the next
chapter. Likewise, colonial institutions or post-colonial influences may explain legacies of administrative structure or economic management. I address these questions
in two ways: first by zeroing in on the processes and circumstances surrounding actor
choices within each case, and also by assessing their effects in the medium-N statistical
24

For detailed accounts of the transition in Benin, see Adamon (1995), Banégas (2003) and Seely (2009).
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analysis.

1.4.2

State Capacity in Benin and Ghana

Although Benin and Ghana are two of Africa’s most celebrated examples of democratic
success, there is growing divergence in the capacity of their state institutions to act as
effective agents of development. In this section I provide an overview of the quantitative
and qualitative evidence of this divergence, focusing on the state’s ability to both
formulate and implement development goals.
As discussed earlier, the overarching concept of state capacity reflects the ability
of the state’s executive apparatus to effectively achieve official goals. One of the most
widely used measures of this general concept is the World Governance Indicators’
(WGI) measures of Government Effectiveness (GE) developed by Kaufmann et al.
(2009). This indicator aggregates data from a wide variety of sources that capture
“perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such
policies.” The underlying data are gathered from mostly subjective sources such as
expert assessments and citizen surveys. Time series for Benin and Ghana of the GE
measure are shown in Figure 1.3.25
Given some limitations of the GE measure, such as reliance on subjective data and
the lack of coverage prior to 1996, I also present the time trends of state capacity for
the two countries using a state capacity measure developed by Hanson and Sigman
(March 21, 2013).26 This measure, called simply Capacity, is derived from a Bayesian
25
The GE scale ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 normalized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
1. Because the annual scores are set against a fixed mean, comparisons over time reflect relative
changes rather than absolute changes. Given that GE scores tend not to experience extreme year-toyear fluctuations, the time series data can nonetheless reliably give some indication of the trajectory of
government effectiveness.
26
Another measure that is similar to the GE measure is the ICRG’s measure of Bureaucratic Quality.
Unfortunately the ICRG data do not cover Benin, or a number of other African countries.
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latent variable analysis of 24 indicators that include both objective data, such as tax
revenues, and subjective data, such as those used to construct the GE measure. The GE
measure itself is not used as a component indicator of Capacity, but the two measures
correlate at .86. One major advantage of this indicator is that it generates estimates in
such a way that allows for consistent coverage from 1960 through 2010.27
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the movement of these two indicators over time for Benin
and Ghana beginning in the 1980s. Similarity in the trends across the two measures
are evident. Both indicators show somewhat similar trends until the early 2000s when
scores between the two countries start to diverge. While the aggregate nature of the
indicators makes it difficult to know precisely what drives the post-2000 divergence,
the Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s (BTI) 2006 country report for Benin provides
some clues in describing the Beninese government’s steering capability as follows:
“compared to the more recent past, the current political leadership seems less able
to prioritize and organize its policies according to strategic aims beyond immediate
concerns of political competition.” Regarding Ghana’s rising scores after the mid2000s, I describe in the next section that some major national development programs
materialized during that time.
Variation in Benin and Ghana’s state capacity is also evident by examining the
extent to which the two countries have successfully formulated and implemented
development agendas. While Ghana has experienced at least moderate success in
implementing and sustaining social and economic reform programs, Benin’s reform
agenda has largely stalled in the democratic era. These divergent paths are evident
in brief comparisons of both the planning and implementation experiences of each
27
There are also, however, some problems with Capacity’s time series. First, with so few data sources
available for Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, I suspect that the model’s use of missing data as a predictor
of low state capacity systematically under-estimates capacity scores for Africa in these decades. For
this reason, I do not include those years in Figure 1.4. Second, due to the model’s sensitivity to the
inclusion of different indicators in different years (for example, the ICRG data begin in 1982 and so we
see larger-than-average changes in those years), I use a three-year moving average Capacity to smooth
the year-to-year variation.
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Figure 1.3: Government Effectiveness 1996-2010 (WGI)
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Figure 1.4: State Capacity 1986-2009 (Hanson and Sigman)
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Planning
One indication of capacity differences is simply the existence of a development agenda.
Whereas, in Ghana, party manifestos have come to occupy an important place in
the development agenda there are few effective planning mechanisms, political or
otherwise, in Benin. In Ghana, for example, Gyimah-Boadi (2001) notes that Rawlings
once drew blood from his finger to autograph a copy of the NDC’s manifesto for auction,
perhaps an indication of the seriousness with which politicians treat these documents.
Likewise, Kennedy (2009) explains that in the lead-up to the 2008 election, the NPP
put a considerably large amount of planning and coordination into the development of
the party manifesto. Although it is common to hear complaints that manifestos fail to
articulate coherent national visions for economic growth or human development, the
fact that the parties put much effort into their development has consequences for the
government’s efforts to adhere to that agenda once in office.28
The process of translating party manifestos into a governing agenda is relatively
well institutionalized in Ghana. According to Article 36, clause 5 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution requires the President,“within two years after assuming office, the president
shall present to parliament a coordinated programme of economic and social development policies, including agricultural and industrial programmes at all levels and in
all the religions of Ghana” (Government of Ghana, 1992). The party manifestos provide a basis for these plans, for example in the NDC’s Ghana Vision 2020 (1996-2000)
and now their Better Ghana Agenda. Although issues of commitment, sustainability
and implementation are widely observed,29 they often serve as a benchmark to assess progress. As Ayee observes,“when parties are in government...manifestos take a
28

For example, one think tank employee I interviewed described the manifesto as a “quilt” where
everybody’s parts are stitched together with no overarching theme.
29
For an excellent overview of these issues, see Okereke and Agupusi (2015).
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prominent place in the scheme of things...They have become a useful place to catalogue
the nation’s priorities.”(2011: 372-3)
By contrast, both political parties and incumbent governments in Benin struggle to
articulate policy visions, for example in terms of economic growth strategies, poverty
reduction plans or the development and even in the disitribution of goods and services.
There are two main planning mechanisms in place. First, there are the Etats Generaux national conferences that convene in an ad hoc manner to make recommendations for
future programs on specific reform topics. Second, the government often participates
in the development of donor-led poverty reduction and economic growth strategies.
Although piecemeal progress is sometimes apparent on specific programs or targets,
neither of these mechanisms have a strong record of producing plans to which the Beninese government is meaningfully committed.30 The former tends to serve as a way to
appease and placate vocal social groups while the latter helps to attract foreign aid and
investment. As Keefer suggests, however, there is often a very vague understanding
of what, if anything, becomes of these plans, noting that “even [the announcement of
policies] is missing in Benin,” and what decisions Beninese governments have made.
The ten percentage point increase in primary school funding, for example, is relatively
unknown; the status of concessions in different areas where government is seeking
to encourage greater private sector participation is opaque; the government’s specific
legislative plans are unclear.(Keefer, 2010: 32).
The most notable plans that have existed in Benin are the Poverty Reduction Strategies developed by donors, notably the IMF. As Bierschenk et al. (2001) note, however,
the level of institutionalization of these plans in Benin is quite low. Regarding government’s adoption of these plans, they explain:
some are concerned about the government’s inability to implement a viable
strategy in the fight against poverty. This difficulty is, in effect, attributable
30

One exception, of course, is the 1990 National Conference that charted the course for political reform.
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to several factors, including inefficiency in the coordination and allocation
of work between different departments, poor management of human and
financial resources and weak motivation linked to low pay and the phenomenon of corruption within administration. (2001: 35).
Implementation
Once articulated, policies in Ghana are considerably more likely to be implemented in a
way that is consistent with their intended goals.31 High levels of political commitment
to reform are evident across a variety sectors in Ghana. The implementation of Ghana’s
National Health Insurance Program shortly after the NPP took office in 2001, for example, was pushed forward by Presdient Kufuor’s allies despite reservations from
technical advisers (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Amoako-Tuffour (2008) also point to
a number of successes in poverty reduction programs, including an overall higher
percent of spending on pro-poor sectors and the development of stronger processes to
integrate stakeholder into delivery processes (2008: 316-7)
Benin’s democratically-elected governments, in contrast, have struggled to make
meaningful progress implementing basic reform programs.

As Bierschenk notes,

poverty reduction programs have frequently run into issues of lacking political will,
weak mechanisms of financial management, lacking ability to coordinate across agencies and rejection of reform programs by ministry personnel, (Bierschenk et al., 2001).
Keefer (2010) agrees, noting a “policy gap” that exists between Benin and other democracies in Africa whereby Benin’s governments have been unable to pursue the policies
that many believe would improve basic social services, improve infrastructure for the
transport of commercial goods, or curtail major losses of government revenue from
ports and the cotton sector, instead pursuing policies that cater to a very narrow set
31
I refrain from saying that policies in Ghana are likely to be implemented effectively or efficiently,
since many studies have documented the ways that policy implementation ultimately falls short of
intended goals. Nonetheless, some clear differences exist in the extent to which policies and campaign
promises are executed in the two countries.
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of special interests, thus seriously impeding the government’s ability to meaningfully
support economic growth.
Though challenges to implementation are common in Ghana, and policy successes
are not completely absent in Benin, there is sufficient evidence to suggest substantial
variation in the developmental capacities of their state’s executive institutions.

1.4.3

Data

The case analysis of Benin and Ghana draws on three principal sources of data collected
during one year of field research, including 1) a comprehensive database containing
appointment and biographical information on all cabinet ministers from founding elections through 2013, 2) an original survey of over 500 civil servants in each country and
3) semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 political and state actors. These
data allow me to overcome many of the challenges that complicate research on patronage to construct a new theory of patronage-based recruitment patterns and examine
the impacts of these patronage patterns on the broader developmental capacities of the
state.
The minister database includes appointment and biographical data on all cabinet
ministers from 1991/1993 through 2013.32 Specific data include portfolio assignments,
dates and duration of appointment, reason for dismissal or resignation, ethnic origins,
educational background, professional background, and political history. I use these
data to assess the extent to which appointments are based on patronage, technocracy,
or the co-optation of opposition, as well as to explore variation in cabinet stability
and elite cohesion. The database was assembled using data from a variety of sources.
Much of the data was compiled from official government documents such as press
releases and biographies posted on government websites, communiqués from Presi32
The databases begin with appointments made following founding elections, held in March 1991
in Benin and December 1992 in Ghana. Since Ghana’s presidents are usually inaugurated in January
following the election, the appointments begin in the successive year.
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dents to the legislature, and reports of legislative committees reviewing Presidential
appointments.33 Where information was lacking from these sources, I used online and
print news stories covering appointments or profiling ministers. Finally, where neither government nor journalistic sources yielded the desired information, I consulted
historians, ministry personnel or political party officials familiar with appointees. The
dataset includes information on 260 ministerial appointments in Benin, and 254 in
Ghana.34 The specific indicators constructed from these data are described in much
more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, but they allow me to construct measures of patronage, as well as cabinet stability and cohesion. Unlike perception-based measures of
patronage, the use of objective minister data permit cross-national comparisons using
the same criteria that are not subject to variation in meanings of the term patronage.
My analysis also draws on a written survey of over 500 public servants in each
country. To administer the survey, I distributed questionnaires in MPA or similar training programs that enroll public sector employees at multiple sites in each country.35
Though not a representative sample, the survey captures a diversity of public servants
across different agencies and experience levels and was conducted in a context where
public employees regularly discuss openly the challenges they face in their organizations. Additionally, the classroom setting ensured that public sector workers were
completing the surveys in an environment in which their supervisors were not present,
thereby encouraging free and honest responses. Given the limitations of the sampling
33

This included reports of the Appointments Committee in Ghana’s Parliament. Additionally, Ghana’s
parliament had copies of CVs submitted by the nominees for approximately 130 appointees from the
Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. In Benin, an initial list of Ministers was created from Pierre
Metinhoue’s (2005) book on the governments of Dahomey and Benin.
34
This is the number of appointments, not the number of individual ministers. The data are analyzed
at the appointment level unless otherwise specified. To my knowledge, these are all of the ministerial
appointments since the first elected governments of the current democratic era. In Ghana, I exclude
regional ministers and deputy ministers because they are commonly viewed as “junior ministers” who
do not usually exert significant influence on the direction of policy. Limiting the sample in this way also
ensures that I am comparing like units of analysis.
35
In Benin, the survey was conducted in Cotonou, Abomey-Calavi and Parakou. In Ghana, the survey
was conducted in Accra, Kumasi, Navrongo and Wa.
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design, I use the survey simply to detect convergence and divergence between the two
countries, rather than for any individual- or group-level analyses. The survey included
19 questions about subjects’ personal experiences in the organization, perceptions of
the strengths and weaknesses of the subjects’ organizations and various types of political influence on the organization. The survey was designed in English with the
assistance of Ghanaian academics and civil servants and translated into French with
the assistance of bilingual Beninese academics and civil servants. Pilot versions of the
survey were tested on approximately 25 students in both countries before finalizing
the questionnaire. The English version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix
A. Appendix B provides demographic data on the survey respondents in each country.
Interviews with political and state actors provide crucial insight into patterns of
decision-making at various points in the causal chain. Respondents include current and
former ministers and presidential staff, political party officials, high-level bureaucrats
and academic and think tank experts. I used snowball sampling with multiple entry
points across incumbent, opposition and swing populations to ensure that the interviews will capture diverse perspectives. Interviews are semi-structured with questions
probing the logic behind appointment decisions, party pressures and expectations, the
inner workings of the cabinet and management of the civil service. Some, but not all,
interviews were recorded. My decision to record or not was based on language, the
level of formality of the meeting and the topics I planned to discuss. Given the sensitive
nature of some interview content, interview respondents are kept anonymous, using
only vague titles to describe the person’s background. Where possible, I supplement
interview data with existing case work. This strategy helps to provide confidence in the
data and observations gleaned from interviews. I completed 39 interviews in Ghana
and 22 in Benin.
For each component of the argument, I piece together the quantitative and qualitative data in a way that aims to shed light on key differences between the two countries
35

while also providing insight into the causal processes within each case. That said, the
political behavior I study is not always easily observable. Parties in Benin and Ghana
do not regularly or reliably report their financing sources. Ministerial appointments
are announced publicly, but are rarely accompanied by any rationale for the appointment decision. Codified recruitment rules for public service positions certainly exist,
but deviations from these rules occur regularly with a wide range of speculation about
who benefits and who loses. Interviews often generated opposing responses about particular phenomena, for examples perceptions about the rationale behind appointment
decisions. To some extent, the systems and processes I study endure precisely because
reliable information is limited. These challenges mean that the empirical work does
not always yield direct observation of the theorized behavior, forcing instead the use
of proxies or leaving holes in the empirical support for the argument.

1.5

Roadmap

Each of the following four chapters develops a key component of the overall argument
relating party financing practices to state capacity. Because each chapter analyzes a
distinct outcome, I include the theoretical and empirical background that is relevant
to each outcome in the respective chapters. The conclusion returns to the overall
argument, offering a preliminary test of its wider applicability and discussing the
implications for theories linking democracy to state capacity, and for the trajectories of
African state institutions more generally.
Chapter 2 describes and analyzes varying modes of party financing. Though parties raise funds from multiple sources in both countries, I show that the exchange of
government contracts for party financing support is particularly prominent in Ghana,
while Benin’s ruling party relies more on well-positioned bureaucrats to access state
revenues or rents that can be used for political functions. The Chapter traces these
varying modes of party financing to variation in both the size of the formal private
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sector and the strength of party organizations.
In Chapter 3 I explain how the varying modes of party financing lead to divergent
patronage practices. The exchange of government contracts for financial support requires politically loyal individuals in higher-level positions. Efforts by Ministers and
Deputy Ministers, in particular, to control procurement processes provide particularly
illuminating evidence of this connection in Ghana. The chapter also explains that in
Benin, the president has fewer elite-level allies that can be trusted to manage state resources in line with his goals. Instead, presidents can more easily and reliably depend
on lower-level political allies in key bureaucratic agencies to garner resources for the
ruling party.
Chapter 4 examines the ways that party financing practices, and the patronage
patterns they produce, affect the broader capacity of the state. I analyze the effects
of elite-level patronage practices on stability and cohesion at the apex of government
and show that elite-level patronage reduces information asymmetry in Ghana, thereby
producing relatively stable and cohesive cabinets. This stability and cohesion enables
executive leaders to sustain commitment to development programs even in the face of
thorny implementation challenges.
In Chapter 5, I show how these patterns of party financing, patronage and executive
dynamics trickle down to affect the day-to-day workings of bureaucratic organizations.
Survey results reveal that Benin’s public sector organizations suffer more than Ghana’s
in terms of technical deficiencies amongst public personnel, the frequent disappearance
of state resources for political use and bureaucratic paralysis from fear of political
retribution. In this environment, the delivery of public goods and services is much
more tenuous than in Ghana’s relatively professional organizations.
The conclusion, Chapter 6, begins by providing a preliminary larger-N test of the
argument. The chapter then summarizes the contributions and avenues for a research
agenda that seeks to further unravel the relationship between political regimes and
37

state institutions in Africa and similar contexts.
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Chapter 2
Modes of Party Financing
A common assertion in the literature on African democracy is that ruling parties
derive major electoral advantages from their unfettered access to state resources. Incumbent parties can use these resources to, among other things, buy votes of key
constituencies, fund their party apparatus and co-opt powerful individuals capable of
building opposition parties. Despite the prevalence of this narrative, we lack information about the specific channels through which party leaders access and accumulate
these resources. Other than vague references to political corruption and rent-seeking,
opaque methods of public financial management and procurement decisions, there
is little systematic knowledge about how parties access state funds to support their
political organizations.
This chapter outlines two distinct modes of state-dependent party financing in
Benin and Ghana. In Ghana, parties tend to access state money by soliciting support
from businesses in exchange for government contracts. In this mode of fundraising,
businesses profit from the state and return some portion of the money to the party.
The practice is widespread in Africa, but its viability depends ultimately on the extent
to which private sector actors are available for contracting and the extent to which
party leaders can trust state agents to administer these contracts in line with party
goals. Well-established parties with strong organizations, such as those in Ghana, are
particularly well-positioned to pursue this fundraising strategy.
Incumbents in Benin are more likely to access state resources more directly from
bureaucrats who occupy strategic positions either in terms of direct access to state
coffers or rent-seeking opportunities. This form of party financing may be necessary
when fewer private sector actors exist, or when elite party agents can not be trusted
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to execute contracts in line with presidential goals, such as where party systems are
fragmented and the parties themselves are weakly organized.
The chapter begins by discussing the particular party financing challenges that
parties in African democracies face and the strategies that incumbent leaders employ
to overcome them. The second section outlines two distinct modes of party financing
that are evident in Benin and Ghana. In the third section, I discuss the sources of
divergent fundraising practices in Benin and Ghana in the two countries. The chapter
concludes with a brief discussion of the ways that party organizations and private sector
size interact in mutually reinforcing ways and the implications of these dynamics for
the broader argument of the dissertation.

2.1

Party Financing in African Democracies: Challenges
and Strategies

Politicians in African democracies face great pressure to distribute resources to voters.
For this reason, it is widely theorized that incumbents who control state resources derive a major electoral advantage over opposition parties. But in competitive contexts,
incumbent leaders face dilemmas about how to access and distribute state resources
for their parties without 1) empowering their competitors; or 2) availing themselves
to risks of prosecution once out of office. This section provides a brief overview of
these dynamics in contemporary African democracies, highlighting the need to better
understand the ways that political leaders gain access to state resources. Widespread
evidence suggests that clientelistic forms of voter mobilization dominate election campaigns in Africa.1 Specifically, politicians distribute, or promise to distribute, money,
goods, services or jobs to ‘buy’ votes from individuals who might not otherwise vote for
1

I define clientelism as the distribution of benefits targeted to individuals or groups contingent on
their electoral support. Note that this definition includes patronage, but is not equivalent to patronage,
which I define more narrowly as the exchange of a job in the state apparatus for political support. For
an overview of definitions and concepts related to clientelism, see Hicken (2011).
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them, or to ‘buy’ turnout from base voters (Nichter, 2008). Exchanges may take place
directly between politicians and voters, or through brokers who exercise influence over
key voting blocs.
No matter what the specific mechanism of the exchange, politicians in African
countries require increasingly vast amounts of resources to be able to compete in this
type of system (Banégas, 1998; Lindberg, 2003, 2010). Even where voters may be
swayed by programmatic or ideological appeals, clientelistic exchanges tend to persist
as an integral part of electoral campaigns (Wantchekon, 2003; Weghorst and Lindberg,
2013). One perspective sees the clientelistic electoral exchange not so much as an
electoral transaction, but as a signal to voters that the politician, once in office, will take
further action to support the individual or community (Nugent, 2007). Such accounts
are consistent with recent research suggesting that elections in Africa focus to a large
degree on questions about valence: “how to attain desired goals and who is more likely
to succeed in doing so” (Bleck and Van de Walle, 2013: 1397), and help to explain the
persistence of clientelistic politics amongst growing middle-class populations.2
Parties also require resources to build and sustain their organizations. Whether
parties possess strong machine-like organizations or a weaker assemblage of candidatecentered groups, resources are required to mobilize activists, build coalitions and offer
ongoing support to members. According to Gyimah-Boadi, “most party activists and
grassroots supporters expect upfront monetary payment, payment in kind, or future
material reward in return for services to the party”(2007: 25). Likewise, Bob-Milliar
(2012a) notes that party members become active in parties specifically for the material
benefits and social insurance involved. Coalition building at the elite level also requires
resources, for example to convince potential coalition members of the candidate’s
viability or to co-opt potential opposition.
2
A similar argument is advanced by Baldwin (2013) who argues that voters decide whether or not to
vote with traditional leaders according to their ability to secure resources from their preferred candidate.

41

With largely unfettered access to state resources, incumbents are thought to enjoy
a major advantage in both electoral competition and party building, whereby the
“system provides the incumbent party with both easy access to public resources and
enormous capacity to intimidate the private sector, preventing it from financing the
opposition ”(Widner, 1997: 79). State control of economic resources, which tends
to be relatively high in African countries, keeps incumbents in power and increases
the risk involved to private sector actors who choose to support opposition parties
rakner09, manning05. Despite this advantageous position, however, incumbents may
be constrained in exploiting state resources to their political advantage. First, there are
questions about the effectiveness of vote-buying efforts where the quality of information
about voter alignments is relatively low. Politicians do not necessarily know which
voters can be “bought,” and they have little capacity to monitor the outcomes of their
campaign efforts.
Second, voters do not uniformly and uncritically attribute increased availability of
goods and services to the ruling party. For example, Harding (2015) finds that the
improvements in roads, but not education, tend to be rewarded electorally, precisely
because the road improvements are easily attributed to the ruling party. In short, in
a complex service delivery landscape comprising donors, NGOs and a multitude of
government actors, there is a considerable possibility that ruling parties will not reap
the electoral rewards of their efforts to distribute in an electorally advantageous way.3
Given the uncertainty of electoral payoffs associated with the state-sponsored distribution of goods and services, the incumbent is likely to find the fungibility of monetary
resources more attractive, as they they can be used for either vote-buying or partybuilding purposes. Although many anecdotal accounts suggest that incumbent party
leaders use their positions to either siphon resources directly from state coffers or seek
3
It is also important to note that much of the literature that focuses on the politics of distribution is
potentially biased by the type of goods studied, thereby decreasing our confidence in observed patterns
of the political benefits of distributive practices (Kramon and Posner, 2013).
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rents to raise the funds necessary to support their parties, there are reasons to believe
that these practices may be less widespread than is commonly assumed. One reason
these practices may be more limited is that when new parties take office, they often
embark on politically motivated prosecutions of former leaders for having illegally acquired public money during their time in office (Lawson, 2009).4 Though clearly aimed
at diminishing any political threat posed by the defeated party, these instances of “anticorruption” initiatives are often applauded by donors or advocacy groups seeking to
exemplify the effectiveness of their anti-corruption programs, further solidifying the
practice and increasing the risk of eventual criminal charges brought against ousted
incumbents.
To limit risks of future prosecution, party leaders look to access resources in more
diffuse, less traceable ways. For example leaders might engage private actors by
offering them procurement contracts in exchange for their financial support. Another
strategy is to offer jobs to bureaucrats in strategic positions where they can access state
revenues or extract rents from the public in need of their agency’s services. In enlisting
a larger number of individuals in undocumented transactions, incumbents make it
more difficult for future leaders to successfully pursue legal action once out of office.
How the incumbent leaders choose to access state funds, and who they enlist in the
process, is, to some extent, a function of where money is available.
Diffusing responsibility for fundraising may also come with risks since leaders are
likely to have limited trust in party and state agents with access to these resources, especially where incentives for party defection are relatively high. Even in relatively stable
party systems, there are instances where incumbents’ political allies have managed to
build up their own political standing in ways that threaten the incumbent’s power.
In Senegal, for instance, Macky Sall was amongst President Abdoulaye Wade’s most
4
One striking thing about these cases is that it is almost never the President who is implicated, but
rather a Minister or close associate.
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trusted advisors, serving as his campaign manager and Prime Minister before breaking
off to form his own party and and eventually defeating Wade in the 2012 election. The
choice of fundraising strategies may, therefore, also depend on the availability of trusted
agents to raise party funds.
In sum, incumbent politicians in competitive contexts may be limited in their ability
and/or willingness to exploit state resources for the benefit of their parties. Instead,
incumbents are likely to raise funds in ways that minimize the risks of either empowering the opposition or opening themselves to future prosecution. As I make clear in
the remainder of the chapter, the strategies that leaders choose depend principally on
the extent to which private sector actors are available for these exchanges as well as the
availability of trusted party agents at either the elite or public service level. The differences in party financing practices in Benin and Ghana, presented in the next section,
illustrate how these conditions shape party financing decisions.

2.2

Party Financing in Benin and Ghana

I now turn to an exploration of the modes of party financing in Benin and Ghana.
Despite similar levels of electoral competition, two distinct modes of political party
financing have evolved in the two countries. Although incumbent parties in both
countries are heavily dependent on state funds for their sustenance, the modes through
which they access these funds differ considerably. I begin with a discussion of Ghana
where a relatively large formal private sector acts as an important vehicle through which
parties gain access to state funds. Parties effectively “buy” the support of the businesses
by promising to award lucrative government contracts if elected. This translates into a
system where state funds make their way to politically supportive businesses, who then
funnel some of the money back into the party. Additionally, an increasingly common
practice called “judgment debts” helps parties to sustain support from businesses in
the face of electoral loss. The losing party who later returns to power, awards large
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settlements to the supportive businesses for alleged abrogations of contracts during the
opposing party’s rule. As I make clear in the following pages, the system depends not
only on the availability of private sector actors but on a well-organized party system
in which elite-level party agents are trusted to award contracts in a manner consistent
with the party’s pecuniary interest. In short, Ghana’s strong and internally democratic
party organizations produce a supply of politically loyal and tested elite allies that can
serve as effective brokers in the distribution of contracts to firms in exchange for party
support.
In the second part of this section, I turn to the case of Benin, where opportunities
to raise funds through government contracts are more limited, and where weak party
organizations make it difficult for the President to find reliable intermediaries that he
can trust to distribute resources in line with his own goals. Instead, party funds are
more likely to come directly from strategically-placed bureaucrats with access to state
resources or key rent-seeking opportunities in state agencies.

2.2.1

Ghana

As large membership organizations, Ghana’s two major parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the National Patriotic Party (NPP) require vast resources
for party infrastructure and campaign functions. In addition to financing campaign
activities, Ghana’s parties require funds for recurrent and capital expenditures for party
administration, for the procurement of technical and consulting services and for the
administration of internal party elections (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). Although accounts of
campaign spending are not available, and likely do not exist in any meaningful form,
there is widespread speculation that campaign spending has increased substantially
in recent years, a trend that is well-documented at least for parliamentary elections
(International IDEA and Center for Democratic Development, 2004; Lindberg, 2010).
As one Electoral Commission employee explained, “the monetization of elections has
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become a bigger problem since the 2004 elections...money is much more important in
elections than it used to be.”5
In that local party organizations also play a support role to their communities,
funds are required to provide a wide range of support to party members in need of
school or hospital fees or by making a customary contribution when attending events
such as weddings and funerals. According to one detailed study of party members
in Ghana, for example, individuals often choose to join political parties based on the
expectation of receiving some form of financial benefit or employment from the party
(Bob-Milliar, 2012b). This expectation is not confined to campaign cycles, as one can
regularly see members visiting party offices to ask for help in times of need. Indeed, one
constituency party chairman emphatically noted that “you can’t say no” when asked
by party members for support.6 With strong party organizations, including party
infrastructure throughout the country and ongoing engagement in the community,
Ghana’s parties have a very consistent need for funds to keep the party viable.
The sources of party funds are, by many accounts, quite diverse.7 Although the state
provides some in-kind support for parties, for example the provision of free airtime on
Ghana’s government-owned TV and radio stations, parties generally raise funds in a
“free-wheeling manner” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). Officials in both parties spoke openly
about the challenges involved in collecting membership fees, and the fact that the fees
are collected from only a very small percentage of members. Likewise, it is common
for Party Treasurers to have information, in some form or another, about total amounts
collected in fees. Said one regional NPP official, “even if every member paid his dues,
5

Electoral Commission, November 29, 2013
Western Region NDC, December 2, 2013.
7
It was not possible to obtain any official documentation related to party financing. Parties are
supposed to file reports with the Electoral Commission periodically, but these reports are not made
available to the public and it common for “the commission to turn a blind eye to obviously inaccurate
returns from the parties” (Ayee et al., 2007: 6). It was also clear that some party officials became
uncomfortable in interviews when I posed questions about sources of funds beyond memberships and
filing fees. This type of response from interview respondents was also also noted by the authors of a
report sponsored by IDEA and CDD in 2004.
6
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it would not be nearly enough for the elections.”8
Another widely acknowledged source of funds is from candidates who pay filing
fees to the party in order to run. It is reported, for example, that the NPP’s candidate
for the upcoming 2016 elections, Nana Akufo Addo, paid a filing fee of 80,000 GHC,
the equivalent of $23,000 dollars at the time of payment. In the NPP, non-incumbent
parliamentary candidates in the current election cycle are required to pay a fee of
30,000 GHC, the equivalent of approximately $8,600 dollars.9 In the lead-up to the 2012
elections, now-President John Mahama paid a reported 5000 GHC filing fee. Currently
the fee for parliamentary candidates in the NDC is set at 2,000 GHC.10 Although
none of the regional or national party officers I interviewed acknowledged it, the
practice of accepting donations in exchange for appointments is, allegedly, increasingly
common, especially for Deputy Minister positions. The issue came to light when, in
November 2013, Deputy Minister of Communications Victoria Hammah was caught
on tape saying, among many other things, that “my appointment was solid way back,”
a statement widely interpreted to mean that she had contributed a sufficient sum of
money to secure the appointment.

11

Private donations are, perhaps, the most important source of funds for Ghana’s
political parties. In particular, according to Gyimah-Boadi, contributions from businesses and from “men of means” represent the main direct sources of funds” (2009: 2).
The practice of businesses contributing to political parties in Ghana dates back to the
1960s, when wealthy members of parties made voluntary contributions, especially to
the nationalist parties of the era Austin (1964). Each of the major parties has a number
of particularly well-known business financiers who are rumored to donate huge sums
of money, such as investment banker Ken Ofori-Atta for the NPP and Alfred Woyome
8

Ashanti Region NPP, December 4, 2013
Reported at Citifmonline, March 24, 2015.
10
Available on the ghanamps.com website that tracks developments related to the Parliament of Ghana.
11
There is abundant coverage of this news story. The audio recording is available at on GHKings
Youtube site and a transcription of the recording on the Modern Ghana website.
9
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for the NDC. As reported by Ivor Agyeman-Duah, a close advisor to President Kufuor,
the Young Executive Forum, a wing of NPP business-men, had also been very active in
soliciting donations from businesses for the financing of NPP’s campaigns (AgyemanDuah, 2003: 112). But local party organizations, as reported by a number party officials
interviewed, said that smaller-scale businesses, especially commercial land developers
and construction companies, provide much financial and in-kind support to the local
parties.
Finally, fundraisers in party chapters outside the country, especially in the U.S.,
U.K., Germany and Australia are known to generate a lot of income for the parties
and are widely reported in the media and by the party organizations themselves.12
Donations directly to parties from non-Ghanaian citizens are illegal, but many believe
the practice is still widespread.13 One staff member at the NPP national office noted that
one reason Ghanaians in the diaspora contribute is that so that their family members’
businesses can benefit back home saying that “maybe they have a economic interest in
the country or maybe their families have a small enterprise that wants to work with
the government.”14
Contributions from businesses often come with an explicit expectation of receiving
lucrative government contracts should the party’s candidate win. A 2003 report on
party financing in sub-Saharan Africa by the National Democratic Institute explains
generally how this works:
There is a link between party financing patterns and corruption: businesses
buy access and influence through their donations...and parties buy support with handouts indstead of addressing the issues. Either because of
12

News articles of fundraisers with international chapters of the two major parties are widely available,
as are reports of incumbents and opposition candidates traveling overseas to raise funds, especially in the
U.S., the U.K., Germany and Australia. For examples, see Diaspora News, October 13, 2010; Ghanaweb
General News, August 7, 2007 or SakoFM on May 16, 2015.
13
Ghana’s Political Parties Act of 2000 allows contributions for party-building from NGO’s or other
international actors, but only indiscriminately in the form of support to the Electoral Commission.
14
Accra NPP, April 7, 2014

48

campaign debts or simply because they have the opportunity to do so with
impunity, public officials are widely rumored to collect a 10 percent cut in exchange for awarding various government contracts. It is believed that those
funds benefit both individuals and political parties. (National Democratic
Institute, 2003: 61)
Specific examples of this practice in Ghana are widely available in the media and
were regularly cited in interviews. One such example is described by Transparency
International in their 2007 Country Report: a recorded case of procurement irregularity
involving the Yendi district executive Alhaji Mohammed. He claimed he was awarded
multiple contracts from the NPP government in amounts ranging from $27,000 to
$30,000, but that a condition of receiving these contracts was that he was supposed to
generate funds for the ruling party (Transparency International, 2007). Though not in
relation to this specific case, a former NPP Minister reported to me that “No, it’s not
that the party members, once they get to government, steal the money. They award
contracts to the businesses of their brothers or their uncles. Maybe they have office
supplies or a copy machine business and those contracts go to them. Then they become
part of [the party].”15
Results from my survey of public sector employees lend further evidence of the
pervasiveness of politicized procurement processes in Ghana. As reported in Figure
2.1, 73.7% percent of the Ghanaian public sector employees surveyed said that the
awarding of procurement contracts based on political support is either a problem
(37.9%) or a very serious problem (35.8%) in their organization. A relatively smaller
number of those surveyed in Benin, 54.5%, perceived the politicization of procurement
contracts to be a problem (31.7%) or serious problem (13.8%) in their organization.16 A
difference-of-proportions test of the responses between the two countries generates a
15

Accra, December 12, 2013.
Note that the wording of the question does not necessarily represent differences in the frequency of
the practice. Nonetheless there is a clear difference in the perception of this practice being a problem,
which likely relates to how widespread the practice is.
16
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Figure 2.1: Survey: Contracts Awarded for Political Support

z-score of 6.35 with p<.01.
Awarding contracts in exchange for party donations is especially prevalent in procurement of services for public works construction(Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). Opoku (2010)
suggests that “as a group, contractors may well have been the single most important
source of business funding to the NDC,” and that many of the recipients of these
contracts were themselves key party members. (2010: 179). One prominent example
involves the Construction Pioneers, a large German-owned road construction contractor based in Accra. One former NDC Minister acknowledged that they paid money
to the NDC over multiple elections beginning as early as 1992. Writing on this topic,
Paul Nugent describes the Construction Pioneers payments to the NDC in advance of
the 2000 election and notes that “one imagines that [the Construction Pioneers were]
not the only one to do so.”(Nugent, 2007: 284-265). Additional details about the relationship between the Construction Pioneers and the NDC came to light when, in 2005,
they brought the Government of Ghana to the International Chamber of Commerce
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Court of arbitration in London over contract breaches. When the NPP came to power
in 2001, they allegedly cancelled contracts with the Construction Pioneers due to their
longstanding support of the NDC. When the NDC returned to power in 2009 the Construction Pioneers received a very large settlement, an amount in the vicinity of 94
million Euro, for what Ghana’s courts deemed an illegal abrogation of contracts by the
NPP government.
The Construction Pioneers are not the only business to have won a case like this.
Indeed, such settlements are an increasingly common phenomenon, referred to by
Ghanaian media and public as “judgment debts.” In a widely publicized case, NDC
financier Alfred Woyome won a sum of 51 million GHC (equivalent to approximately
25 million dollars at the time) from the government for an abrogated contract to provide ‘financial engineering’ services. According to widespread reporting, the services
outlined in the contract were never actually rendered but the courts awarded the settlement anyway.17 These types of cases are widely viewed as a way to allow party
financiers to access greater amounts of funds than procurement contracts alone would
permit, and as a way to recuperate money they may lose as a result of having invested
in the losing party. They also serve as a way for the party to assure financiers that, even
in the event that the party loses an election, it will be worth their while to contribute.
Though the Supreme Court of Ghana has recently ordered Woyome to refund this sum
of money to the Government, there is skepticism that the NDC government will actually recuperate the money or that practice of awarding “judgment debts” will go away
anytime soon.
Persistent issues in Ghana’s public procurement processes are, perhaps, indicative of
the political importance attributed to procurement decisions. For example, one recent
study concluded that a vast majority of public procurements remain single-sourced
17
There is abundant news coverage of this scandal. See, for example, Daily Graphic Online, August
12, 2014 or Daily Graphic, July 29, 2014.
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rather than awarded through a competitive process, and that even when competition
is present on paper, the outcome of the bidding is more or less pre-determined (OseiTutu et al., 2011). Ghana’s mediocre performance in the implementation of public
procurement reforms (de Mariz, 2006) further suggests that politicians stand to benefit
by keeping the current procurement system in place.
This mutually supportive relationship between political parties and a vast array of
businesses serves to both strengthen the party organization as well as the private sector,
and rewards party agents for facilitating the exchange of contracts for financial support.
If they were not business owners before, members of the winning party will often
form businesses immediately following the election to benefit from the possibility of
receiving government contracts. As one former NPP minister stated “even the contracts
to provide stationery to the ministry can benefit the party members.”18 As I discuss at
greater length below, this dynamic serves to strengthen the party by reinforcing party
membership with handouts in the form of contracts and spurs growth in the private
sector, albeit through firms which are entirely dependent on the party and state.
This section has shown that although political parties in Ghana draw funding from
multiple sources, the prevalence of contributions from businesses in exchange for
government contract opportunities is, by many accounts, extremely important for the
sustenance of the parties as they exist today. Multiple sources of data form compelling
evidence that this mode of party financing is prominent across Ghana’s two major
parties and that, through the practice of “judgment debts,” is becoming even more
entrenched. As I discuss in the next section, this system of party financing is, to some
extent, also evident in Benin, but the practice of awarding contracts in exchange for
party financing is much more constrained by Benin’s smaller private sector and their
relatively weak party organizations.
18

Accra, NPP, December 12, 2013
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2.2.2

Benin

Parties in Benin function quite differently than those in Ghana.19 The idea of political
“transhumance,” which translates literally as “nomadism” or “seasonal migration,” is
often invoked to describe “episodes of denials, reversals and rallies of former opponents
by national or local elected officials, who, having received the nomination of their
parties, resigned to join the government movement with the hope of receiving some
benefit” (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013). This pattern of party fragmentation makes it
difficult for parties to develop stable organizational infrastructure. Indeed, Bierschenk
describes Benin’s political parties as “very light organisations, built around the personal
ambition of individual politicians (or coalitions of ’big men’ in the case of the larger
parties), who are also as a rule their main sponsors”(2006: 547-548) As such, the bulk
of party funding goes towards election campaigns, a more limited, albeit increasingly
expensive, endeavor than that of sustaining party offices and operations throughout
the country in off-election years. Since there was no upcoming election during the time
I was in Benin, I struggled to find one party office that was open and operational. When
I asked a high-ranking member of the ruling party if there were any ruling party (FCBE)
offices that I could visit, he said that he did not know. The task of financing a party
in Benin is, therefore, basically synonymous with that of running a candidate-centered
election campaign.
Unlike Ghana, Beninese law mandates public funding for political parties and limits
on campaign spending. Specifically, Article 40 of the 2003 Political Parties Act Number
2001-2 requires the government to provide a financial grant to legally registered political parties with at least one seat in the National Assembly. The law has more or less
been followed regularly by Benin’s presidents though the timing of the disbursements
have been unpredictable and, according to at least one observer, correspond to the Pres19

There is a burgeoning literature on Africa’s diverging party systems. See, for example, Arriola
(2012); Bogaards (2004); Lindberg (2008); Manning (2005); Riedl (2014).
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ident’s need or desire to exert control over party alignments in the National Assembly.
Regarding a 2009 disbursement, a Wikileaks Cable notes that “a few suspicious politicians perceived the decision as an attempt to calm the contentious opposition while
the majority of National Assembly deputies, including opposition deputies, saw the
move as President Yayi’s support for the role of political parties” (Wikileaks, 2009).
Although the funds are substantial – 5 million CFA ($10,000) for each party in the 2009
disbursement – one report notes that the funds provided are insufficient to make a
difference to the operation of the opposition parties (Saffu, 2003: 25).
Financing for Benin’s parties has not depended as much on the support of business
people looking for government contracts, though that certainly does occur, but rather
on bureaucrats who are well-positioned to access resources and rents from their state
positions. In particular, a major source of party financing in Benin are bureaucrats in
key state agencies, including the customs, taxes and ports administrations. A longtime
government official and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nassirou Bako-Arifari has
written that the Port of Cotonou is “one of the principal sources of [party] financing
in Benin.”(Bako-Arifari, 2001: 42). The party leaders and onlookers I interviewed also
suggested the importance of bureaucratic positioning for party fundraising purposes.
As one party official put it, “one knows that there have been certain agencies that
nourish the President’s political needs.”20 Additionally, one opposition party member
I talked to noted that when there is insufficient support from business people, candidates will seek out Beninese living abroad or “wealthy employees of the state” who
might support them.21 Summarizing the circumstances surrounding party financing
in Benin, NDI writes “The party in power (and those that have ministers or support
the government) get funds from state resources, foreign contributions, and by placing
party members who then contribute. Membership dues and donations are permitted
20
21

FCBE, Cotonou, June 18, 2014.
MADEP, Cotonou, June 20, 2014.
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by law, but neither suffices in any meaningful sense”(National Democratic Institute,
2003: 32). Officials from three of the biggest parties acknowledged that elections had
become more expensive in recent years, an observation also made by Bierschenk (2006)
and, earlier, by Banégas (1998).
Further evidence of the importance of state money in politics comes from the Beninese public sector employees I surveyed. They overwhelmingly answered that resources from their agencies often disappear for political party use. Of the survey
respondents in Benin, 84.4% said that the disappearance of resources for party use was
either a problem or a serious problem in their organization, compared to only 26.7%
expressing this concern in Ghana (See Figure 2.2). A difference-of-proportions test
on the country responses to this survey question produces a a z-statistic of 18.5 with
p<.001. It is telling that in a 2007 survey on corruption in Benin conducted by the World
Bank Institute, the respondents, all of whom were civil servants, rated political parties
and the customs administration as the two most corrupt institutions (World Bank and
Government of Benin, 2007).
Individuals in the aforementioned agencies may raise party funds by both siphoning
official state revenue and by collecting rents. Prior to the installation of the West
Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 2000, for example, customs revenue
accounted for as much as 46% of tax revenue (Arifari, 2006: 184).22 While more recent
figures are not available, there is no evidence that the proportions of tax revenue sources
in Benin have undergone any substantial changes in recent years.
Even more striking is the enormous opportunity for rent-seeking associated with
the public agencies responsible for regulating trade and transport, including the customs and port administrations, police and gendarmes. In a highly informative study
of corruption in Benin’s customs and transport sectors, Arifari (2006) notes that the col22
One result of UEMOA was to abolish customs duties for goods and services traded between UEMOA
countries.
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lection of side payments at numerous points in the process of transporting goods from
the Port of Cotonou northwards to Niger, as well as eastwards into Nigeria provides
opportunities for individual officers to earn 200,000 to 300,000 CFA per day (equivalent
to as much $400-$600), which well exceeds the monthly salary of most of the Beninese
population (2006: 209). He notes that the importation of second-hand vehicles alone
is estimated to generate 6.5 billion CFA francs ($13 million) in informal (undeclared)
profits (2006: 214). Additionally, Arifari notes that the placement of individual customs
officers is highly coordinated with customs officers working their way from ‘dry posts’
to ‘less lucrative posts’ to ‘lucrative posts’, but that officers get rotated frequently to
allow new people to enter the rotation, especially those that have ‘bought’ their jobs
from the current government. Moreover, “the ‘buyers of postings’ are considered by the
other officers as being most actively involved in corrupt practices because they need to
recover the resources invested or promised in exchange for their lucrative assignments”
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(2006: 210).
At the local level, bureaucrats who serve as “sponsors” of local parties may also
be engaged in informal businesses, especially in the transport sector, which makes up
another very large portion of Benin’s economy. In an ethnographic study of political
parties competing in the 1999 National Assembly elections in Parakou, the cotton
capital and largest city in the Northern part of Benin, Badou documents how candidates
court “rich and popular personalities” in the city who can provide resources and tap
their networks for support (2003: 18). These “sponsors,” as they’re called,23 are often
transporters or traders, who may also occupy posts in the regional or local governments,
or both! The engagement of bureaucrats with the informal economy serves as yet
another reason why politicians would align with them for party financing purposes.
Although bureaucrats are more likely to be involved in party fundraising activities
in Benin, this is not to say that leaders do not also exploit opportunities to raise money
from private sector actors in exchange for contracts. The survey results reported
in Figure 2.1 suggest that although this sort of exchange is more limited in Benin,
it nonetheless exists. As I describe in the next section, rather, the scope of party
fundraising that revolves around exchanges with the private sector is either much
more limited or much less formal than the system that has evolved in Ghana, thereby
limiting the extent to which incumbent politicians can rely on this strategy.
This section has described and analyzed the evolution of two distinct forms of
party financing in Benin and Ghana. As I discuss in the next section, these modes
of party financing, though both reliant on state resources, involve different enabling
conditions and different sets state actors. In Ghana, a larger private sector and stronger
party organizations facilitate the awarding of contracts in exchange for donations from
business financiers. This practice tends to be administered at higher levels of the
executive apparatus by individuals with close and longstanding party ties. In Benin,
23

“Parrains” in French.
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a smaller and less formal private sector combined with very weakly organized parties
creates an environment in which it is more favorable for parties to access state resources
directly from bureaucrats, often strategically placed civil servants in agencies with
direct access to state revenues and rent-seeking opportunities.
Finally, it’s important to note that the preceding discussion focuses principally on
the fundraising activities of incumbents, since it is these activities that form the basis
of the arguments in the following chapters of the dissertation. In competitive contexts,
however, to the extent that they can credibly make promises, fundraising strategies of
opposition parties are likely to mimic those of the ruling party (Riedl, 2014). Evidence
of this mimicry is especially apparent in the discussion below of the growing practice
of judgment debts in Ghana, where, upon their eventual return to power, a losing party
awards their financiers through the legal system, compensating for the promises they
made during their unsuccessful campaigns.

2.3

Sources of Divergence: Private Sector Size and Party
Organization

Why do leaders engage in these different modes of party financing in Benin and Ghana?
As theorized in Section 2.1, these varying party financing practices are likely to result
from differences in where money is available and who incumbents trust to access it. This
section applies these considerations to the party financing practices in Benin and Ghana.
As I make more explicit in this subsection, the larger size of the formal private sector in
Ghana expands opportunities for more diffuse access to state resources by channelling
money from the state to businesses to political parties. A more limited set opportunities
to engage the formal private sector in Benin makes the enlistment of bureaucrats in
party financing activities more attractive. These choices are compounded by differences
in the party system. Thanks to their well-organized and internally democratic parties,
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Ghanaian leaders have a set of trusted party agents to manage procurement decisions
in a way that is financially favorable to the party. Weak party organizations in Benin’s
more fragmented party system make it difficult to trust elite-level allies with the desired
execution of contracts, while the Presidents’ clients in the public service have less
incentive and fewer options involved in exiting the Preisdent’s partisan alliance.

2.3.1

Where’s the Money?

Leaders in Ghana raise funds by awarding government contracts because, to some
extent, that is simply where money is available. A key difference between Ghana
and Benin, for instance, is in the size of the private sector. Though it is difficult
to find reliable data on private sector size in Africa, a 2011 study estimates private
investment, averaged over the 1996 to 2008 period at 12% of GDP for Benin and 16%
for Ghana (Stampini et al., 2011). Given that Ghana’s GDP is anywhere from 5 to 6
times larger than that of Benin’s during this period,24 means that private investment
is in fact much more sizable in Ghana than in Benin.25 As another indication of the
robustness of Ghana’s private sector relative to that of Benin, Arriola (2012) has shown
that, historically, Ghanaians have had greater access to private capital with a larger
number of independent banks servicing the private sector.
In Ghana, as described above, a larger formal private sector and more abundant
procurement opportunities perpetuate a system in which parties receive support in
exchange for government contracts. A 2002 OECD study estimates that the government
procurement markets in Benin and Ghana are both around 12-13% of GDP. Given the
24

GDP statistics accessed from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, estimates provided
in current US dollars.
25
Private investment represents one of the best available ways to measure private sector size. Since
consumption would include the informal economy, it does not provide particularly valuable information
about the number of firms seeking contracts. While data on the size of the public and private sector labor
markets might be helpful, I could not locate labor market data for Benin. Reliable data on the number of
registered firms was also difficult to locate, and may not capture foreign firms looking to do business in
the country.
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differences in GDP between the two countries, however, this translates into a difference
of approximately $600 million dollars in available procurement opportunities in the
early 2000’s. Ghana’s recent development as an oil-producing country as well as
their recent GDP growth make it very likely that the divergence in the two countries’
procurement markets has become increasingly stark in recent years, thereby providing
even more opportunity for Ghana’s ruling parties to exchange contracts for political
support. Such growth in the procurement market could serve to consolidate and
strengthen the two major party organizations and support the growth of the private
sector.
The more limited and volatile formal private sector in Benin makes a procurementcentered party financing strategy less viable. Benin’s formal private sector has historically been dominated by the cotton industry, which represents over 10% of GDP. Given
longstanding state control over the cotton sector, the industry is dominated by a few
powerful actors, the most notorious of whom is magnate Patrice Talon. Talon, who
built his fortune in Benin’s cotton industry in the 1980s, decided to support Yayi’s 2006
campaign because he believed in the possibility of a much-needed “rupture” from the
past 26 Some estimate his contributions to Yayi in the election at around 4 billion FCFA,
the equivalent to approximately $8 million. Once elected Yayi’s government embarked
on a privatization program in which the government-controlled Société Nationale pour la
Promotion Agricole (SONAPRA) was set to hand over 45 percent of its capital to Talon’s
Société Commune de Participation (SCP). Although the government later cancelled the
privatization plans, they have allowed Talon’s groups to consolidate control over 80%
of the input supply and ginning activites.27 The consolidation was the result of at least
one large government contract with Talon’s group for the importation of agricultural
fertilizers and pesticides, as well as for one of his companies, named Benin Control,
26
27

From an interview in Jeune Afrique, November 20, 2012.
These details are provided by Gergely et al. (2009).
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which was retained by the government to verify the transit of goods in the Port of
Cotonou. When Talon, in 2013, allegedly refused to fund Yayi’s planned campaign to
amend the Constitution in order to allow him to run for a third term, Yayi accused
Talon of attempting assassination and exiled him from the country. Though Talon has
more recently been allowed to return, the episode illustrates the fragility of these types
of alliances with political financiers in Benin, particularly when compared to the enduring business-party relationships that have evolved in Ghana. With comparatively
few domestic formal private sector actors and, as I explain below, a more fragmented
party system, private actors have the market advantage. They can ‘shop around’ for
a new candidate or party to support, leading to much more volatile party-business
relationships and, in turn, more limited opportunities to raise money from these types
of arrangements are substantially more limited.
This volatility is observed directly by Badou (2003) in her ethnographic study of
political parties campaigning for National Assembly elections in Parakou, the largest
city in the North of Benin. Another fundraising strategy is for candidates to court
business people or public officials to provide both in-kind and cash support. This
strategy is especially important for those without strong links to the ruling party. As
Badou explains, “in the case that the sponsor does not profit, the sponsor can break
with the political party in question and establish other party relations with the most
promising candidate.” (2003: 19). She quotes one sponsor, who is the ‘first-in-charge’
in the administrative unit at the Département du Borgou, as saying
you have to go to someone who’s looking for you, know your value and
shop around because if I am in the North and those in the north have not
considered me, I can not stay in their party. I joined the party because it
leads to knowledge (relations)...the PSD courted me because I’m popular,
not because of my transport business. But when the party has an issue
of 100,000 CFA, this is nothing for me. The location of the headquarters,
electricity, I pay it. It is thanks to my knowledge in Parakou, Kandi [and]
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Djougou that the PSD made great scores in the [last parliamentary election.]
This example, as well as that of the Yayi-Talon alliance underscores the limited and
fragile nature of party-business alliances in Benin. As is detectable in these examples,
and as I make clear in the next section, this fragility is further compounded by the
volatile nature of Benin’s party system. The uncertainty in these relationship leads
incumbent party leaders, who are in a stronger bargaining position than opposition
candidates, to look more directly to bureaucrats for party funds.

2.3.2

Availability of Trusted Party Agents

Modes of party financing are also shaped by the party system itself. In stable and
well-organized party systems, such as in Ghana, presidents are likely to have a much
greater amount of information about which elite allies can be trusted to raise or protect
state funds for the party. Such information enables the President to place these elite
allies in strategic positions to manage efforts to award contracts to those who have
donated to the party. Where party organizations are neither stable nor well-organized,
it can be risky to place elite party or coalition members in strategic high-level positions
for fear they might defect and join or start opposition movements. This latter dynamic
is especially prevalent in Benin.
Ghana’s well-organized and internally democratic parties produce a corps of elite
allies that can be trusted to facilitate the exchange of contracts and donations. The
primary election processes in Ghana’s two major parties are particularly important in
cultivating a group of trustworthy elite allies. Structured contests within the party
offer party leaders the opportunity to establish a corps of loyalists. This phenomenon
was particularly evident in the period following President John Kufuor’s victory in
the 2000 election when a heated primary contest between Kufuor and Nana Akuffo
Addo resulted in the formation of well defined party factions. When Kufuor eventually became President in 2001, “the Kufuor faction...consolidated its power base by
62

monopolising all the key sectors of the state apparatus. In the two administrations of
President Kufuor (2001-2008), members of his faction received the lion’s share in the
allocation of ministerial portfolios” (Bob-Milliar, 2012a: 581). Indeed, quite a number
of key supporters of the “Kufuor faction” in the 1998 primaries were appointed to Ministerial positions, including Jake Obetesey Lamptey (Minister of Presidential Affairs),
Richard Anane (Minister of Health), Patricia Appiagyei (Ministee, Ashanti Region),
Alan Kyeremanteng (Minister of Trade), Papa Owusu Ankoma (Attorney General) and
Sampson Kwaku Boafo (Minister of Culture).
Though succession in the NDC has generally involved less competition, tension
between party factions has also shaped elite patronage. As the Vice President to Rawlings, John Atta Mills easily won the 1999 NDC primary election to succeed Rawlings as
the party’s Presidential candidate and continued to occupy the top of the NDC ticket
in the 2004 and 2008 elections. Though small groups of NDC members splintered off
from the NDC during this time due to their support of party members other than Mills,
the party remained generally united behind Mills until early in his Presidency, when
Rawlings and his loyalists grew frustrated with Mills’ unwillingness to prosecute members of the former NPP government for corrupt practices and as revenge for the NPP’s
prosecution of Rawlings’ wife and her business associates. In 2010, in an effort to undermine Mills’ influence, Rawlings “the pro-Rawlings faction attempted to reclaim the
party by supporting candidates for executive positions in the [party’s] leadership contest.” (Bob-Milliar, 2012a: 592) Three Rawlings loyalists were elected, including Nana
Konadu Agyemang-Rawlings, the wife of the former President. From this platform,
according to Bob-Milliar (2012a), Rawlings and his wife intensified their criticism of
President Mills’ leadership style and the government’s abandonment of the core NDC
values and principles. Agyemang-Rawlings went on to contest Mills in the 2011 NDC
Primary elections, but party delegates remained staunchly behind Mills, who won the
primary with 96.9% of the votes. Key support for Mills came, somewhat surprisingly,
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from longtime party stalwarts such as the Ahwoi brothers (Ato and Kwamena), Dr.
Cadman Mills, Kojo Tsikata, Totobi Quakyi and Kofi Awoonor, many of whom had
served with Rawlings for many years. The alliance of these individuals with younger
reformist-minded members of the party, who had already benefitted from lower level
appointments in the Mills regime, proved difficult for the Rawlings duo to overcome.
Contests like the 1996 and 1998 primaries in the NPP and the 2011 primaries in
the NDC underscore the ways that internal party dynamics, more than the inter-party
competition, shape the internal logics of party financing and, as I describe in the next
chapter, the cabinet-level patronage decisions of incumbent presidents. From the President’s perspective these contests serve as a ’test’ of loyalty amongst potential recipients
of patronage posts, and assures him that they are suited to be in powerful ministerial
positions. As one former NPP Minister told me in response to a question about why
he thought that he was selected for a Ministerial post, “The President saw I supported
him in the primary election. I brought the delegates from my constituency to vote for
him. I helped him raise funds. I campaigned with him. He knew I was solid.” That
Presidents have the ability to learn about potential appointees through internal party
processes, suggests that Presidents in well-organized, internally democratic parties are
in a better position to pursue an elite level patronage strategy that produces a more
loyal and trustworthy group of Ministers capable of managing the relationships with
party financiers.
There is a strong expectation that both elected and appointed officials support their
party with whatever means available. Pressure to do so comes from both above and
below. For example, Municipal/Metropolitan/District Chief Executives (MMDCE), who
are appointed by the President, are often given directives to use their district funds to
support party efforts during campaigns
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. These practices may be fully within the

realm of the law, such as by delivering goods and services that local governments have
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promised, or by working extra hard to highlight the achievements of the government.
An NDC official at the National Headquarters noted that the party’s communications
department, for example, will provide MCEs and DCE’s with the “resources and training” to make sure that the party’s accomplishments are amplified in their districts. A
recent study meticulously details how MMDCE’s aid the party by awarding contracts
for local government services to businesses that support the party (Luna, 2015).
Elected and appointed officials are also under intense pressure from below to support the party, especially for fear of reprisal from the party’s “foot soldiers,” younger
activists who are mobilized to campaign for the party. Members of Parliament are
expected to deliver an array of goods and services to their constituencies beyond what
the government is already providing. Although each MP is provided with an allocation from the District Assemblies Common Fund to undertake special projects in their
constituency, (Lindberg, 2010) explains how voters expect the MP to pay additional
attention to their more personal needs. Not only their own, but also the party’s reputation is at stake in these exchanges. As one MP put it, “there is extreme pressure to
solve the personal problems of my constituents. If I can’t do it, it becomes a problem
for the party too. Sometimes I prefer to stay in Accra because it can be very difficult
in the constituency, but it’s important for the party that I’m there.”29 A local NDC
official added “it’s a challenge for us because the MP in our constituency is not from
our party. When we need money or resources for our members we ask the regional
[NDC] office and we ask local businesses for support. We might also ask the people
who plan to run for the parliamentary seat.”30 When an elected or appointed official
is perceived as not doing enough to support the local party members, the foot soldiers
will express their discontent in any number of ways, at times taking extreme measures
such as vandalizing party offices, organizing demonstrations at party events, or even
29
30

Accra NPP, December10, 2013.
Western Region, NDC, December 4, 2013
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violence. As parties expand, as intra-party competition intensifies and as the foot soldiers become more vigilant, the pressure on elected and appointed officials to provide
financial support to the party becomes increasingly intense.
There is much less order to Benin’s party system. Characterized by fluid inter-party
relations, highly mutable coalitions and parties centered around individuals who see
themselves as representing their own constituencies (Riedl, 2014), Benin’s party leaders
may ally with the ruling party for a short time, especially immediately following an
election, before joining an opposition coalition or mounting a direct challenge to the
ruling party. Writing about Benin’s party system, Riedl (2014) explains that parties
are created “through direct relations between newly aspiring candidates and their
local supporters, reflecting personalist appeals rather than party organization” and
that, in turn, “the implosion of the incumbent party further relates to the patterns of
regional and local-level concentration in voting”(Riedl, 2014: 198). She further notes
that the destabilization of the party system towards the end of President Soglo’s term
in office (1991-1996) led to patterns in which parties and candidates would regroup
both in advance of, and following each legislative and presidential election in order to
improve their ability to “make their own personal mark” (Riedl, 2014: 200).
In contrast to Ghana’s well-established and highly organized parties, the fluid nature
of Benin’s party system means that, even if presidents could raise funds by distributing
contracts to a broader set of private actors in exchange for support, they may lack the
required agents to carry through with this strategy. Unlike in Ghana, where party
officials must work their way up through the party chain with few alternative party
options, party elites in Benin can and do regularly defect from ruling party coalition.
The President faces a major threat from placing coalition allies in a position where they
can develop their own links to private sector actors.

66

2.3.3

The Interaction of Private Sector Size and Party Organizations

The varying nature of business-party relations in Benin and Ghana raises important
questions about the relationship of economic structure and party organizations. While
it is beyond the scope of this project to investigate whether or not one of these factors
causes the other, it is clear from the above examples that their interaction leads to a
mutually reinforcing relationship in which strong party organizations both benefit from
and contribute to a robust private sector, or in which a less formal private sector helps
to destabilize the party system which, in turn, creates a less stable environment for
formal private sector growth. These relationships point to the existence of two distinct
equilibria (or paths) that are likely to become more engrained over time. Several
examples from the two countries highlight the mutually reinforcing nature of these
relationships.
As I reference above, it is common for party members in Ghana, in anticipation of
receiving contracts from the party, to create formal businesses once their party wins
office. Though the business may ultimately suffer following a turnover of power, the
party organization, the strength of the party organization dose provide the stability
necessary for a member to start a business. In turn, the party can rely on businesses not
only for financial support, but also to supply jobs to party members. In a particularly
memorable interaction, one NDC constituency party secretary showed me a list of
names of party members who had asked the party to help them secure a job. When I
asked the party secretary what she planned to do with this list, she told me that she
planned to show it to the President on his next visit to the region but that she doubted
the President would be able to do find jobs for all these people. Instead, she explained
that some of local businesses who are supportive of the party would likely be able
to help find jobs for these members.31 To the extent that the continued strengthening
31
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of party organizations depends on the parties’ abilities to meet member needs, the
development of a party-dependent private sector represents an important part of the
process.
In Benin, instability in the party system enables the informal sector to flourish, and
vice versa. The case of transport entrepreneur Rachidi Gbadamassi is illustrative. Bierschenk (2006) describes the informal business niche developed by Rachidi Gbadamassi,
a Parakou-based businessman who has more recently risen up the political chain and
is likely to run for President in the 2016 elections.
Gbadamassi is member of a network of businessmen whose activities are
centered on the port of Cotonou...The network comprises other politicians,
most of them in their 30s and 40s, who are heavily involved in import
activities, in particular the importation of used cars...[many of which] find
their way unofficially into Nigeria. It appears that Gbadamassi’s particular
function in this network was to act as a carrier of funds between businessmen
and politicians. (Bierschenk, 2006: 558)
Gbadamassi’s success depends on the informal networks he develops with the government port and customs workers, which effectively allow him to continue to operate his
business activities at a high profit, thereby accumulating wealth, and funneling that
wealth into his blossoming political career. This mode of political financing differs from
the Ghanaian system in that it is largely facilitated by street-level bureaucrats and does
not require any formal contracts, or even firms for that matter. As such, the system
perpetuates the existence and growth of the informal sector, and puts previously nonpartisan business people in a strong position to enter the political arena by creating
their own parties, thereby further destabilizing and fragmenting the party system.
Entrepreneurs like Gbadamassi have three options to elevate their political position:
(1) they can support the incumbent in hopes of accessing more formal business opportunities; (2) they can support opposition candidates to ensure influence in the future; or
(3) they can enter the political arena themselves. In Benin’s fragmented, disorganized
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and uncertain party system, option (3) represents, perhaps, the most risk-averse alternative in terms of securing both their economic and political future. One indication
of the preferability of this alternative is that Gbadamassi began developing his own
youth associations that could be used to mobilize voters when the time came for his
election to the local council (Bierschenk, 2006), his campaign to become a Deputy in the
National Assembly and has lately made appearances suggestive of a run for President
in 2016. That informal business actors like Gbadamassi prefer to fund the development
of their own parties or pseudo-parties, serves to further destabilize the party system.
Another example from Benin is provided by Adjovi (1998), who explains how Mathieu Kerekou enlisted business mogul Sévéin Adjovi to his 1996 campaign for President,
despite the fact that Adjovi had strongly opposed Kerekou during the transition.32 According to his CV, Adjovi had, during the 1980s, worked in real estate and construction
businesses and as a management consultant.33 Adjovi had himself run for President
in 1991, but finished seventh with only a very small percentage of votes. After leading
Kerekou’s successful campaign for President in 1996, Adjovi served first as Minister of
Defense then later as Minister of Culture and Communications and, finally, Minister of
Commerce, Handicrafts and Tourism, then ran unsuccessfully for Mayor of Cotonou
in the 2002 elections, a position that could have catapulted his chances for success in
the 2006 elections, when Kerekou, after having already served two terms, would not be
eligible to run. In short, Adjovi’s financial support for Kérékou’s campaigns served as
a way for him to advance his own business interests, as well as potentially catapult his
own political career. But the alliance also underscores the more unstable nature of these
types of alliances. Kerekou was relying on a former rival for support and although
Adjovi was allegedly able to profit financially from his investment in Kerekou’s cam32
According to Adjovi, Soglo, in describing, the new alliance between the two men, said “they engage
in a sato-masochistic relationship with their former executioner”(1998: 148).
33
I obtained the CV from the City of Ouidah offices, where Adjovi currently serves as Mayor.
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paign, 34 he was ultimately unable to successfully pursue the political offices to which
he aspired.

2.4

Conclusion

This chapter has both described and analyzed two distinct forms of party financing
in African democracies. Starting from the premise that political competition induces
leaders to adopt more diffuse fundraising strategies, I illustrate how incumbent leaders in Benin and Ghana select alternative fundraising strategies according to the size
of their respective private sectors and the strength of their party organizations. In
Ghana, a larger private sector and stronger party organizations facilitate the awarding of contracts in exchange for donations from formally recognized businesses. In
Benin, a smaller and less formal private sector combined with very weakly organized
parties creates an environment in which it is more favorable for parties to access state
resources directly from bureaucrats in agencies with direct access to state revenues
and rent-seeking opportunities. Not only does this explanation fill a major gap in our
understanding of political party behavior in contemporary African democracies, but it
also lays the groundwork for a more systematic analysis of patronage as a mechanism
of control over state resources, a topic to which I turn in the next chapter.
The analysis in this chapter also raises several important questions about party
financing itself, as well as the broader argument of the dissertation. First, as is discussed
in the last section of this chapter, the self-reinforcing relationship between party systems
and private sector development means that party financing systems are engrained
in a broader context in which economic structure and institutions interact. These
dynamics suggest the development of (at least) two paths for contemporary African
democracies that are likely to become increasingly engrained over time. The patronage
34

While serving in Kerekou’s government, Adjovi founded Telecel Benin, one of the country’s leading
telecommunications companies. The company was later absorbed by Moov, a deal that was allegedly
very lucrative for Adjovi.
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and governing dynamics that result in each path form the subject of the next three
chapters. Second, while it is clear from the discussion why Benin’s incumbents do not
rely to a greater extent on funds that are raised in exchange for government contracts
with private sector actors, it remains considerably less clear why Ghana’s political
leaders choose not to enlist lower level bureaucrats in their party financing efforts.
The difficulty involved in explaining something that does not occur means that this
question remains largely unresolved with available data, an issue I return to in the
concluding chapter.
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Chapter 3
Which Jobs for Which Boys?
As the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 made clear, party patronage represents
an important link between multi-party politics and state capacity. By employing unqualified individuals or politicizing the bureaucracy, patronage may undermine opportunities for the state to successfully pursue economic reform, improve the provision
of public goods and services and respond to citizen needs or desires. Many close observers of democracy in Africa note that intense political competition seems likely to
reproduce, or even worsen, patronage as elected leaders exchange state jobs for support
at the polls. However, the rise and proliferation of political competition in Africa since
the early 1990s has not uniformly led leaders to evade the appointment of technocratic
ministers or usurp public service hiring rules. Why then, in highly competitive, yet
clientelistic democracies, do patronage practices vary?
This chapter argues that leaders use patronage not only for electoral advantage but
to better control the use of state resources for party financing purposes. As the previous
chapter argued, leaders employ party financing strategies according to the availability
of both private sector actors and trusted party agents. Whether parties raise funds by
awarding contracts to businesses in exchange for financial support, or by siphoning
money directly from state coffers, affects the types of patronage strategies they employ
once in office. The implication is that party leaders make patronage decisions in
response to structural factors that shape political fundraising, rather than the narrower
electoral considerations of “buying” votes or turnout. This explanation emphasizes the
need to control the state’s resources as much, if not more than, distributing state jobs
in exchange for vote. It also underscores the importance of asking not only how much
patronage, but more specifically which jobs are distributed and to whom.
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The present chapter shows that patronage practices in Benin and Ghana differ
considerably, not so much in the extent to which politicians use patronage, but rather
in the types of jobs they distribute to their political supporters. The involvement of elite
intermediaries in procurement-based party financing in Ghana translates into higher
levels of political patronage at the elite level. The greater involvement of public servants
in party financing in Benin generates a greater demand for patronage-based recruitment
at the public servant level.
This explanation is supported not only by combining the three types of data described in the Introduction, but also by developing measures of elite patronage that represent considerable improvements over existing measurement strategies. By matching
educational and professional backgrounds to assigned portfolios and directly surveying
public sector employees, I am able to show systematic differences in the appointment
and recruitment practices in Benin and Ghana.
The chapter begins by outlining the theoretical rationale for viewing patronage as
a party financing tool. The second section describes, in greater detail, the construction
of the measures used in the analysis. Section three presents variation in patronage
practices in Benin and Ghana that result from varying modes of party financing. In
the fourth section I assess the strength of the party financing explanation against an
explanation based solely on electoral calculations. I conclude by discussing the broader
implications of these findings for neopatrimonial theories of democracy and the African
state.

3.1

Electoral Competition, Clientelism and Patronage

In much of the literature on clientelistic democracy, the distribution (or promised distribution) of jobs in the state apparatus - what I call patronage - is treated much like
any other state resource that is distributed in exchange for political support (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013; Wantchekon, 2003). Candidates provide or
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promise jobs as a way to mobilize votes, either in the form of “vote buying” (Stokes,
2005) or “turnout buying” (Nichter, 2008). Jobs may come in the form of executive
appointments to key brokers - individuals who can mobilize entire voting blocs - or as
lower-level public service jobs offered to individual voters in exchange for their support. Once called the “common currency” of clientelism in Africa (Clapham, 1982) jobs
are especially appealing to voters as a source of ongoing security, as well as for their
potential access to “prebends” above and beyond the simple paycheck(Joseph, 1987).
Indeed, some scholars suggest that patronage serves a major source of incumbency
advantage in African elections, as well as an important mechanism of elite accommodation (Arriola, 2009; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009; van de Walle, 2003).
Understood as a tool of electoral mobilization, patronage practices ought to reflect
the actual or perceived electoral benefits that accrue to the party or politician. In other
words, the distribution of state jobs ought to reflect the party’s greatest need for votes
or turnout. Although the availability or reliability of brokers may influence patronage
decisions (Stokes et al., 2013), the vote-oriented logic behind patronage remains the
same: distribute jobs to those who deliver votes.
This approach is embodied in explanations of patronage in democracies throughout
the world. While in many cases, robust competition is thought to constrain leaders’
use of patronage (Geddes, 1994; Grzymala-Busse, 2007; Robinson and Verdier, 2013),
research on this topic has found that this effect is likely to be conditional on one of
several factors, such as the institutionalization of the state (Shefter, 1994), level of
economic wealth (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), or party system institutionalization
(O’Dwyer, 2006). In the presence of a highly institutionalized state, a wealthy economy
or a well-developed party system, the electoral costs of patronage-based mobilization
may come to outweigh the benefits, causing politicians to abandon patronage as a
mobilization strategy. For example, the development of broad-based civil service
reform movements may result in a large number of voters willing to “throw the rascals
74

out” (Grindle, 2012). Despite the addition of these useful insights, the general approach
is the same: given the right conditions, greater levels of electoral competition constrain
leaders’ use patronage.
In some ways, “neopatrimonial” theories of African politics pose a challenge to
this expectation. In these contexts of widespread clientelism, leaders derive legitimacy
specifically from their ability to effectively distribute goods and services to their clientele
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1973; Lemarchand, 1988; Médard, 1982;
Scott, 1972). Rather than constraining patronage, greater levels of political competition
may instead heighten the need for leaders to legitimize their rule, perpetuating or
even magnifying their patronage practices. Indeed, some recent research has found
comparably high levels of patronage across both competitive and non-competitive
party systems (Kopecky, 2011), and that the use of clientelistic mobilization is actually
higher in more competitive districts (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008).1
Despite the prevalence of clientelistic forms of exchange in competitive African
democracies, there are reasons to believe that the distribution of patronage jobs, in
particular, may diverge from more general patterns of clientelistic exchange. The same
attributes that render jobs such a valuable “currency” of clientelistic exchange also
present a specific set of challenges to winning candidates, particularly presidents, in
their efforts to control the resources of the state. Unlike the provision of money or
goods in exchange for votes, jobs offer recipients an opportunity to gain access to state
resources, rent-seeking opportunities, or both. As discussed in the previous chapter,
such access could either threaten or bolster the power of the incumbent, as well as their
fate in future elections.
There are also serious empirical obstacles in understanding the extent of patronagebased selection in the state apparatus. A dearth of reliable statistics on public sector em1
Although Lindberg and Morrison are not specifically focused on the distribution of jobs, they suggest
that their findings apply generally to mobilizational strategies.
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ployment throughout Africa combined with the prevalence of fragmented and opaque
hiring practices renders the task of measuring and analyzing patronage particularly
challenging. Some recent work on executive cabinets in African countries, for example,
suggests that cabinets are considerably more diverse than much of the literature suggests (Francois et al., 2012). Likewise, it is not uncommon to come across observations
of variation in the professionalism of African public services, both within and across
countries (i.e. Grindle (1997); Leonard (1991, 2010); Mkandawire (2001)). Without a systematic understanding of the extent of, or variation in, patronage practices, we should
be wary of efforts to ascribe broader theories of the relationship between competition
and clientelism to patterns of patronage in African democracies.

3.1.1

The Role of Party Financing

Though mobilizing votes with patronage is an attractive option to many candidates,
the longer-term political benefit of this approach may depend on the type of position offered and the behavior of the individual once in office. Eisenstadt’s view of
modern neopatrimonialism as a means of controlling “autonomous access to resources
and positions” (Eisenstadt, 1973: 15) is particularly instructive in this regard. As the
dominant economic force in many, if not all, African countries, state employment may
present politicians with a coveted opportunity to, among other things, amass political
resources. In short, if the result of patronage distribution is to grant potential opponents access to state resources, a patronage strategy that focuses only on vote-buying
could easily backfire.
A major task of the politician using patronage as a mobilizational strategy, then, is
to determine which jobs provide access to state resources and which individuals can be
trusted to manage those resources in line with his or her goals. A focus on the dominant
modes of party financing helps us to understand how the politician may confront these
issues in his or her patronage decisions.
76

How parties access state resources, whether through private sector actors or directly
from state employees, has important implications on the types of patronage strategies
leaders employ. The analysis of party financing practices in the previous chapter clues
us in to the potential calculations of incumbent leaders in their decisions to appoint
party agents to ministerial posts or interfere in public service recruitment processes.
Where parties widely engage in raising funds by awarding (or promising to award)
contracts in exchange for donations, it is very important to have political allies, such
as those that have proven their loyalty to the party, in positions that enable them to
award contracts in line with party goals, such as ministerial posts or other high-ranking
offices. Where politicians access state funds more directly through strategically placed
bureaucrats, it is particularly important that they place political allies in the civil service
positions that afford greater access to state funds and rent-seeking opportunities.2
This party-financing based explanation of patronage helps to explain patronage
practices in ways that arguments based on electoral math or ethnic politics cannot. It’s
important to note, however, that the party financing approach put forth in this paper
is not necessarily inconsistent with existing theories of patronage-based mobilization.
It is both possible and likely that leaders balance their interest in controlling economic
resources with concerns about electoral calculations. Additionally, both the party
financing strategies described in the previous chapter require the mutability or weak
enforcement of administrative laws. In more institutionalized states, such as European
or East Asian countries, strong norms of Weberian rule-bound behavior in the executive
apparatus is likely to constrain, to a greater degree, both the use of patronage as well as
the types of party financing described above, thus lending support to Shefter’s theory.
Additionally the explanation set forth is consistent with the notion that in poorer
countries with few formal job opportunities outside of the state, patronage is still a
2
Note that the formulation of patronage used here excludes the concept of co-optation. I view cooptation as a practice of appointment that precludes opposition members from engaging in activities
opposed to the incumbent, rather than necessarily rewarding them for political support.

77

powerful mobilizational tool. This latter observation is consistent with explanations
of patronage that are based on state ownership of the economy and economic wealth,
such as those set forth by Lemarchand (1988), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and
Weitz-Shapiro (2012).

3.2

Measuring Patronage

An empirical examination of the party financing argument depends on our ability
to discern not only how much patronage is used by ruling parties, but also which
jobs are distributed and to whom. This empirical strategy departs from most existing
research on patronage, which rarely distinguishes between types of patronage and/or
provides limited information about the actual recipients of jobs. Due to the difficulties
of obtaining reliable and informative information about patronage practices, scholars
are often forced to to rely on either “competing qualitative judgments” (Kitschelt,
2000: 869), perception-based surveys from citizens or experts3 , or rough proxies such as
cabinet size (Arriola, 2009). The two former approaches can be unreliable and can lack
standardization across countries, especially where definitions of patronage may vary.
The latter approach assumes that all cabinet appointments are based on patronage, thus
blunting our ability to gain a more nuanced understanding of appointment practices.

3.2.1

Elite Patronage

To analyze elite patronage, I code biographical data on government ministers to produce
a series of variables designed to provide insight into the logic of the appointment
decision. The first appointment variable, a dummy variable called EDUCATIONAL
MATCH, measures whether or not the educational background of the appointed cabinet
member matches the portfolio to which they are assigned. Where the educational
background of the minister is directly relevant to the portfolio(s), the EDUCATIONAL
3

See, for example, Kopecky (2011).
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MATCH variable is coded as 1. The same coding process is used for the variable
PROFESSIONAL MATCH, but assesses the relevance of the appointee’s professional
background, including their stated profession and their previous work history, to their
portfolio assignment.
Coding the MATCH variables involved several challenges. First, in some cases
ministers have educational or professional backgrounds that are generally relevant
to the post, but do not represent expertise in the particular policy sector. Common
examples include degrees in law or public administration for portfolios that do not
correspond directly to those fields (i.e. portfolios other than, for example, Justice or
Human Rights for those with law degrees, or portfolios other than, for example, Finance
or Civil Service for those with public administration degrees). To address this issue I
present two- and three-category versions of each of the MATCH variables. The first
variable, which I call EDUCATION/PROFESSIONAL MATCH-2, is a simple binary
coding of whether a match is present or not. In this variable, backgrounds of general
relevance are presumed to NOT be relevant to the assigned portfolio. In the threecategory version, called EDUCATION/PROFESSION-3, 0 represents backgrounds that
are not at all relevant, 1 represents a background with general relevance to the position,
and 2 represents a background with specific relevance to the portfolio.
Second, in some cases it was difficult to know what type of educational or professional background would be most relevant to the assigned portfolio. To the extent
possible, I enlisted help from local researchers from both countries to make these judgment calls. In some cases, however, best guesses were required.
A third variable, labeled TECHNOCRAT, aggregates (by addition) EDUCATIONAL
MATCH-3, PROFESSIONAL MATCH-3, and a 5-point scale representing educational
level.4 The resulting variable runs from 0 to 7 and is used to measure the extent to
4
Educational level is coded as follows: 1 - High School Degree/Bac, 2 - Some post-secondary school
training, 3 - Bachelors/Bac +3 or equivalent, 4 - masters/Bac+4 or equivalent, 5 - PhD/Bac+5 or equivalent.
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which each appointee can be considered a technocrat in their portfolio sector.
In addition to examining the extent to which their educational and professional
backgrounds match their portfolios, I also use the minister database to inquire into
appointees’ political backgrounds. Using information on appointees’ party affiliation(s)
as well as their past roles and length of membership in the party, I construct a categorical
variable called POLITICAL PROFILE. Political profile is coded as 0 if the appointee has
no apparent political experience. A POLITICAL PROFILE score of 1 signifies that this
person is a longtime personal ally or friend of the incumbent President. A POLITICAL
PROFILE score of 2 indicates a long-serving member of the incumbent party or coalition.
I code those who are newer allies of the President with a POLITICAL PROFILE score of
3.5 A POLITICAL PROFILE score of 4 signifies that this is a member of an opposition
party at the time of appointment. Again, the information collected did not always
permit an informed assessment of the political background and I would welcome
opportunities to employ additional coders in the future.
Two (more) potential problems with these data merit explicit attention. First, it
was not possible to locate biographical information for 100% of ministers. In Benin, 43
appointees are missing data on either their educational or professional backgrounds,
while 21 are missing data on their political backgrounds. The amount of missing
data is similar in Ghana where 40 are missing educational or professional data and
31 are missing data on their political backgrounds.6 It is possible, but unlikely, that
missing data are systematically related to the appointee’s background, for example if
the government was trying to hide the fact that some ministers were not very well
qualified for their position. But in this case, missing information is distributed mostly
evenly across countries and presidential terms, with a slightly greater amount missing
5
The difference between a longstanding political ally and a newer one is whether support for the
party/president was only observable as far back as the immediately preceding election.
6
In almost all of the Ghana cases I can identify their party affiliation. The percent missing means that
I was not able to determine their level of activism or their length of time in the party.
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from earlier years. In Benin, 18 of those missing educational data are coded as having
no known prior political experience, while 14 are coded as either close personal or
partisan allies of the President. The situation is slightly different in Ghana because
almost all appointees are party members. There, 26 of those missing educational data
are coded as partisan allies, while only 1 (of 4 total in Ghana) have no known political
experience.
Second, experts in both countries expressed concern that those nominated for their
positions are prone to provide false information on their CVs. In Ghana, these instances
are sometimes documented in reports of the Parliament’s Appointments Committee.
On several occasions, for example, the Appointments Committee members openly
questioned the information provided on nominees’ CVs and in some cases asked them
to change their CV before allowing a vote on the appointment. Specific concerns about
the veracity of educational diplomas earned overseas or online were prominent in both
countries. In general, these concerns warrant at least some skepticism about the overall
levels of qualification and training of Ministers, but should not seriously impact the
findings of this analysis since the phenomenon seems prevalent and would have the
same overall effect in both countries.

3.2.2

Public Service Patronage

I measure public service patronage using a series of survey questions included in the
survey of public employees. The questions, numbers 5, 6, 21 and 22 on the questionnaire
provided in Appendix A, are as follows:
• Which of the following BEST DESCRIBES how you came to be employed in the
public service?
• Which of the following BEST DESCRIBES how other staff at your organization
get hired?
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• Are you a member of a political party?
• Did you participate in a political campaign during the last election?
Although the possible responses to the first two questions (family/friend,
exam/interview or involvement in a political party or campaign)7 are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, the questions do ask respondents to choose one response, thereby
understating the extent to which other factors may influence the hiring process. It is
hoped that the questions about party membership and political campaigning will help
to tease out the potential influence of political factors in hiring.

3.3

Analysis

I begin by investigating the proportions of appointees with educational and professional backgrounds relevant to their assigned portfolio(s). Given that Ghana’s system
of party financing through contracts requires more party agents at higher levels of the
executive to award contracts, we expect that Ministers in Ghana will have lower levels
of relevant technical proficiency as well as higher levels of political experience than
their Beninese counterparts.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show mosaic plots for the EDUCATION MATCH-2 and PROFESSIONAL MATCH-2 variables respectively. Differences in the two countries are
readily apparent, though perhaps not as extreme as we might expect from the previous
discussion. Whereas 41.7% of Benin appointees possess educational backgrounds with
high relevance to their positions, the same can be said of only 22.5% of Ghana’s Ministers. Likewise, 47.4% of Benin’s Ministers have relevant professional backgrounds as
7

In the Ghana version of the survey, we also included an option for National Service. University
graduates in Ghana complete a National Service requirement, many of whom are placed in public
organizations. Fifty-eight of the 508 responding to the hiring question reported that they were first hired
through National Service. When analyzing results, I coded these the same as I would for a response of
exam/interview since several National Service employees are generally required to interview for their
positions.
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Relevant
Not Relevant

Educational Background

Figure 3.1: EDUCATIONAL MATCH-2 in Benin and Ghana
22.4%
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77.6%
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58.3%
(123)

Benin

Ghana

opposed to only 28.9% of Ghana’s appointees. In difference-of-proportions tests, both
variables produce large and statistically significant z-statistics.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present the three-category variables for PROFESSIONAL
MATCH and EDUCATION MATCH. Since appointments of ministers with a generallyrelevant background were coded as “not relevant” in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the proportion
with “relevant” backgrounds does not change. We are able to see in Figure 3.3, however, that 36.0%in Benin and 32.7% in Ghana have educational backgrounds that are
generally relevant to their positions. In Figure 3.4 we see that 32.7% in Benin and 34.4%
in Ghana have professional backgrounds that are generally relevant to their positions.
This means, for example, that perhaps they served in previously in the government but
not in a position that was directly relevant to their assigned portfolio.
Although the differences between the two countries are not extreme, the patterns
are generally consistent with the hypothesized expectations. Appointees in Benin
are approximately 20% more likely to have educational backgrounds that are directly
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Figure 3.2: PROFESSIONAL MATCH-2 in Benin and Ghana
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Figure 3.3: EDUCATIONAL MATCH-3 in Benin and Ghana
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Figure 3.4: PROFESSIONAL MATCH-3 in Benin and Ghana
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relevant to their assigned portfolio and approximately 10% more likely to have professional backgrounds relevant to their assigned portfolio. Another way to compare
appointees across the two countries uses the TECHNOCRAT variable, which follows
similar cross-country patterns. Benin’s average TECHNOCRAT score comes out to
5.02 while Ghana’s is only 4.21. The t-statistic comparing these two means is 5.99 with
p <.001. This statistically significant difference means that all three of the variables
analyzed in this section, EDUCATIONAL MATCH, PROFESSIONAL MATCH AND
TECHNOCRAT, indicate that Benin’s appointees are significantly more likely to have
backgrounds that are both more relevant and more expertise for their portfolio.
An examination of the political backgrounds of appointees provides further evidence of the higher frequency of elite level patronage in Ghana. Differences in the
POLITICAL PROFILE variable, presented in Figure 3.5 are consistent with the expected findings, showing that appointments of elite political allies are significantly
85

Table 3.1: Difference-of-Means Test: TECHNOCRAT

Benin

Mean
6.65

St. Dev.
.11

t
5.14***

Ghana

5.81

.12

*** p<.001

more prevalent in Ghana than in Benin. While nearly 32% of appointees in Benin have
no apparent political background, the same can be said for only 4% in Ghana. Upwards
of 94% of Ghanaian ministers are either longtime or newer allies (members) of the ruling party compared to 54% in Benin. As expected given Benin’s more fragmented and
volatile party system, ministers there are more likely to be co-opted from opposition
parties than in Ghana where less than 2% have been members of parties other than the
ruling party.
Finally, the data show that, in most cases, presidents face a real tradeoff between
technocracy and political patronage. This tradeoff is less stark in Ghana where almost
14% of those appointed had either educational or professional backgrounds matching their portfolio and were also politically active for the incumbent party. In Benin,
however, less than 7% of appointees had both technocratic and politically active backgrounds.
The data presented in this section suggest that patterns of elite patronage practices
vary in ways consistent with the party-financing argument advanced above. Elite patronage is considerably more common in Ghana. Compared to their Beninese counterparts, Ghanaian ministers are likely to have longer political histories and qualifications
that are less relevant to their portfolios. The party financing logic, itself informed by
the structure of the private sector and the party system, helps us to understand why
Ghanaian Presidents are likely to appoint a large proportion of political supporters to
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Figure 3.5: Political Backgrounds of Ministers in Benin and Ghana
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ministerial posts. Not only are these elite-level allies less important in the Beninese
system of party financing, but the fragmented and fluid nature of the party system
makes it considerably more risky to appoint those with political ambition to powerful
posts. Instead, Benin’s Presidents seem to favor the safer alternative of either appointing technocrats with little, if any, political experience or ambition or stunting opposition
members’ abilities to build their party by co-opting them into government.

3.3.1

Public Service Patronage

Do the patronage patterns in public service recruitment reflect those at the cabinet level
or do they follow the logics of party financing described above? The party financing
perspective would predict higher levels of public service patronage in Benin, where it is
necessary to have political allies in positions that enable them to access state revenues
or rents. I analyze the prevalence of patronage in the hiring of personnel to public
organizations using data obtained from the written survey of public sector employees
in each country. The findings indicate that patronage practices differ considerably at
elite and public servant levels. As expected, higher levels of public service patronage
are evident in Benin.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show statistically significant differences in the role of political
affiliation in hiring. Whereas nearly 20% of the survey respondents in Benin reported
that their political affiliation was the main way that they obtained their job, less than 1%
of respondents in Ghana answered the question in this way. Although that percentage
jumps to 4% when Ghanaians were asked about others in the organization, there is
still a difference in the proportion of respondents (z=5.94) with p<.01. Interestingly,
more Beninese respondents reported that they themselves were hired based on political
affiliation (20%) than their perception about the ways that others in their organization
were hired (15%).
As a second indication that public sector patronage may be more politicized in
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Figure 3.6: Survey: How you were hired?
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Figure 3.7: Survey: How others were hired?
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Figure 3.8: Survey: Campaign for a candidate/party in the last election?
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Benin than in Ghana, I report survey responses to the question of whether or not those
surveyed affiliate with a political party and whether s/he campaigned on behalf of a
candidate or party in the prior election. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 indicate that the public
sector employees surveyed are significantly more political in Benin than in Ghana. The
results, moreover, differ from overall levels of party affiliation and campaign activism
as reflected in the Round 5 Afrobarometer surveys.8 In Benin, 32.2% of Afrobarometer
respondents reported feeling close to a political party while 66.19 responded that they
do not feel close to a political party. In Ghana, 59.7% of Afrobarometer respondents
said yes to the question of whether or not they feel close to a political party while
35.21% said no. Thus, the results of the public sector survey appear to capture trends
in the politicization of public sector employment that are distinct from variation in the
overall party affiliation rates in the population.
8

The surveys were conducted in Benin in 2011 (after the 2011 election) and in Ghana in 2012 (before
the 2012 election).
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Figure 3.9: Survey: Member of a political party?
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The data collected from the survey provide consistent evidence that patronage
drives recruitment to Benin’s public sector to a much larger extent than in Ghana. The
findings further suggest that such politicization may result specifically from patronagebased recruitment, with over 37% of Beninese public sector workers having said that
they campaigned for a party or candidate in the last election. Once again, these
patronage patterns are consistent with a party financing explanation. The need to
place politically supportive bureaucrats in positions with access to state resources and
rent-seeking opportunities translates into high levels of public service patronage in
Benin.9
9

The results, however, leave open the question of why ruling parties in Ghana have not also utilized
patronage-based recruitment to the public service, a question I turn to in the next section.
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3.4

Assessing the Electoral Argument

Before concluding this chapter, I test the possibility that electoral calculations may also
be at play in the decisions animating these patronage patterns. If patronage decisions
were based primarily on electoral logics, we would expect a consistent, disproportionately large patronage benefit for individuals from either swing (vote-buying) or
stronghold (turnout-buying) regions for the incumbent party. This section examines
the viability of this hypothesis by analyzing the extent to which ministerial posts are
distributed along these logics.10 There is some marginal evidence of this pattern in
Ghana and none at all in Benin.
Figure 3.10 shows distribution of ministerial appointments to stronghold, opposition and swing regions. Each region is classified based on the results of the most
recent presidential election. Stronghold regions are regions where the winning candidate received greater than 60% of the vote. Opposition regions are regions where the
winning candidate received less than 40% of the vote. Swing regions are regions where
the winning candidate received between 40% and 60% of the vote.11 I compare the
proportion of appointees from each type of region to the proportion of the country’s
population residing in the various types of regions.12
What is striking is that the evidence that ministerial appointments are used for
vote-buying or turnout-buying is not consistent across the two countries. As shown in
Figure 3.10, the proportion of appointees from stronghold and swing regions appears
10

Ideally, I would also be able to test this argument for civil service patronage, but my data do not
allow for that. I am in the process of trying to obtain statistics on the ethno-regional makeup of the civil
service in each country.
11
I consider this classification of swing regions as conservative, in that it minimizes number the
opposition regions. An alternative specification of swing regions as, say, 45%-55% of the vote for the
winning candidate only strengthens the possibility of having more appointees from opposition regions.
In elections where there were two rounds of voting, vote percentages were taken from the first round of
voting.
12
Surely, a more useful statistic for this purpose would be the number of eligible voters rather than
the population, but I was not able to obtain reliable data on eligible voters stretching back in time.
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Figure 3.10: Ministerial Allocation by Vote Region
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disproportionately large in Ghana, but the distribution in Benin is very even, with
a larger proportion of appointments going to individuals from opposition regions.
A closer examination of Ghana’s appointments in each Presidential term (see Figure
3.11), reveals that there is no consistent patterns of awarding ministerial appointments
to individuals from particular regions. Ministers from opposition regions have been
over-represented in two of the six presidential administrations (1993-1996 and 20012004) and nearly evenly represented in the 2005-2008 term. Moreover, the data show no
clear pattern of a preference for appointing ministers from stronghold areas, as many
theories of clientelistic voting would suggest.

3.5

Conclusion

This chapter has conducted a comprehensive comparison of patronage practices in
Benin in Ghana. The results of the analysis are consistent with a party financing-based
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theory of patronage. Specifically, the data suggest that elite-level patronage is more
common in Ghana, where the incumbent president depends on party agents to award
contracts to politically supportive firms. By contrast, in Benin, the president is more
likely to appoint technocrats with little political experience and opposition members
to ministerial posts.13 The data show that public service patronage is more common in
Benin, where the ruling party is more likely to raise funds from bureaucrats. Moreover,
the low levels of political patronage in Ghana’s public sector is rather striking, especially
in light of the neopatrimonial conceptions of African states.
The analysis also provides evidence that ministerial appointments do not necessarily follow an electoral math logic, either in terms of vote-buying or turnout-buying.
Though there is more that could be done to test this alternative hypothesis, the evidence provided in this chapter provides reason to question that applicability of these
13

As I show in the next chapter, these appointees are also more likely to leave their posts more quickly
and not have much leeway to do their jobs or access resources.
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explanations. Further work along these lines might, for example, break down the data
to the district level, conduct similar regional-level analyses of public-service hiring or
test arguments related to elite-level accommodations related to legislative dynamics.
In addition to providing an alternative understanding of patronage practices, this
research demonstrates the importance of distinguishing patronage from other forms
of clientelism. Unlike the provision of a school, hospital, electricity or roads, patronage jobs often come with the potential for ongoing access to state resources, especially
in contexts of weakly institutionalized administrative laws. This means that incumbents must carefully decide which ‘boys’ are appointed to particular jobs, suggesting
the need to refocus neopatrimonial theories of democracy on questions about control
(i.e.(Eisenstadt, 1973; Kopecky, 2011)) as much as, if not more than, questions about
electoral transaction. The analysis also underscores the need to develop better empirical strategies for the study of patronage. This chapter shows that there are useful gains
to be made by employing more informative and objective measures of patronage and
by considering jointly the patronage patterns at elite and civil servant levels.
By examining the connection between party financing and patronage, this chapter
and the previous chapter have laid the groundwork necessary to examine how party
politics influence the workings of executive institutions after the appointment or hiring decision is made. The next chapter considers the ways that elite-level patronage
influence the workings of the state’s executive institutions at the apex of government,
then Chapter 5 moves on to an investigation of the politicization and performance of
public service organizations.
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Chapter 4
Elite Patronage and State Executive Capacity
Whether presidents choose to appoint technocrats or political supporters has consequences for the capacity and performance of their executive institutions. On the
one hand, technical experts may provide the competency and autonomy necessary
to devise and pursue strong policy programs. On the other hand, political loyalists
are likely to make executive institutions more responsive to presidents’ agendas and,
under certain conditions, more responsive to the public. This chapter demonstrates
that in neopatrimonial contexts, the appointment of elite political allies to executive
posts provides the stability and cohesion necessary to pursue developmental goals in
a relatively effective manner.
In particular, this chapter analyzes how variation in patronage practices in Benin
and Ghana affect the capacity of the state’s executive institutions to achieve development goals, irregardless of the content of those goals. Rather than adhere strictly
to a Weberian-inspired analysis this chapter focuses on three attributes of executive
institutions that are known to engender greater capacity in a variety of contexts: technical competence, stability and cohesion. The chapter’s findings suggest that elite-level
patronage in Ghana, despite lower levels of technical competence, produce more stable and cohesive cabinets, ultimately contributing to a greater capacity to successfully
develop and implement policy over time. Technical competence, though often the focal point of Weberian analysis, may be more limited if governments are unstable and
lacking cohesion at their apex.
The chapter begins by presenting evidence of variation in state capacity in Benin
and Ghana, which serves as a backdrop to both Chapters 4 and 5. The second section
outlines theoretical expectations about the ways that patronage practices affect state
capacity, particularly at the apex of government. I then turn to the data to compare the
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three attributes of executive capacity across the two countries: technical competence,
stability and cohesion. Reflecting on the analysis, the fourth section discusses the theoretical implications and contemplates the mechanistic role of information asymmetry
in linking appointment practices to executive capacity.

4.1

Patronage and Executive Capacity

Scholars have long debated the relative merits of various modes of executive appointment. The dilemma stems from the notion that presidents must, simultaneously, balance the need to remain responsive to voters while effectively steering the bureaucracy
to achieve policy goals. Theory dictates that while appointing political loyalists helps
to achieve the former goal, technocrats will be more likely to succeed in the latter.1
The literature on neopatrimonial states, however, generates somewhat different
expectations. The president’s political clientele, those who have supported her efforts
to rise to power, are likely to themselves have patron-client networks to which they must
attend. The pyramidical nature of political ties, described by Scott (1972) and others,
generates centrifugal pressures that draw power and resources away from the center,
thus severely impeding the state’s ability to act autonomously from particularistic
interests in society. This perspective forms the basis of some theories that assert the
weakness of African states relative to their societies (Chabal and Daloz., 1999; Kohli,
2004; Migdal, 1988). The implication is that the appointment of political supporters is
especially harmful to the state’s executive capacity in these clientelistic contexts.
Despite extensive acceptance of this logic, there have been few efforts to systematically assess the effects of patronage on state capacity in Africa, and to understand when
patronage may be more or less consequential for the capacity of state institutions. This
chapter offers an analysis that begins to provide a more empirically-informed understanding of the ways that appointment practices actually shape the workings of the
1

For a nice overview of these dilemmas, see Peters et al. (2004).
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state’s executive institutions.
In the following paragraphs, I outline three important ingredients of a state’s executive capacity: technical competence, stability and cohesion. In addition to explaining
how these concepts affect the potential performance of the executive, I also discuss
theoretical expectations about the ways that patronage practices may influence each of
these components.

4.1.1

Technical Competence

Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy suggest a fundamental tradeoff between technical
competence and patronage. The practice of patronage itself, whereby individuals
are appointed based on their political allegiance to a leader, is essentially a form of
traditional authority and runs against the principles of rational-legal authority on
which modern bureaucracy is based. In reality, however, Weber acknowledges the
co-existence of these two forms of authority in systems where cabinet ministers, for
example, are not specialists (Weber, 1978). The lack of technical competence that results
from high levels of patronage undermines the efficiency of the bureaucratic system, a
claim with both widespread theoretical import and empirical support.
While the relationship between technical competence and the performance of public organizations is generally well established empirically (Rauch and Evans, 2000),
the relationship between technical competence and executive capacity in particular
is more questionable.

On the one hand, studies of both industrialized countries

(Gallo and Lewis, 2012; Maranto, 2005) and the rapidly developing East Asian states
of the post-War era (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982) suggest that technical competence
at minister/secretary-levels is an important ingredient in ensuring government commitment to development programs, the state’s necessary autonomy from society as
well as the general performance of state agencies. Others have questioned the relative value of technical competence and political loyalty at the elite level, pointing to
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higher levels of accountability and commitment that result from the appointment of
politically loyal individuals. Describing this perspective in the Latin American context, Grindle writes: “at times politicians have employed patronage as a tool to bring
about significant policy reform and improved performance of government by bringing
in ‘their people’ to support change. Thus, the ability to colonize often rigid or ineffective bureaucratic organizations with those who share commitment to new policy
agendas...are valued opportunities for many reform-oriented presidents and their ministers” (Grindle, 2010: 3-4). Whether or not patronage helps or hinders performance is
likely to depend on the extent to which technocratic appointees are empowered to use
their knowledge and the extent to which patronage-based appointees actually commit
to the President and his agenda. Since neopatrimonial theories perceive the recipients
of patronage appointments as likely to be well-entrenched in their own patron-client
networks, the use of patronage by leaders in neopatrimonial contexts is commonly
viewed as especially detrimental to the potential for effective pursuit of policy goals.

4.1.2

Stability

While much of the literature on government stability in parliamentary systems focuses
on the partisan composition of the governing coalition, I focus more specifically on
what Huber (1998) calls “portfolio volatility,” defined as changes in the control of
policy portfolios within the government. The partisan composition approach is not
relevant to these cases for several reasons. First, even if parties are quasi-ideological, as
in Ghana, the actual policy programs pursued by Ghana’s governments have typically
not resembled the parties’ ideological roots. Partisan composition, therefore, is unlikely
to correspond to support for particular policies, at least on ideological grounds. Second,
the dominance of Ghana’s two major parties system renders partisan composition
basically moot, since nearly all ministers selected are affiliated with the ruling party.
Third, although, in theory, the practice of transhumance in Benin means that both ruling
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and opposition party members are likely to be negotiating changes in their party
affiliation during terms. Any benefits in terms of government effectiveness that result
from stability of partisan composition in the executive is likely neutralized by this
practice.
Described by (Lijphart, 1968: 72) as a measure of “the health of the system,” government stability is important to executive capacity for several intuitive reasons. First,
frequent changes in ministers can threaten the sustainability of key government initiatives, for example reducing the time horizons of executive actors (Cornell, 2013)2 . Such
shortened time horizons can produce an environment in which ministers are likely to
greatly discount longer-term benefits of the policies pursued and favor defection. This
tendency is particularly well-documented by Simmons (1994) in her study of foreign
economic policy. She finds that cabinet instability shortens time horizons in ways that
inhibit coordination and conflict management, ultimately limiting the potential for mutually cooperative actions (Simmons, 1994: 61). Difficulties related to commitment and
coordination are likely to result where there are high turnover rates amongst ministers
both inside and outside of the cabinet.
Second, stability in the executive can improve effectiveness because it promotes
cooperation amongst ministers and civil servants. As Huber (1998) notes, such control
is important because bureaucrats and ministers may have competing objectives. He
writes that:
obtaining reliable information should be easiest when a cabinet minister
knows that s/he shares a common objective with civil servants, expects to be
in a long-run relationship with them, and bears low costs of oversight. If a
cabinet minister is new to a particular post, then s/he will often be uncertain
about the preferences of civil servants. This uncertainty should decline
as the minister’s tenure increases enabling the minister to learn on whom
2

Cornell focuses more specifically on career bureaucrats, but the logic certainly applies to ministers
as well
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to be in a long-run equilibrium relationship with performance. (Huber,
1998: 579-580)
Though Huber’s analysis focuses specifically on the ways that portfolio stability promotes informational sharing between civil servant and bureaucrat, one can see how
conditions that facilitate cooperation between these sets of actors can affect performance in a multitude of ways, for example in building trusting relationships that
facilitate coordination and control without incurring high costs of monitoring.
Finally, stability shapes the extent to which ministers are experienced in government.
The need for learning in the executive, a concept advanced most notably by Heclo
(1977), suggests that a “government of strangers” entails an often-elusive search for
effective political management of the bureaucracy. Politicians appointed to executive
leadership positions must learn to navigate the bureaucratic and the political landscapes
in government, learn how to control bureaucrats and manage stakeholders and, in
many cases, learn the specific technicalities of their policy sector. Such varied forms
of learning take time. The accumulation of experience is particularly important in this
regard.
The specific link between patronage and stability (or volatility) is not well theorized
in the literature, especially in the African context. One study of parliamentary democracies in Europe suggests that larger parties have a larger pool of potential ministers
from which to choose, therefore leading to and reducing problems related to adverse
selection (Huber, 1998). In Benin and Ghana’s semi-presidential systems, however, the
Presidents select all ministers and so they are formally free to choose from any party.3
As explained above, neopatrimonial theories might suggest that patronage-based appointees are likely to have their own patron-client networks to which they must attend,
thereby reducing their likelihood of remaining loyal to the President after the initial
3

In Ghana, the president must appoint at least half of all cabinet members from Parliament, but there
is no restriction in terms of party affiliation.
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appointment. For example, Rose-Ackerman’s (1999) work suggests that patronage will
lead to more corruption in government, leading to potential problems for the party
leader. In both of these models, the extent to which patronage breeds stability depends
on the ability of party leaders (presidents) to know and control their ministers.

4.1.3

Cohesion

The ability to effectively pursue policy goals is ultimately limited if executive actors
are unable to act as a unified group. Lacking cohesion threatens both commitment to
the government’s agenda and coordination of policy implementation. The notion of
elite cohesion appears particularly prominently in literature on developmental states,
but has also been applied elsewhere. Viewed in terms of government effectiveness, the
concept takes two basic forms: policy cohesion and corporate cohesion.
The importance of policy cohesion is evident in works on developmentalism such
as those by Waldner (1999) and Frye (2010). The concept encompasses the notion that
elites must be unified in their views of desired economic outcomes and the role of the
state in development. As Waldner writes,
political stability is a function of the level of consensus about the proper
economic role of the state, which in turn is strongly influenced by the degree of elite homogeneity. Elites can resolve relatively technical questions
about efficiency within the parameters of existing political arrangements
and even conflict about distributive concerns may be peacefully resolved
through compromise. When debate erupts about the legitimacy of economic outcomes or about the threats to property posed by state control over
the economy, however, it is unlikely that people will act in the predictably,
routine ways that constitute institutionalized policies. (Waldner, 1999: 151)
Viewed from this perspective, cohesion helps to generate a set of clear and consistent
policy goals, as well as the commitment of key actors towards those goals. A clear and
unified vision can help to mobilize public and bureaucratic support for this vision,
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coordinate action within the executive and provide a set of clear goals against which to
measure progress.
A second type of cohesion results not from homogenous perspectives on policy
questions, but rather from a corporate culture that sets rulers apart from the social
groups over which they are trying to exert control. This view of cohesion is especially prevalent in studies of East Asian countries, such as Japan and Korea, where
the cohesion of political and business elites produced a synergy that enabled their
governments to pursue developmental policies that helped to grow and transform key
industries (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982). The corporate cohesion at the apex of government was also, in some cases such as South Korea and Brazil, a result of military
officers gaining power. According to Kohli, developmentalism in Brazil resulted from
military-influenced cohesion and discipline where “[developmental] priorities trickled
down, molding the behavior of economic bureaucrats in a manner that contributed
to the state’s effectiveness” (Kohli, 2004: 198). This form of cohesion stands in stark
contrast to his account of Nigeria, where the military officers themselves lacked professionalism and organizational cohesion, which ultimately contributed to an inability
of military rulers to effectively pursue developmental policies.
To the extent that parties themselves might serve as a source of cohesion, then
appointment practices that favor party patronage may indeed produce cohesion where
other potential sources of cohesion are lacking. Where the goal is to balance a variety
of factors in appointment decisions, or keep power away from particular groups, then
appointment practices themselves are unlikely to have a positive effect on cohesion.

4.2

Analysis

This section investigates the ways that varying appointment practices in Benin and
Ghana influence the technical competence, stability and cohesion of the executive.
Drawing on multiple sources of data, both quantitative and qualitative, the analysis
103

presents trends both across countries and over time to shed light on the relationship
of patronage to the state’s executive capacity. The over-time comparisons use the
presidential term as the relevant time unit.

4.2.1

Technical Competence

As was evident in the previous chapter, ministers in Benin are likely to have more
technocratic backgrounds than those in Ghana. The analysis showed that ministers in
Benin were nearly twice as likely to have educational and/or professional backgrounds
relevant to their assigned portfolio. From the data, we can assess the education levels
of ministers appointed by each president across the two countries.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that whereas the percentage of Ministers in Ghana with PhDs
or MD’s has declined substantially since 1993, the percentage in Benin has remained
more or less stable over the five presidential terms. Although the percentage has
declined slightly in the Yayi’s terms in office, which began in 2001, the overall number
of Ministers with high-level degrees remains remarkably high (22 in Yayi’s first term
from 2001-2006). A particularly precipitous drop occurred between Kufuor’s first and
second term. By some accounts, Kufuor, during his first term from 2001-2004 tried to
balance his preference for technocrats with a mix of party loyalists, both those who
would tend to party needs and MP’s who would help him secure his parliamentary
majority for key votes (Lindberg and Zhou, 2009). But when the implementation of his
signature health insurance program started to get off-track, Kufuor eventually replaced
the more technocratic ministers with ones he could rely on politically (Agyepong and
Adjei, 2008).
Although there exists a stronger tendency to appoint individuals with high levels of
education in Benin, intellectuals often encounter difficulties once appointed to office.
In one particularly notorious instance, Yayi appointed Collette Houeto, a highly accomplished figure in education, as the Minister of Primary and Secondary Education.
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Soglo
1991-1996
Kerekou
1996-2001
Kerekou
2001-2006
Yayi
2006-2011
Yayi
2011Total

No High School High School Bachelors
2
5
3
4.7%
14.2%
9.4%
0
8
6
0.0%
22.2%
16.7%
0
5
12
0.0%
15.0%
35.0%
2
6
18
2.7%
8.1%
24.2%
0
11
6
0.0%
26.0%
15.6%
4
34
46
1.7%
15.6%
20.8%

MA or Law PhD or MD
14
12
37.7%
33.0%
8
14
22.2%
38.9%
5
12
15.0%
35.0%
25
22
34.9%
29.6%
11
9
26.0%
21.3%
63
73
28.6%
33.0%

Table 4.1: Education Levels of Ministers in Benin
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Rawlings
1993-1996
Rawlings
1997-2000
Kufuor
1997-2000
Kufuor
2005-2008
Mills
2009-2012
Mahama
2013Total

No High School High School Bachelors
0
1
4
0.0%
5.5%
22.2%
0
3
10
0.0%
12.0%
40.0%
3
7
21
5.4%
12.5%
37.5%
0
5
33
0.0%
7.5%
49.3%
0
11
26
0.0%
19.6%
46.4%
0
6
17
0.0%
14.0%
39.5%
3
33
111
1.1%
12.5%
41.8%

MA or Law PhD or MD
8
5
44.4%
27.8%
6
6
24.0%
24.0%
13
12
23.2%
21.4%
23
6
34.3%
9.0%
14
5
25.0%
8.9%
14
6
32.6%
14.0%
78
40
29.4%
15.1%

Table 4.2: Education Levels of Ministers in Ghana

When Houeto sought to appoint a past colleague as her chief of staff in the ministry, a
highly respected expert in education, Yayi expressed public disapproval of this choice
and fired her not for incompetence, but for “independence of mind and firmness.” At
the heart of the issue, according to one journalist, was that both Houeto and her chief
of staff had been closely affiliated with educational programs of the Catholic Church
which, in Yayi’s own words “threatened the cohesion of the government.”

4

Another example concerns the Beninese Minister of Health who has served under
both Kerekou and Yayi, Dorothée Kindé Gazard. Gazard, according to one former
official in the Ministry of Health, is amongst the most competent and respected of
any Minister that has served in the Government of Benin, with strong connections to
the international community that empower her to accomplish goals even when the
government does not offer high levels of support.5 When Gazard sought to become the
Regional Director for Africa of the World Health Organization, a position that could
elevate the position of Benin and their opportunities for international health resources,
it was lack of support from Yayi that ultimately foiled her opportunity to get selected
for the post. Citing her close connection to National Assembly President Malthurin
Coffi Nago and the fact that she never became a “militant” for the ruling FCBE party,
Yayi took a number of steps to undermine her efforts to occupy this strategic position.6
While some observers noted that this type of treatment of technocrats may be
specific to Yayi’s leadership style,7 it also reflects the broader notion that in Benin’s
political-economic landscape, Ministers are often not trusted to command any authority independent of the President. Additionally, although it is not uncommon for
Ghana’s presidents to assign troublesome ministers to Ambassadorial posts, these are
usually in instances where they have actively sought to detract from the Presidents’
4

Journalist inteview, Cotonou, March 18, 2014. See also, Panapress, July 16, 2006.
Cotonou, November 11, 2013.
6
Les Infos Plus, November 6, 2014.
7
Academic, Abomey-Calavi, November 22, 2013; and Ministry of Civil Service Employee, Cotonou,
March 20, 2014.
5
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agenda or interfere with party ambitions, rather than on account of their interest in
advancing the development agenda. One NPP official explained that the party actively
seeks intellectuals and technical experts to join at a younger age in order to increase the
availability of individuals who can be viewed both as party loyalists and technical experts.8 The NDC has, arguably, been more successful with this strategy beginning with
Rawlings, whose inner circle included a number of academics with leftist credentials.
One intellectual, Kwamena Ahwoi, originally a Lecturer at the Ghana Law School who
served in several ministerial positions in Rawlings’ PNDC government (then called
Secretaries, not Ministers) as well as the NDC government in the 1990s, explained how
he entered the government:
In 1978 I returned to Ghana and lectured in the faculty of law at the University of Ghana until 1982 when the coup d’état took place and the chairman
of the ruling council at the time, Jerry Rawlings, invited me to join his government. So I worked in the Secretariat of the government from 1983 to
1988, when I was appointed to the Ministry of Local Government. I was
doing this alongside my lecturing and activities at the university, then in
1993 I left the university and attended full time to government business.
This was when we moved into constitutional rule and I had to become a
full-time minister.9
Indeed, Rawlings’ governments included a number of noteworthy intellectuals,
including economists, lawyers and engineers. Many of them reportedly did not know
Rawlings prior to joining the government, but Rawlings was impressed with their
academic accomplishments, their revolutionary credentials or both.10 Though the
numbers in Table 4.2 suggest that the inclusion of technical experts has waned in the
years since Rawlings left office, the qualitative inquiry reminds us that the numbers
themselves do not necessarily reflect the extent to which technocrats are meaningfully
8

Kumasi, December 5, 2013
Princeton Innovations for Successful Societies Interview, 2009
10
Former Minister, Accra, July 14, 2014.
9
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included in the inner circles of the presidents, and in the workings of government more
generally.

4.2.2

Stability

As explained above, government stability is important not only for consistency in policy
and public management but also in terms of ministers’ opportunities to learn on the
job. This section explores the rates of portfolio turnover, the stability of the government
and the retention of ministers in each country.
I begin by comparing the total number of appointments each year in the two countries, as displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. As expected, the highest number of appointments occur when a new president is inaugurated, signified by the years that
are depicted in red. Outside of election years, divergent patterns are to some extent
detectable both across countries and over time within each country. Whereas an increasing amount of instability is detectable in Benin with increasingly high numbers
of appointments in non-election years, the pattern is slightly more stable in Ghana.
With the exception of 2007, when President Kufuor forced the resignation of at least
7 ministers running in the NPP presidential primary (Kennedy, 2009), the pattern has
been lower numbers of non-inauguration year appointments.

11

The patterns within each country are also telling. In his eight years as President
of Ghana, Kufuor made 47% (108 out of 230) of all appointments for the period under
consideration (1993-2013). As of 2013, with upwards of two more years left in his
second term, Yayi had made a whopping 128 appointments out of 263 total for the
period 1991 through 2013, representing nearly 49% of all appointments. Unlike the
other presidents, both Kufuor and Yayi were relatively new to the political scene,

12

11
In Ghana, elections are in December and appointments are usually made in the early months of the
following year.
12
Kufuor had run for President in 1996 and had served briefly in the Rawlings administration in the
1980s, but the NPP party in its current form had never occupied the Presidency.
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while Soglo, Kerekou, Rawlings, Mills and Mahama had all had recent experience
in office. In Benin, Soglo led the transition government in the lead-up to the 1991
election while Kerekou, as is explained elsewhere, ruled Benin through a leftist military
government from 1972 through 1989. Rawlings, likewise, had been in power for over
10 years when the 1992 elections took place. Mills was Vice-President to Rawlings in
his second term, from 1997-2000, and Mahama served as Mills’ Vice-President until
Mills’ death in August 2012, when Mahama was sworn in as President and assumed
Mills’ place on the 2012 ballot. These trends suggest the possibility that politicians who
have less experience in executive office are likely to rotate ministers more frequently.
As explained in Chapter 2, the fact that Benin’s party system is more likely to see the
rise of new parties with actors previously unknown to the political scene suggests that
continued trends towards instability may be more likely than in Ghana, where the two
main parties appear to be gaining more and more experience in government.13
Viewed another way, portfolios turnover more frequently in Benin than in Ghana.
Overall, the average minister in Benin holds their portfolio for 20.2 months before
they are either appointed to a different portfolio or let go from the government. In
Ghana, the average minister retains their portfolio for 28.4 months. The specific rates
of turnover for each presidential term are provided in Figure 4.3.

13

An alternative perspective is suggested by Lindberg and Zhou (2009) suggests that Kufuor frequently
rotated ministers in order to secure support from MP’s in Parliament, since the NPP held only a very
narrow majority. In other words, it was the ministers who were also MP’s who he was rotating frequently
- a claim I intend to test empirically with the data. But while feasible, the legislative margin explanation
seems insufficient since the NDC’s legislative majority was even more narrow during Mills’ presidency
and yet Mills did not seem to need to rotate ministers in order to secure support, suggesting that Kufuor
had either a weaker hold over his party members or that his relative inexperience caused him to appoint
individuals who, for whatever reason, did not succeed in their positions.
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Figure 4.1: Appointments per Year: Benin
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Figure 4.2: Appontments per Year: Ghana
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Figure 4.3: Rate of Portfolio Turnover by Presidential Term
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Using the appointment data, I also consider the extent to which each government
retains experienced ministers. As described above, experience in government enables
leaders to, among other things, avoid mistakes and resolve conflicts. As seen in Table
4.3, an individual in Ghana, once appointed, is significantly more likely to receive
successive appointments to different portfolios as the average number of appointments
in Ghana is 1.51 compared to only 1.28 in Benin.14 Once appointed, individuals in
Ghana are likely to stay in the government for a period of 2.37 years compared to only
2.06 in Benin. Additionally, ministers in Ghana are more than twice as likely as those
in Benin to serve under multiple presidents: a total of thirteen ministers in Ghana have
served under two or more presidents compared to only six in Benin.
Additionally Figure 4.4 shows the retention of experienced ministers for each presidential term.15 The bar graph shows that despite higher rates of portfolio turnover
14
15

Though statistically significant, it is questionable whether this difference is substantively important.
The differences may appear smaller than the overall figures in Table 4.3 because 9 ministers appointed
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Table 4.3: Retention of Experienced Ministers
Benin
1.28
(.59)
Ave. Months Served per Individual 24.72
(1.20)
Individuals Serving Multiple Pres.
6

Ave. Appointments per Individual

Ghana
1.51
(.84)
28.44
(1.44)
13

t
-3.15**
1.93**

**p<.01

Average Number of Appointments for Individual Minister

Figure 4.4: Average Number of Appointments per Individual
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during President Kufuor’s first term, as seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.2, that Kufuor was
also retaining ministers at a higher rate than his counterparts in both Ghana and Benin.
This section has shown that governments tend to be more stable in Ghana than in
Benin, but that the election of a President who is relatively new to the political landscape is an especially crucial determinant of ministerial stability across both countries.
As I discuss in greater detail below, an important explanation for this variation in
stability has to do with the reduced levels of information asymmetry associated with
by Mahama had previous appointments, but because Mahama assumed office in January 2013, there is
not a sufficient length of time to include comparative statistics for his term.
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appointment practices in Ghana.

4.2.3

Cohesion

Cohesion at the apex of government produces stronger commitment of state officials to
policy goals and allows for better inter-ministerial coordination. This section examines
differences in executive cohesion between the two countries, including both potential
sources of cohesion as well as qualitative evidence of cohesion. I begin by analyzing
the potential sources of cohesion across the two countries: ethno-regional, educational
professional and political. Because the potential for cohesion exists, however, does not
ensure its presence. Thus, the second part of this section presents qualitative evidence
of varying levels of cohesion, especially political cohesion.
Ethno-Regional
Common backgrounds and experiences enable the executive to act as a corporate unit,
enhancing the potential for autonomy from groups or actors that may seek to detract
from the executive’s pursuit of policy goals. I begin by examining the ethno-regional
backgrounds of ministers as a potential source of cohesion. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the
number and proportion of total appointments from each of the major regions in Benin
and Ghana.16 Though in most cases regional boundaries do not correspond precisely
to actual ethnic groups, if regional-ethnic cohesion was present, we would expect, at
a minimum, to see large numbers of appointees from specific regions. The numbers
and percentages depicted in red text are the regions from which the president or the
president’s family originates. Population proportions averaged over the entire period
are also provided in the two tables in order to provide a ministerial representation
relative to the population.
Appointments tend to be distributed at least somewhat evenly in proportion to the
16

The numbers reflect the total number of appointments to individuals from the region during the
entire presidential term. This approach could be misleading, as individuals from the same region may
not serve at exactly the same time during the particular presidential term.
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population. In no instances has a single region enjoyed more than 30% of appointments,
and only rarely does this figure exceed 20%. In four of the terms (Soglo, Rawlings,
Kufuor and Mahama), presidents have over-appointed individuals from their own
region relative to the population proportion. In the case of Rawlings and Kufuor, the
over-representation was not consistent across both of their terms in office. As seen in
Chapter 3, even when these regions are grouped according to their political allegiances,
there are not clear discernible patterns of appointing from a specific group of regions.
In short, the data suggest that ethno-regional backgrounds are not likely to serve as a
source of cohesion in the governments of either country, though one possibility is that
co-ethnics are granted more power in the president’s inner circle.
Professional
Another potential source of cohesion comes from shared experience in professional
settings. Tables 4.7 and 4.6 show the number of appointees with particular professional
backgrounds serving each President. Looking first at Benin, we see that the potential
sources of professional cohesion have varied from one presidential term to the next.
Typically, bureaucrats and teachers have been most prevalent, but there has been a
steady increase in business representation, as well as from the NGO sector. This
latter trend may be a result of Yayi’s propensity to appoint religious affiliates, who are
classified in this category.
There are a couple of patterns worth noting in Ghana. First, the NDC governments
(Rawlings, Mills and Mahama) have been made up primarily of individuals in law,
education, public administration and the military. In other words, a large percentage of
Rawlings’ appointees were already working in government when they were appointed.
Seeing as Rawlings maintained power for the ten years immediately preceding the 1992
election, these individuals have the shared experience of working in the revolutionary
PNDC government, known for its strong commitment to the ideals behind the 1979

115

116

% of Pop.
Soglo
1991-1996
Kerekou
1996-2001
Kerekou
2001-2006
Yayi
2006-2011
Yayi
2011-

Alibori
8.1%
1
2.0%
1
2.4%
1
2.5%
5
6.3%
5
11.4%

Collines
7.4%
4
8.2%
3
7.3%
5
12.5%
4
5.1%
4
9.1%

Cuoffo
7.7%
0
0.0%
1
2.4%
1
2.5%
4
5.1%
2
4.6%

President’s home region displayed in red

Atacora Atlantique Borgou
7.9%
12.6%
11.1%
2
12
3
4.1%
24.5%
6.1%
4
5
4
9.8%
12.2%
9.8%
2
4
4
5.0%
10.0%
10.0%
6
14
9
7.6%
17.7%
11.4%
6
7
3
13.6%
15.9%
6.8%

Donga
5.4%
4
8.2%
3
7.3%
1
2.5%
4
5.1%
2
4.6%

Littoral Mono Ouémé Plateau
Zou
8.7%
5.2%
11.1%
6.2%
8.9%
0
4
11
1
7
0.0%
8.2%
22.5%
2.0%
14.3%
1
2
12
1
4
2.4%
4.9%
29.3%
2.4%
9.8%
3
3
10
0
6
7.5%
7.5%
25.0%
0.0%
15.0%
0
6
11
4
12
0.0%
7.6%
13.9%
5.1%
15.2%
0
1
4
2
8
0.0%
2.3%
9.1%
4.6%
18.2 %

Table 4.4: Regional Allocation of Ministers: Benin
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% of Pop.
Rawlings
1993-1996
Rawlings
1997-2000
Kufuor
1997-2000
Kufuor
2005-2008
Mills
2009-2012
Mahama
2013-

Ashanti
19.1%
8
22.2%
4
10.8%
13
18.8%
15
20.8%
6
9.8%
3
6.8%

Brong-Ahafo
8.9%
2
5.6%
4
10.8%
8
11.6%
5
6.9%
3
4.9%
3
6.8%

Greater Accra
15.8% 9.8%
5
13.9%
1
2.7%
9
13.0%
7
9.7%
6
9.8%
5
11.4%

Northern
4.6%
1
2.8%
4
10.8%
5
7.3%
7
9.7%
6
9.8%
5
11.4%

President’s home region displayed in red

Central Eastern
9.6%
10.8%
6
4
16.7%
11.1%
6
3
16.2%
8.1%
12
9
17.4%
13.0%
14
7
19.40%
9.7%
4
7
6.6%
11.5%
4
3
9.1%
6.8%

Upper East
3.0%
0
0.0%
4
10.8%
1
1.5%
3
4.2%
4
6.6%
4
9.1%

Table 4.5: Regional Allocation of Ministers: Ghana
Upper West
8.5%
4
11.1%
2
5.4%
3
4.4%
4
5.6%
15
24.6%
7
15.9%

Volta
10.0%
5
13.9%
8
21.6%
6
8.7%
3
4.2%
5
8.2%
6
13.6%

1
2.8%
1
2.7%
3
4.4%
7
9.7%
5
8.2%
4
9.1%

Western

and1981 military coups led by Rawlings. In this sense, the military regime and the
events that propelled it to power, appear to comprise a potentially important source of
cohesion in the executive.
A different set of potential sources of cohesion are evident in Kufuor’s governments.
In both of his terms in office, upwards of twenty-six percent of appointments went to
individuals from the business community while another large proportion (22-30%) went
to individuals practicing law. Of those law practitioners, more than half were in private
law practices. The business connections, as explained in Chapter 2, were particularly
important to sustain the NPP while in opposition, particularly longstanding links to
the cocoa industry and those involved in business overseas.
4.2.3.1

Political

Finally, this section examines potential political sources of cohesion. As explained
above, political cohesion reduces elite conflict that can inhibit the pursuit of policy
programs or national projects.
As was shown in Chapter 3, ministers in Ghana are much more likely than their
Beninese counterparts to be long-time political allies of the president or the ruling party.
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 break down the POLITICAL PROFILE scores of appointees presented
in the previous chapter. Aside from the overall differences between the political backgrounds of appointees in Benin and Ghana, there are few, if any, discernible patterns
evident from the data presented in the two tables
Of note, however, is qualitative evidence suggesting that cycles of division, reconciliation and reform within Ghana’s two major parties give rise to the political cohesion.
Regarding the NPP for example, Bob-Milliar explains how particular members of party
factions are favored for appointments over others:
In 2001 Kufuor became president of Ghana after defeating the incumbent
NDC in a run-off ballot. Once in office, though, the Busia faction [of the NPP]
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Soglo
1991-1996
Kerekou
1996-2001
Kerekou
2001-2006
Yayi
2006-2011
Yayi
2011-

Business
2
6.5%
4
11.8%
6
16.7%
14
19.7%
10
25.6%

Education
10
32.3%
6
14.7%
5
13.9%
12
16.9%
6
15.4%

Law Agriculture Public Admin. Medical Military Science/Eng. NGO/Int’l Media
3
2
5
2
3
2
2
0
9.7%
6.5%
16.1%
6.5%
9.7%
6.5%
6.5%
0.0%
4
5
11
1
1
1
1
0
11.8%
14.7%
32.4%
2.9%
2.9%
2.9%
2.9%
0.0%
4
4
12
1
1
1
1
1
11.1%
11.1%
33.3%
2.8%
2.8%
2.8%
2.8%
2.8%
7
4
10
4
4
6
8
2
9.9%
5.6%
14.1%
5.6%
5.6%
8.5%
11.3%
2.8%
4
2
6
3
2
2
4
0
10.3%
5.1%
15.4%
7.7%
5.1%
5.1%
10.3%
0.0%

Table 4.6: Professional Backgrounds of Ministers - Benin
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Rawlings
1993-1996
Rawlings
1997-2000
Kufuor
1997-2000
Kufuor
2005-2008
Mills
2009-2012
Mahama
2013-

Business
3
10.0%
2
7.4%
15
26.3%
18
26.0%
5
8.5%
5
11.4%

Education
7
23.3%
8
29.6%
8
14.0%
10
14.9%
14
23.7%
10
22.7%

Law Agriculture Public Admin. Medical Military Science/Eng. NGO/Int’l Media
4
1
7
2
5
0
0
1
13.3%
3.3%
23.3%
6.7%
16.7%
0.0%
0.0%
3.3%
5
1
3
0
5
1
2
0
18.5%
3.7%
11.1%
0.0%
18.5%
3.7%
7.4%
0.0%
13
2
3
3
1
2
4
6
22.8%
3.5%
5.3%
5.3%
1.8%
3.5%
7.0%
10.5%
21
2
4
0
1
4
3
4
31.3%
3.0%
6.0%
0.0%
1.5%
6.0%
4.5%
6.0%
16
1
12
4
1
1
3
2
27.1%
1.7%
20.3%
6.8%
1.7%
1.7%
5.1%
3.4%
12
2
7
2
0
2
4
0
27.3%
4.5%
15.9%
4.5%
0.0%
4.5%
9.1%
0.0%

Table 4.7: Professional Backgrounds of Ministers

Table 4.8: Political Backgrounds of Ministers: Benin

Soglo
1991-1996
Kerekou
1996-2001
Kerekou
2001-2006
Yayi
2006-2011
Yayi
2011-

No Pol. Background
13
39.4%
7
17.5%
5
12.8%
6
9.5%
14
32.6%

Longtime Ally
12
36.4%
15
37.5%
18
46.2%
18
28.6%
10
23.3%

New Ally
4
12.1%
6
15.0%
9
23.1%
27
42.9%
10
23.3%

Opposition
4
12.1%
12
30.0%
7
17.9%
12
19.0%
9
20.9%

Table 4.9: Political Backgrounds of Ministers: Ghana

Rawlings
1993-1996
Rawlings
1997-2000
Kufuor
2001-2004
Kufuor
2005-2008
Mills
2009-2012
Mahama
2013-

No Pol. Background
2
6.5%
1
3.0%
3
4.8%
1
1.5%
1
1.8%
2
4.8%

Longtime Ally
25
80.6%
27
81.8%
44
69.8%
52
78.8%
48
84.2%
29
69.0%
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New Ally
4
12.9%
5
15.2%
9
14.3%
12
18.2%
6
10.5%
11
26.2%

Opposition
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
7
11.1%
1
1.5%
2
3.5%
0
0.0%

became the Kufuor faction, and consolidated its power base by monopolizing all the key sectors of the state apparatus. In the two administrations
of President Kufuor (2001-2008), members of his faction received the lion’s
share in the allocation of ministerial portfolios. (Bob-Milliar, 2012b: 581)
Although the power inequity between the two factions may have escalated tensions
between the Busia and Danquah factions within the NPP, these tensions were at least
temporarily resolved when Nana Akufo-Addo, a Danquah-ist, was elected the successive party leader over Kufuor’ “hand-picked” successor, Alan Kyerematen by NPP
delegates at their 2007 party meeting.17 Although the aforementioned appointments
may have, at least temporarily, exacerbated divisions within the NPP, the close-knit
group of co-partisans in key posts appears to have benefitted policy efforts in a number
of ways. Regarding the development of Ghana’s National Health Insurance Program
(NHIP), Agyepong and Adjei (2008: 158) explain that the replacement of technocrats
with trusted political associates ultimately helped to sustain the program’s implementation momentum despite serious technical challenges. In particular, the technical
specialists were “slower to fully discern the political concerns, climate, influences and
policy characteristics, their importance and how to create appropriate space to maneuver to steer policy in the desired technical direction within them.” As political
associates came to dominate the process of Ghana’s NHIP development, the implementation of the program prior to the 2004 elections became both increasingly pressing
and increasingly attainable.
Likewise in the NDC, the factionalization of the party, which was evident in President Mills’ selection of ministers from 2009 until his death in 2012, enabled Mills to
eschew distracting calls from the “pro-Rawlings” faction of the NDC to prosecute for17

However, two unsuccessful presidential elections for the NPP (2008 and 2012) have revived tensions
between the two factions. Although Akufo-Addo won primaries for the party’s presidential nomination
for the 2012 and 2016 elections, members of the ‘Busia’ faction have taken over the chairmanship and
other leadership roles in the party, raising questions about whether or not these party officials can and
will offer effective support to their presidential candidate.
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mer NPP officials on corruption charges, as retaliation for similar actions taken by the
NPP when they took office in 2001. Mills’ appointment of “anti-Rawlings” ministers
and cooptation of party executives through appointments to boards and commissions of
parastatals not only served to consolidate support behind Mills as the party’s nominee
for President in the 2012 elections, but also allowed Mills to forego calls for retributive
prosecutions from within the party, allowing for greater focus on the NDC’s “Better
Ghana Agenda.”18 Although some have questioned Mills’ choices for cabinet posts,
alleging that he did not know the people he was appointing (Bob-Milliar, 2012b: 595)
and attributing some policy failures to those choices and speculating that these decisions have simply worsened the “culture of accumulation” amongst the political class
19

Mills’ actions as a forward-looking strategy that strengthened the NDC’s governing

capacity in the longer-term.

20

The cycles of division, reconciliation and reform that animate Ghana’s internal
party dynamics stand in stark contrast to the internal dynamics in Benin’s parties and
coalitions where political reconciliation after division seems increasingly rare. At the
outset of President Yayi’s first term, for example, the cabinet included a number of
appointees who were close associates of cotton magnate Patrice Talon, most notably
Prime Minister Pascal Irènée Koupaki. Unsurprisingly, when the Yayi-Talon alliance
began to sour, these individuals were forced out of government. If any enduring
source of cohesion exists within the Yayi government, it is probably the result of Yayi’s
strong affiliation with the fast-growing Evangelical church, in which Yayi is himself an
ordained Minister. A number of Yayi’s closest Ministers are self-described as “Brothers
in Christ” with the President and have maintained their posts longer than average in
18
The Better Ghana Agenda serves basically as a list of localized projects that the NDC plans to pursue
in office and some vague goals in areas like governance and the advancement of democracy. It is
available at the Government of Ghana website. Nonetheless, when the Government tracks progress on
the agenda, and refers to it frequently when delivering these projects to their intended recipients.
19
Interview with think tank leader, Accra, March 4, 2014.
20
I am grateful to Paul Opoku-Mensah for helping me towards this insight.
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the Yayi government. How or to what extent this type of cohesion translates into policy
accomplishment remains unclear.
That lacking cohesion amongst Benin’s political elite impairs the government’s commitment and ability to implement much-needed developmental programs is widely
acknowledged. A 2014 article in La Fraternité, one of Benin’s most widely circulated
private newspapers proclaims that
Today, what the Head of State needs, is cohesion around him for the remaining two years of his mandate to bring about fruitful action. These are the
hopes, these are the promises, these are the immense dreams for Benin. Let
be Dr. Boni Yayi to realize them for us over the next two years. And the
responsibility of those who support him, or at least who say they support
him, must do everything to construct cohesion around him.21
With low levels of cohesion throughout Yayi’s first eight years in office, including a host
of sudden and poorly understood dismissals from the cabinet, it is hard to imagine that
the President could even identify a potential group of people to cohere around him, let
alone actually inspire their cooperation and loyalty.

4.2.4

22

Summary of Findings

Summarized in Table 4.10, the data presented above show distinct patterns of executive
capacity in Benin and Ghana. Despite higher levels of technical competence amongst
Benin’s ministers, Ghana’s elite-level executive institutions are more stable, and managed by more experienced and more cohesive groups of ministers. Though patterns
sometimes vary from one President to the next, the stability and cohesion in Ghana’s
government clearly produces an environment that is more conducive to the pursuit of
developmental policies, both in terms of national programs such as the NHIP as well
21

La Fraternité, March 19, 2014, http://fraternitebj.info/politique/article/auregarddelagrande.
This sentiment was expressed in particular by an interview respondent who was, somewhat briefly,
employed in the President’s office during the President’s first term. Cotonou, March 10, 2014.
22
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as the targeted delivery of goods and services. Although technically competent individuals are more likely to serve as ministers in Benin, their ability to influence policy
outcomes is often limited by either a lack of political support for their efforts, distrust
that they may undermine the President’s power, or both. While some in Ghana lament
the lack of professionalism amongst Ministers that could result from the appointment
of more technocrats, the stability, experience and cohesion in Ghana’s cabinets generate
a clear advantage in terms of their ability to see their agendas through.

Table 4.10: Executive Capacity in Benin and Ghana
Benin
Technical Competence Medium
Stability
Portfolio Volatility
Low
Experience
Medium
Cohesion
Low

4.3

Ghana
Low
Medium
High
High

Discussion and Conclusion

In addition to providing insight into the ways that executive capacity varies in Benin
and Ghana, the analysis above suggests that patronage-driven appointments, perhaps
counterintuitively, have the potential to produce more capable executives. In Ghana’s
system, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the appointment of ministers based on
patronage is aimed not only at awarding those who can deliver votes, but also those
that can generate revenue for the party by, among other things, awarding government
contracts to supportive firms. This translates into a system of personnel selection that
favors not only for the ability of appointees to garner votes, but also their demonstrated
loyalty and reliability in raising funds. To achieve this goal, the President in Ghana uses
information gleaned from past party or governing experiences about which ministers
are most capable of fulfilling this role. The strong party organizations serve as a means
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through which to transmit this information and the internal party contests serve as a
way to determine and test loyalty. As such, Presidents in Ghana have relatively highquality information about which ministers to appoint. This low level of information
asymmetry in the appointment process contributes to greater levels of both stability
and cohesion, both of which favor the successful planning and implementation of
development agendas. Likewise, Ministers who do not perform in accordance with
party goals, both in terms of securing finance and delivering on policy goals, risk
backlash from the party itself.
The system in Ghana is by no means flawless. That ministers are overwhelmingly
politically ambitious generates, at times, a shortage of technical competence and a lack
of professionalism. Widespread speculation of high-level NDC involvement in the
narcotics trade in Ghana during Mills’ presidency suggests that the drive for money at
the apex of government, even if in service of the party, can backfire if not effectively
monitored.23 The situation is especially troublesome for Deputy Ministers, many of
whom are thought to receive their positions by donating money to the party and whose
roles in their ministry are rarely well defined. Their interest in money and politics apart
from governing constitute a drag on the capacity of the executive and often distract
the party from its more pressing matters. Despite these unprofessional distractions, if
the President in Ghana is set on seeing his agenda through, the executive is sufficiently
stable and capable to do so, even with complex and ambitious programs such as the
NHIP.
By contrast, appointment strategies in Benin tend to produce technically competent,
yet more volatile and divided cabinets. Presidents in Benin face a much more difficult
appointment environment. That politicians in Benin can gain leverage by practicing
“transhumance” makes it difficult for the President to know who will remain loyal to
23
Many interview respondents suggested that Mills was too sick during his presidency to effectively
manage his government.

126

the ruling party. The technocrats tend to be untested in terms of both their governing
capacity and their political loyalty. The motivations of opposition members are better
known, but their commitment to the President’s agenda is likely to be very low. Such
problems translate into shorter tenures of office for ministers and infrequent retention
of experienced ministers, thereby inhibiting the learning processes that occur more
frequently in Ghana.
By promoting stability and cohesion, political patronage in Ghana, itself driven
by the factors outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, produces more capable executives. The
findings suggest that elite-level patronage is considerably less detrimental to state
capacity than the neopatrimonial state literature often leads us to believe. Though
this finding may be limited to contexts in which particular modes of party financing
prevail, the research should force us to think more carefully about stylized portrayals
of African states. In particular, the chapter shows the hazards of bluntly applying
Weberian principles to all facets of the state executive, rather than focusing on the
attributes of these institutions that engender greater or lesser capacity.
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Chapter 5
Public Service Patronage and State Bureaucratic Capacity
Complementing the work of the previous chapter, this chapter investigates the
ways that varying patronage patterns influence the capacity of the state’s bureaucratic
organizations.1 Specifically, the chapter focuses on the extent to which the varying
patronage strategies employed by political leaders in Benin and Ghana affect the goals,
professionalism, resources and cultures of the state’s bureaucratic organizations. At the
center of the inquiry is the question of how recruitment and selection practices shape
1) the politician-bureaucrat relationships that animates the political environment in
which public service employees operate; and the composition and workings of the
state’s bureaucratic organizations themselves.
The chapter begins by presenting four dimensions of bureaucratic capacity: goals
and missions, personnel administration, resources and organizational culture and discusses their theorized relationships to the patronage practices described in the previous
chapters. The second section uses data primarily from the survey to analyze these four
dimensions in Benin and Ghana. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the relationship between the elite-level dynamics presented in Chapter 4 with public service-level
findings of this chapter.

5.1

Patronage and Bureaucratic Capacity

Low state capacity in Africa is often attributed to weak, ineffective or corrupt bureaucracies. The literature identifies a wide range of issues that diminish the performance
of the state’s bureaucratic institutions in African countries, and the international de1
I use the term “bureaucratic capacity” in this chapter to denote the capacity of state’s public sector
organizations. Focusing more specifically on capacity in public organizations entails a set of concepts
that are distinct, yet related, to the capacity of the higher-level executive institutions discussed in Chapter
4.
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velopment community has spent billions on capacity building initiatives intended to
improve performance.2
As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the literature on low capacity in African bureaucracies focuses on the patrimonial underpinnings of African states. The persistence of
patronage-based recruitment results in low levels of technical competence and professionalism, leakage or inefficient uses of public resources and lacking commitment to
national or organizational goals. This section describes these three hypothesized effects
of persistent patronage on the structures and cultures of public organizations, as well
as the implications for bureaucratic performance.

5.1.1

Elite Patronage, Goals and Missions

To the extent that elite patronage practices affect the articulation of a national development agenda they can also shape the capacity of public organizations. A number
of studies find that clear organizational goals and missions endorsed by political leadership increase the likelihood that organizations will perform well (Leonard, 1991;
Tendler, 1997; Wilson, 1989). One way for leaders to clarify goals and missions is to
align them with developmental visions or ideology. Although such visions or ideologies tend to be rooted in the collective interests of a particular class, such as the matajari
interests in Kenyatta’s Kenya(Leonard, 1991), worker or peasant interests in HumphetBoigny’s Cote d’Ivoire(Agyeman-Duah, 2013), or the joint interest of politicians and
economic elite in developing the diamond trade in Botswana, bureaucratic organizations have also been mobilized around more populist visions, such as the collectivist
Ujamaa framework in Tanzania. Finally, a number of works have focused on the effective use of nationalism to mobilize state agents to pursue their goals with vigor. In the
2
It is impossible to know the aggregate amounts spent on capacity building. From 1995-2004, the
World Bank alone reports having spent $9 Billion in lending and $900 million grants on capacity building
programs with the bulk of this support having been directed towards public sector programs (Operations
Evaluation Department, 2005).
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African context, for example, Miguel (2004) finds a relatively strong record of public
goods delivery in Tanzania where leaders have more aggressively used nationalism
and the Ujamaa vision of social life as a unifying mechanism.
As discussed in the previous chapter, higher levels of patronage in Ghana lead to
a more stable and cohesive elite, making them more likely to articulate a governing
agenda and pursue policies and programs that, at least in some ways, seek to achieve
that agenda. The presence of these dynamics at the elite level should, in theory, produce
a clearer sense of mission for public organizations. The analysis in the following section
will examine the public servant perceptions and motivations related to the goals and
missions of the organization.

5.1.2

Professionalism

Conventional wisdom suggests that Weberian bureaucracies support development better than patrimonial ones (Evans, 1992, 1995; Rauch and Evans, 1999). The educational
and bureaucratic traditions of East Asian countries stand in stark contrast to those in
Africa, thereby explaining the former’s successful efforts at economic transformation
in the latter half of the twentieth century (Kohli, 2004). The key institutional characteristics of well-functioning Weberian bureaucracies include meritocratic recruitment
through competitive examinations, civil service procedures for hiring and firing rather
than political appointments and dismissals, and filling higher levels of the hierarchy
through internal promotion (Evans, 1992, 1995; Rauch and Evans, 2000). Patrimonial
bureaucracies stand in contrast to ‘Weberian’ ones in that “rational technical training as a basic qualification for office is scarcely found among household officials and
favorites” (Weber, 1978: 230).
As discussed in the previous chapter, Weberian or professional bureaucracies lead
to better performance by producing a capable pool of officials, by lengthening time
horizons and by uniting officials through their value of effective performance. Ad130

ditionally, “long-term career rewards generated by a system of internal promotion
should reinforce adherence to codified rules of behavior,” thereby leading to the development of “a sense of commitment to corporate goals and esprit de corps”(Rauch and
Evans, 2000: 52). The stability provided by internal promotion should, in theory, allow
formation of stronger professional ties.
Additionally, since patrimonial bureaucracies are characterized by personal loyalty, dismissals of qualified individuals may result from actions that are perceived as
betraying loyalty to the individual or group responsible for their employment. The dismissal of qualified individuals contributes to bureaucratic instability, shortening time
horizons, impedes the development of esprit de corps, and creates an environment
in which individual public servants can be discouraged from taking initiative on the
job. Additionally, the threat of dismissal over personal or political loyalty shapes an
environment in African bureaucracies in which very strict adherence to rules becomes a
strategy for public servants navigating a complex environment which at once demands
adherence to centralized control, social pressures to offer favors or help with public
resources and a variety of norms and systems from both colonial influence and the
‘piling on’ of reform programs over many years (Bierschenk, 2014: 230). The result
is a situation in which “organizational behavior [is] characterized by a great deal of
formalism” (Price, 1975: 208) and where “rules and procedures can lead to inflexibility
and unduly complicated requirements that actually stand in the way of accomplishing important tasks” (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995: 452). Though the adherence to
rules might be seen as an indicator of higher-performing Weberian bureaucracies, this
variety of formalism has more paralyzing effects.

5.1.3

Resource Deficiency

A common observation about African bureaucracies is that they lack not only human resources, but also material ones. Van de Walle’s observation that “equipment
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and technologies at the disposal of personnel are typically inadequate and outdated”
(2001: 131) is readily apparent by simply visiting any number of state offices. Although
resource deficiencies may result simply from the fact that government revenues tend
to be lower in some countries, the misuse of resources that are available is another potential problem. Patronage, in theory, contributes to the disappearance of resources by
employing politicized public servants who likely have their own patronage networks
to which they must attend. Practices of prebendalism (Joseph, 1987; van de Walle, 2007)
in which politicians grant supporters public office as a means to further enrichment is
a particularly extreme, yet not uncommon, form of this practice.
Resource deficiencies not only make administration less efficient, but also impact on
morale and motivation. According to Grindle, when employees were “kept from their
activities because of lack of vehicles or computers, they lost motivation” (1995: 458).
Likewise, in a study of state government in Brazil, Tendler (1997) finds that employee
performance improved considerably when the central government supported the state
administration with material resources such as signs and equipment for their initatives.
A severe, yet common, form of resource deficiency in African countries is when fiscal
problems inhibit the government’s ability to pay public sector employees. Though these
sorts of problems have become less frequent compared to the periods of economic crisis
in the 1980s, it is still relatively common that salaries are not delivered on time or at all.
3

5.1.4

Organizational Culture

In addition to clear missions and goals, merit-based personnel structures and sufficient resources, organizational cultures that incentivize and reward performance can
have an important impact on bureaucratic capacity. Strong, performance-oriented or3
Studies of the fiscal dimensions of public sector employment are numerous. See, for example,
Adamolekun (1993); Brautigam (1996); van de Walle (2001).
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ganizational cultures can help public organizations perform well in the absence of
political support or control(Meier and O’Toole, 2006), or in other low-performance
contexts(Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995). The concept of organizational culture has
emerged as a significant factor in studies of public organizations and management in
developing countries. In a study of twenty-nine organizations across six developing
countries, Grindle and Hilderbrand find that “without exception, the organizations
that performed well were able to inculcate a sense of mission and commitment to organizational goals among staff, while those that were poor performers did not provide the
same sense of mission”(1995: 456). Likewise, Leonard’s(1991) study of Kenyan public
managers found considerable support for the importance of this type of professional
orientation amongst the public administrators he studied.
Although some scholars posit that highly politicized environments can diminish
the link between performance and employment (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995: 459),
one study found that even in high-patronage environments, managers who publicly
recognize their staff are likely to see a distinct improvement in performance, perhaps
even more than in low-patronage environments (Manning, 2001: 254). This latter
perspective suggests that performance-based organizational cultures are not mutually
exclusive with more professional or merit-based ones, lending support to the idea that
greater political commitment may energize the public service in a way that may not be
possible with a more neutral public service (Peters et al., 2004).

5.2
5.2.1

Analysis
Missions and Goals

The analysis begins by comparing public servant perceptions about the existence of
clear goals and missions in their organizations. According to Figure 5.1 a large proportion of survey respondents in both countries reported that their organizations do
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Figure 5.1: My Organization has Clear Missions and Goals

indeed have clear goals and missions. In Benin, 87.5% either agreed (48.0%) or strongly
agreed (39.5%) with the statement that their organization has clear missions and goals.
Perceptions of clear organizational missions and goals were slightly higher in Ghana,
where a total of 92.6% agreed (54.3%) or strongly agreed (38.3%) with the statement.
The difference-of-proportions test on the binary version of the variable produces a
statistically significant difference with z=-2.75 and p<.01. Although the difference is
statistically significant, the high percentage of agreement in Benin suggests that clear
missions and goals are not necessarily tied to the government’s propensity to articulate
a governing agenda.
Despite the perception of clear missions and goals across the two countries, respondents in Benin were significantly more likely to agree that the missions and goals of their
organization change depending on who is in power, and that these changes represent
a problem in their organization. As seen in Figure 5.2, 61.5% of the public sector em-
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Figure 5.2: Survey: Changes in Leadership and Changes in Mission and
Goals

ployees surveyed in Benin either agreed or strongly agreed that the missions and goals
of their organization change frequently because of changes in leadership. Additionally, twice as many Beninese survey respondents attributed organizational problems
to frequently changing missions and goals in Benin than in Ghana. As seen in Figure
5.3, 72.3% of Beninese survey respondents perceive frequent changes in missions and
goals as a problem in their organization, compared to only 34.3% who responded this
way in Ghana.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, both political parties and incumbent
governments in Benin struggle to articulate policy visions. While the lack of any policy
agenda may reflect voter preference for parties that use clientelistic appeals (Banégas,
1998; Wantchekon, 2003), some observers note that a more likely explanation has to
do with patterns of elite politics in which the President seeks to maintain tight control
over resources and block potential opponents from having a platform on which to
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Figure 5.3: Survey: Missions and Goals Change Frequently

succeed. For example, President Yayi’s sudden dissolution of the Cabinet in August
2013, in which he scrapped the position of Prime Minister and took control himself
over the coordination of the Government, was widely seen as a way of neutralizing a
deteriorating relationship between himself and cotton magnate Patrice Talon, whose
close associates occupied a number of key posts in the Government, including Prime
Minister. As one journalist explained: “it is not possible to predict who will stay and
who will leave from one moment to the next. One saw the relationship between Talon
and Yayi deteriorate, but one thought that Yayi would not take such extreme actions so
quickly. The whole affair, including the dismissal of these men, changed the course of
the cotton sector reforms.” Magnusson’s (1996) detailed account of the fate of President
Soglo’s reform agenda in the early 1990s further suggests that the inability to develop
coherent policy plans was actually a function of factional infighting amongst a relatively
narrow group of political elites. These examples are suggestive of the importance of
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elite stability and cohesion to produce a more stable policy environment.
Public servants in both countries suggested that changes in leadership are disruptive to organizational function. For example, a manager in the Ministry of Public Sector
Reform and former staffer at the President’s office in Ghana, noted that a major objective of their programs to make service delivery more “client-centered” is to provide
continuity in the face of political change. She explained that a bigger focus on the
recipients of public programs would help public service employees focus on the beneficiaries of the services rather than get distracted by the political dynamics at upper
levels of bureaucracy, which is particularly problematic in certain ministries.4 In a
similar fashion, an instructor at Benin’s Ecole National de l’Administration noted that it’s
increasingly rare that public service employees are given clear direction by the political
leadership, leaving them paralyzed in their ability to act. This latter issue is discussed
in more detail below.

5.2.2

Professionalism

In Chapter 3 we saw that patronage-based recruitment to the public service is more
common in Benin than in Ghana. This section examines whether or not these patterns
extend to other areas of human resources management such as promotions and firing,
and the extent to which these varying modes of merit-based personnel administration
affect bureaucratic capacity.
First, I investigate the extent to which patterns of politicization in recruitment
extend to other forms of personnel management, namely promotions and job retention.
Figure 5.4 shows the importance accorded by survey respondents to five different
factors for obtaining a promotion in one’s organization. While education and work
performance appear to be among the most important factors in both countries, the
responses diverge considerably across countries when it comes to the importance of
4

Accra, December 13, 2013.
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political party affiliation.5 Nearly 50% of survey respondents in Benin believe that
party affiliation is an important (30.4%) or very important (18.2%) factor for obtaining
a promotion in their organization, while fewer than 15% in Ghana believe that party
affiliation is either important (10.2%) or very important (4.5%). Additionally, as Figure
5.5 shows, those surveyed in Benin were nearly two times more likely to see the
politicized promotion or appointment of higher-level public service positions as a
problem or a serious problem in their organization. In total, 83.5% of those surveyed
in Benin considered this as a problem or serious problem, compared to only 38.8% in
Ghana.
The survey suggests relatively low levels of political influence over personnel administration decisions in Ghana, a finding that is consistent with recent work by Lentz
(2014) in her ethnographic study of Ghanaian public servants. In particular, Lentz’s
5

Responses about the importance of ethnicity also diverge between the two countries which, as I
discuss briefly in the next chapter, relate closely to patterns of party patronage.
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Figure 5.5: Survey: Appointment or Promotion of Agency Directors

Ghana

subjects describe subtle support from “networks” of family members, friends or professional mentors in obtaining public sector jobs and promotions. These contacts specifically help an employee to stand out amongst a group of qualified candidates. They
note that only to reach the highest echelons of the public service would it be necessary
to become politically involved. One group of public servants explained to me that they
prefer to not get involved in political parties because they do not know if present or
future supervisors might use this against them. Though some have noted increasing
prevalence of politically-motivated dismissals of top-ranking public servants (Ayee,
2013),6 these appear to be more rare in Ghana than in Benin.7
Further evidence of widespread politicization of personnel management in Benin
is available in survey responses regarding political dismissals. Once again, there was a
large disparity between the two countries when survey respondents were asked to rate
6

See also Darko’s comments at on GhanaWeb, September 6, 2011.
The article by Ayee (2013) is described as a “desk study.” Ayee does not provide much empirical
support for these observations or how he generates these conclusions.
7
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Figure 5.6: Survey: Political Firing of Qualified Personnel

the seriousness of problems related to the firing of qualified individuals on the basis of
their political affiliation. As shown in Figure 5.6, in Benin, 82.5% of those surveyed saw
politicized firing as a problem (44.7%) or serious problem (37.8%) in their organization,
compared to only 28.8% in Ghana (14.2% as a problem, 14.6% as a serious problem).
Although systematic data on dismissals is lacking, several interview respondents
noted that the top level career positions in many of Benin’s ministries and agencies have
become positions in which individuals serve at the President’s will, rather than through
formal promotion processes. Several noted that it has become increasingly common for
the President to dismiss these individuals and appoint replacements based on political
considerations. One prominent political journalist noted that the top-level Directeur
Général (DG) positions at the Customs Service and the national electricity company,
SBEE, were especially prone to intervention by the President, not only because of the
frequency with which revenue from these agencies is mismanaged, but also for fear that
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the revenue is being directed to opposition parties. For example, shortly after President
Yayi’s re-election in 2011, he fired the General Director (DG) of the Customs Service,
Issiaka Inoussa. Although no official reason was provided by the President’s office,
several news sources reported that Inoussa had not done enough to support Yayi in his
re-election campaign. One source reported that he had worked for the opposition party
UN (Union fait la Nation).8 He was replaced by Théophile Soussia an FCBE member
who was elected as Deputy to the National Assembly on the FCBE list.
Like patronage-based hiring, political influence over promotions and firing in Benin
help the President’s party to ensure exclusive access to key resources for party financing. The concentration of personnel decisions within the Ministry of Civil Service
makes it especially important for the President to maintain strong control over this
Ministry. Ten of the thirteen Ministers of Civil Service that held office between 1991
and 2013 were members of the ruling party or a party closely affiliated with the ruling
party. The two longest-standing Ministers of Civil Service in the current democratic
era, Ousmane Batoko and Emmanuel Tiando, were both very close politically to their
respective Presidents. Batik, serving in this role from May 1998 through February 2003,
had served as Secretary General of President Kerekou’s FARD-ALAFIA party and held
several ministerial posts in Kerekou’s military regime in the 1980s (Houngnikpo and
Decalo, 2013). Tiando, who served as Minister of the Civil Service in President Yayi’s
first government from April 2006 through June 2009, is regarded as one of President
Yayi’s most loyal associates.

9

He has since served as the General Secretary of the Pres-

ident’s office (the highest staff position) and is currently the President of the electoral
commission (CENA), both positions indicating his enduring importance as a political
ally in President Yayi’s administration.
Dismissals of any kind are more limited in Ghana. Several prominent reform
8
9

See La Nouvelle Tribune, May 26, 2011.
See, for example, Nouvelle Expression, November 28, 2014, where he is called “un fidéle des fidéles.”
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proponents in Ghana lamented the difficulty of sanctioning under-performing public
servants. When such events transpire it is not uncommon for family members, chiefs, or
other associates of the individual to publicly appeal for the employee’s reinstatement.
Such was the case, for example, when the IMANI think tank made a public appeal
for the reinstatement of the Director of the Passport Office who was sacked after an
alleged scheme to promote underground production of illegal passports. Likewise,
Larbi (2001) study of performance contracting in Ghana found that managers resisted
sanctioning underperformance and only dismissed non-performing individuals after
many years of unmet goals. His study also noted that the few dismissals that did
take place was likely a case of a principal (the President) “acting opportunistically
by ’scapegoating’ the agent” (2001: 319-320). Lentz (2014) also finds a link between
political party affiliation and the ability to “survive intrigues” by knowing the “ins
and outs of the office”, having “informants” in the relevant ministries and maintaining
good contacts with the media (2014: 192).
Finally, there is also survey evidence to suggest that the effects of these different
recruitment, promotion and dismissal practices are felt by public servants in terms
of their organizations’ performance. As seen in Figure 5.7, a total of 71.7% of those
surveyed in Benin see the lacking qualifications or technical competence of personnel
as a problem (32/1%) or serious problem (39.6%) in their organization, whereas only
24.2% of those surveyed in Ghana saw this as a problem (15.6%) or serious problem
(8.6%) in their organization.
In sum, the politicized management of public personnel in Benin is not confined
to hiring decisions. Both promotions and dismissals are used as mechanisms of political control over the bureaucracy. Likewise in Ghana, the merit-based principles of
recruitment extend to other forms of personnel management as well. The overall result
is a better-qualified and more professional bureaucracy in Ghana than in Benin. An
important takeaway from this finding is that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the preva142
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Figure 5.7: Survey: Lacking Qualifications of Personnel

lence or absence of party patronage at the elite level does not necessarily translate
into more politicized personnel decisions - hiring, promotion and dismissal - across
the bureaucracy. One reason why this does not happen in Ghana is that Ministers
themselves do not have direct control over these decisions, suggesting that centralized
personnel management structures could either facilitate or constrain higher levels of
politicization.

5.2.3

Resource Deficiencies

Two survey questions probe public servant perceptions about the sufficiency of resources in their organizations. As seen in Figure 5.8, a large proportion of those
surveyed, 47.9% in Benin and 45.4% in Ghana, see lacking resources as a serious problem in their organization. An additional 37.8% in Benin and 27.0% in Ghana said it was
a problem, though not a serious one. Comparing the average (mean) scores on the 4
point scale for each country to the other sixteen potential problems listed on the survey,
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resource deficiency ranks as the 4th most serious problem in Benin and the 2nd most
serious problem in Ghana. Clearly public servants in both countries feel constrained
in their ability to perform because they lack the necessary material resources. Public
servants I interviewed in both countries pointed to a range of resource deficiencies
including crumbling office infrastructure, lack of computers, lack of transport and frequent electricity outages. One employee in Ghana’s Office of the Head of the Civil
Service noted that while resources are available, they tend to be distributed very unevenly. One ministry will continually get new equipment, while others remain in very
run down condition. The employee could not explain the disparity, noting simply that
“no one pays attention or coordinates” how these things happen.10
Despite similar views on the detrimental effects of resource deficiencies, responses
from the two countries diverge considerably when asked whether resources disappear
specifically for political party use. Figure 5.9, shown earlier in Chapter 2, shows that
10

Accra, December 11, 2013
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those surveyed in Benin are much more likely to see this as a serious problem (74.8%) or
problem (9.5%) than in Ghana where 13.7% said this was a serious problem, and 13.0%
said it was a problem. This large divergence suggests that issues related to political use
of state resources further compounds problems of resource deficiency in Benin’s public
organizations, but to a significantly lesser degree in Ghana.
As described in Chapter 2, the hypothesized relationship between party financing
logics and patronage practices is related to this apparent divergence. Benin’s parties
rely, to a much larger extent than Ghana’s, on the direct use of state funds for their sustenance. This means not only recruiting political supporters to the public service, but
placing them in positions and managing them in ways that enable them to accumulate
money, some of which certainly finds its way back to the party. The practice is especially prevalent in certain agencies, such as the port authority (Bako-Arifari, 2001), the
customs and tax administrations, as well as the police (World Bank and Government
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of Benin, 2007).

5.2.4

Organizational Cultures

To assess differences in organizational cultures I examine both individual attitudes of
public servants as well as their perceptions of organizational-level characteristics. Figure 5.10 shows the mean country-level responses by those surveyed to statements about
their motivations for working hard. Specifically, the series of questions asked survey
respondents to rate their level agreement with statements about the consequences of
working hard in their organizations.11 Responses are on a scale from 1 to 4 where 1
represents “strongly disagree” and 4 represents “strongly agree.” When it comes to
believing that their work will contribute to national development, advance their careers, help to achieve the goals of their organization and benefit other citizens average
responses in Ghana are slightly higher than those in Benin, but overall very similar.
When it comes to their work benefitting the party’s electoral prospects and pay raises,
however, average level of agreement drops off in both countries but considerably more
so in Ghana, where the average response was firmly in the “disagree” range.
The motivations of civil servants are also evident from survey responses about
why individuals chose to join or remain in their public sector jobs.12 According to
Figure 5.11 Ghanaians reported that they were most interested in working in the public
service because of opportunities for career advancement, for job security and to serve
their country. The Beninese survey respondents, were also interested in the career
advancement and service opportunities of work in the public sector, but were also
more likely to agree that it was the only work available for them, that the educational
opportunities associated with public sector work, and the pay were also quite important
in their decisions. Although this question did not ask about political motivations, the
11
12

See question12 in Appendix A.
See Question 7 in Appendix A.
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variation in responses speaks to some important differences between the two countries,
including the relative attractiveness of the individual benefits from the job such as
educational and other work opportunities, as well as the lacking array of choices
available to Beninese employees.
According to these survey results, public employees in Benin and Ghana are similarly motivated to serve their country, see the work of their organizations as important
for the country’s development, and believe that their own hard work will benefit national development efforts as well as the individuals that their organizations serve.
When asked about the factors that motivated employees to join or continue working in
the public sector, 85.6% of Beninese survey respondents and 83.3% of Ghanian respondents saw the “possibility to serve my community or my country” as an important
or very important motivating factor. Likewise, 93.4% in Benin and 94.6% in Ghana
see the missions and goals of their organization as important for development in their
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Figure 5.11: Reasons for Working in the Public Service
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country, and a similarly high proportion, 93.8% in Benin and 96.6% in Ghana, agree
or strongly agree with the idea that working hard in their organization will contribute
to the development of their country. Together these findings suggest high levels of
service-orientation amongst public servants in both countries.
Despite these similarly high levels of service orientation, Beninese respondents were
significantly more likely to associate their work with the ruling party. For example, as
Figure 5.12 shows, over 90% of survey respondents in Benin agree (56.1%) or strongly
agree (34.4%) with the statement that the mission and goals of their organization as
an important part of the ruling party’s agenda, while only 34.3% of those surveyed
in Ghana responded in the same way (24.1% agree, 10.2% strongly agree). Further
evidence that public service employees in Benin are more likely to see their roles as
political is provided in Figure 5.13, showing that 48.3% of Beninese survey respondents
believe that if they work hard in their current job they will help the ruling party to win
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the next elections, compared to only 16.5% in Ghana who see their work in that way.
Although theories suggest that higher levels of politicization may undermine the
commitment and performance-orientation of public servants, respondents in Benin and
Ghana were both very likely to see weak motivation of personnel as a problem in their
organization. In Benin, 70.9% of respondents see weak motivation of personnel as a
problem (37.4%) or serious problem (33.5%) in their organization, while a slightly higher
percentage, 73.9% in Ghana, responded in the same way (25.3% said it was a problem,
48.6% a serious problem). In other questions, however, Beninese respondents were
significantly more likely to see political interference as a problem in their organization
(see Figure 5.14) and as well as the inability to act because it might damage the ruling
party. As seen in Figure 5.15, 81.5% of survey respondents in Benin said they felt that an
inability to act because of potential damage to the ruling party was a problem in their
organization compared to only 42.0% who responded this way in Ghana. Together the
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results of these two questions, along with the findings about personnel management
suggest that political leaders in Benin exert control over the bureaucracy in ways that
diminish performance. These findings reflect the insights of Bierschenk who notes that
this weakening process allows the heads of state to implement a clientelism personnel
policy, but in the long-term undermines the legitimacy of administrative sanctions
which ultimately weakens the control capacities of the leadership (2014: 228).
Although the data do not speak directly to the presence of organizational cultures
that value performance and goal achievement, the perceived seriousness of political
interference and an inability to take initiative suggests that efforts to perform tasks to
the best of one’s ability is less common in Benin’s public organizations than in Ghana’s,
though a lack of performance oriented culture is also evident amongst Ghana’s public
service. For example, both Lentz (2014) and Price (1975) point to an overwhelming
importance afforded to the qualifications for office, namely educational attainment,
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rather than past performance or accomplishment. This problem was cited over and
over again in discussions with staff at the Office of the Head of the Civil Service and
especially the Ministry of Public Sector Reform. One example was in a discussion with
a staff person working on a committee to re-design annual performance evaluations
of public servants, and tie pay and promotion to these evaluations. Among the many
challenges he cited was that
for so long, they [public servants] have been told that they need the right
education, the right training programs, the right degrees to perform well.
The employees and the government has invested a lot in this education
and training. Now we are going to tell them that the qualifications are
not as important as performance. And the performance is based on a very
subjective review by someone who might, you know, hold a grudge against
them. The new system will be very difficult to implement.13
This perspective speaks to a longstanding tradition of emphasis on qualifications in the
Ghanaian public service. In his study of Ghana’s civil service in the 1960s and 1970s,
Price described it as an “extreme concern for ritualistic expression - that is, they are
concerned to publicly verify the status attributes of their positions – while they reveal
comparatively little interest in performance, or in goal attainment,” (1975: 208) leading
to an environment in which “spontaneous innovation toward the accomplishment of
organizational goals is minimized.” A recent study specifically focused on performance
appraisal processes in Ghana finds an array of challenges in performance-oriented
assessments including elements of superstition, spirituality and fear that often enter
the process, leading supervisors to eschew criticism in favor of praise and, at times,
even using the performance appraisals to coerce inappropriate behavior of employees
(Bawole et al., 2013). Such studies are suggestive of a set of factors outside the political
sphere that work alongside the political factors to affect prospects for performanceoriented organizational cultures to emerge, a “double bind” identified by (Bierschenk,
13

Accra, October 6, 2013.
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2014) and others.

5.2.5

Summary of Findings

Table 5.1 summarizes the above analysis comparing four broad dimensions of bureaucratic capacity and subcomponents of each dimension. The array of findings highlight
the complexity involved in unraveling the strengths and weaknesses of bureaucratic
institutions in these two countries, not to mention the political origins of these strengths
and weaknesses. Despite the prevalence of clear missions and goals in both countries,
frequent changes in Benin make for a less stable environment in which public servants
are tasked with doing their jobs. The most pronounced variation between the two
countries appears in the elements of professionalism, where merit-based principles
appear much stronger in Ghana than in Benin. Both countries report problems related
to resource deficiencies, while those deficiencies are more likely to be associated with
political practices in Benin. Regarding organizational cultures, both countries appear
to have high levels of service orientation and low levels of performance orientation,
but considerably different levels of political orientation.

5.3

Discussion and Conclusion

By examining bureaucratic capacity on multiple dimensions, it is possible to gain
insight into how party politics does - and does not - enter into the workings and
performance of public organizations in Benin and Ghana. First, it will come as no
surprise that elite level patronage dynamics have the potential to shape downstream
organizational capacity. In setting clear developmental goals, sustaining commitment
to those goals and enlisting a cohesive group of political agents (i.e. ministers or other
appointees) to ensure the implementation of those goals, political leaders shape the
environment in which public servants operate. Importantly, the ruling party’s goals
need not be programmatic to foster a more productive bureaucracy. Ghana’s political
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Table 5.1: Bureaucratic Capacity in Benin and Ghana
Benin
Goals and Missions
Clear Goals and Missions
Yes
Frequent Changes
Yes
Missions and Goals Politicized
Yes
Professionalism
Merit-based Promotion
Low
Political Dismissals
Frequent
Lacking Qualifications
Yes
Resources
Deficiency
High
Parties Use Resources
Yes
Organizational Cultures
Service Orientation
High
Political Orientation
High
Performance Orientation
Low

Ghana
Yes
No
No
High
Infrequent
No
High
No
High
Low
Low

parties, especially the NDC, are able to craft and follow through on governing agendas
that seek, above all, to distribute goods and services in targeted, largely particularistic
ways. The party’s agenda guides the actions of the ministries and public servants,
especially where ministers are closely aligned with the President.
Likewise, the instability and division that characterize elite-level executive institutions in Benin comprises a more difficult working environment for public service
employees. Not only do goals and missions change when leadership changes, but the
President’s efforts to maintain tight control over state resources - a political necessity
in Benin’s state-dominated economy and fluid party system - create an organizational
environment in which bureaucrats are severely limited in their ability to act, even if in
the apparent interests of the ruling party. In this sense the need to tightly control state
resources for political advantage, as described in Chapter 2, drives not only patronage
practices, but the broader control of bureaucratic organizations.
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Second, a striking yet puzzling result of varying patronage practices is an apparent gulf between the governing dynamics of political leaders and the motivations of
bureaucrats. A relatively well-articulated governing agenda in Ghana and a unified
set of elites could, in theory, benefit tremendously from politically mobilized public
servants eager to serve the needs of the party. Exactly why Ghana’s political leaders do
not interfere in public service personnel decisions more often is difficult to understand.
By contrast, in Benin, a politically mobilized public service receives little support and
direction from a fractured political elite. Were there less concern with maintaining tight
control over state resources, a clearer governing agenda could generate greater levels
of productivity in the state’s bureaucratic apparatus by allowing individual public
servants to work towards their goals in ways they see fit.
Ultimately, however, neither the more professional bureaucracies in Ghana nor the
more politically mobilized ones in Benin are able to overcome challenges related to
resource deficiency and the motivation of personnel to perform their duties. While
political factors such as the varying roles of bureaucrats in party financing may serve
to deepen or lessen these challenges, their underlying sources extend beyond the party
dynamics that have developed in the current democratic era. To understand these
issues it is necessary to consider the historical trajectories of the public services and
reform efforts in African countries more generally (Bierschenk, 2014), as well as the
social and economic contexts in which the bureaucratic institutions operate (Bayart,
1993; Price, 1975).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion:
State Capacity for Development in African Democracies
This dissertation is motivated by the question of when and why democracy produces stronger and more capable states. Addressing this question provides insight
into the prospects for democratic paths of development in Africa, and the future of
democratic institutions themselves. While general theories suggest that democracy
ought to produce an array of positive governing outcomes, such outcomes are more
tenuous in African countries, where the patrimonial underpinnings of both states and
societies are, by many accounts, exceptionally strong. Whether or not African countries
actually deviate from general trends remains the subject of debate, a debate that is often
clouded by stylized accounts of the normative virtues of democracy or the hopelessly
corrupt character of African states. A fundamental concern of this debate, moreover,
is whether or not multi-party political competition constrains neopatrimonial behaviors, such as patronage, that are widely believed to undermine the effectiveness of the
state’s executive institutions, thereby inhibiting the effective pursuit of developmental
policies.
I contribute to this debate in two important ways. First, I approach patronage not
only as a vote-buying strategy but also as a means of controlling state resources. The
distribution of state jobs in particular embodies not only a good to be exchanged in a
political transaction, but also a means of securing control over the resources used to
derive political advantage. This approach helps to move the debate beyond pluralistic
arguments emphasizing the importance of ethnic politics and electoral math to explain
patronage practices. That patronage enables politicians to better control resources
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helps us to understand its persistence in places where its effectiveness as a vote-buying
strategy is called into question.
Second, rather than assuming that patronage necessarily undermines the capacity
of state institutions, I investigate ways that patronage practices shape the composition
and functioning of the state’s executive institutions. This approach avoids the risk of
tautology involved in attributing weak state institutions in Africa to their neopatrimonial underpinnings, when the definition of a weak state is itself one that does not
embody Weber’s principles of legal-rational organization. Instead, the research presented in Chapters 4 and 5 investigates the ways that patronage practices, and the party
financing logics that drive them, affect a set of institutional attributes that engender
capacity, irregardless of the extent to which they embody Weberian principles.
In this concluding chapter, I begin by restating the argument developed through
the course of the preceding four chapters. The second section presents a preliminary
inquiry into the generalizability of the argument and its import relative to alternative
conceptions of the relationship of multi-party politics and state capacity. The final
section highlights the implications of the dissertation’s argument for both democracy
and development in African states.

6.1

Summary of the Argument

The preceding chapters develop a party-financing based theory of the relationship
between multi-party politics, patronage and state capacity. The dissertation’s central
argument is that modes of party financing shape the patronage practices employed
by political leaders, and these patronage practices have consequences on the broader
capacity of the state. Where patronage is concentrated at the elite level, I find that better
governing outcomes are possible.
In the first two chapters, I show that varying modes of party financing lead to divergent patronage practices: not necessarily in terms of how much patronage, but in terms
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of which jobs are distributed and to whom. Most African parties depend on state resources
for sustenance. How parties access state resources, however, can vary considerably
from one country to the next. Some parties access state funds by awarding contracts
to businesses in exchange for financial support. Others access money more directly
from state coffers, or from strategically-placed bureaucrats with access to state funds
or rent-seeking opportunities. The former, as seen in Ghana, requires coordination of
party elites placed strategically in the upper echelons of the executive and thus leads to
higher levels of party patronage at the elite level. The latter fundraising strategy, evident
in Benin, shapes leaders’ decisions to distribute public service jobs directly to supportive
voting blocs, the most loyal of whom are placed in state ministries where access to
resources or rent-seeking opportunities is particularly abundant.
Of course, these party financing practices do not appear out of thin air. As Chapter
2 explains, they reflect both the availability of trusted party allies (party organization)
and the extent to which state resources are distributed through procurement contracts
(private sector size). In Ghana, a healthy supply of tested and loyal partisan elites
is cultivated through the development and organization of the party, internal party
elections and the resolution of conflicts within the party. These allies are trusted to
distribute contracts to the private sector actors that are most supportive to the party.
The situation is substantially different in Benin, where the the availability of formal
private sector actors is considerably more limited and where the fluidity of the party
system makes it difficult for presidents to trust more than a small handful of elite-level
political actors. These constraints result in a party financing system that depends on
direct access to state resources, especially where state revenues and rents are accessible
by public servants.
These two variables - private sector size and party organization - not only produce
distinct modes of party financing, but also interact to perpetuate and solidify the
systems in place. In Ghana, where parties are well organized, the government awards
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contracts in ways that support private sector actors who invest in the party, the result of
which is to further strengthen the party and grow the formal private sector. The much
more fragile nature of state-business relations in Benin creates a difficult environment
for both party-building and the development of the formal private sector resulting in
the persistent fragmentation of parties and informality of the private sector.
The second part of the dissertation examines the implications of these varying patronage practices on the broader capacities of the state. I argue that the prevalence
of elite patronage in Ghana produces more stability and cohesion at the apex of government, providing the consistency, learning and coordination necessary to garner
stronger executive commitment to a set of more clearly defined developmental goals.
This higher level of executive capacity is essential to sustain the development and
implementation of national programs over time, and even aids governments in making good on clientelistic promises of distribution. Benin’s cabinets, in contrast, are
dominated by a mixture of co-opted opponents and technocrats with little political experience. This latter composition translates into high levels of information asymmetry
that, in turn, produce less stable and cohesive cabinets: a governing environment that
makes the pursuit of developmental policies more challenging.
In Chapter 5, I examine the ways that party financing and patronage practices affect
the capacity of the state’s bureaucratic organizations. In Benin, higher levels of instability and division at the elite level creates a challenging environment for public service
employees, especially in terms of rapidly changing missions and goals and a tightlycontrolled bureaucracy. Additionally, high levels of patronage-based recruitment to
the public service in Benin results in lacking technical competence and professionalism
and, as explained in Chapter 2, the siphoning of resources for party use. Together, these
patterns help to distinguish Benin’s relatively weaker bureaucratic capacity than that
of Ghana’s, even in a context where both resources and performance-oriented cultures
are severely lacking.
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Remaining Questions
Although the dissertation seeks to provide a comprehensive account of two distinct
equilibria that characterize the relationship between party finance, patronage and the
state’s executive institutions, there are important substantive questions that remain
unaddressed by the present work. The evidence provided suggests that political patronage represents an important means of controlling political resources. In Ghana,
this means that presidents appoint elite partisan allies to executive posts whereas, in
Benin, this means keeping elite level political actors, even if they have once supported
the president, out of positions where they can access resources, while strategically
distributing public service jobs to members of politically supportive groups. The argument leaves open the question of why Ghana’s political leaders do not interfere more
often in recruitment to the public service. With centrally-managed personnel administration organizations (the Public Services Commission and the Office of the Head
of the Civil Service) it would be simple for the Ghanaian President to appoint politically loyal individuals to head these agencies, and reap the potential political benefits
of patronage in the public service. Future work on this question will investigate the
applicability of party financing logics, as well as consider the potential utility of alternative explanations such as Shefter’s (1977) theory of state institutionalization, a
(British) colonial legacy of civil service neutrality, or political party incentives to have
a more professional bureaucracy that is more capable of achieving policy goals. This
example underscores the possibility that the party financing explanation of patronage
may operate alongside, rather than in lieu of, existing explanations.
Second, the present work has not fully addressed the question of how, in the absence of strong party organizations, Beninese presidents can effectively recruit political
supporters to strategic public service positions and rely on their continued loyalty. I
suspect that ethnic ties are particularly important in this regard, as they provide a basis
for political alliance in the absence of party ties. This supposition raises a broader
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complicating issue: the relationship between ethnic and party politics. As discussed
in Chapter 1, there are undoubtedly ethnic dimensions to the political landscapes in
both countries, though rates of ethnic voting tend to be higher in Benin. Some recent
research, however, suggests that the political salience of ethnicity is more likely a consequence, rather than a cause, of party building processes. Recent research, for example,
suggests that a key factor in the formation of multi-ethnic political coalitions is first
and foremost the availability of capital Arriola (2012) that is not controlled by the state,
while another study points to the important role that local leaders play in brokering
cross-ethnic voting (Koter, 2013). To the extent that these two factors are likely to affect the strength of party organizations, as I believe they probably are, then the ethnic
dimensions of politics can be seen as a consequence of party building processes. This
view sees the recruitment or appointment of co-ethnics as a political strategy rather
than a sociological phenomenon.
Finally, the party financing argument hinges on the interaction of economic structures and party organizations. Chapter 2 describes how these two variables interact
to produce particular modes of party financing. I discuss the potential relationship
between these two variables in a bit more detail below, but the development of the
argument will likely require a more detailed exploration of the the ways that economic
structure influences party development and vice versa.

6.2

Generalizability

The dissertation provides an array of evidence for each of the adjoining pieces of the
argument: the existence of distinct modes of party financing, the patronage practices
that result from those modes of party financing, and the impacts of patronage on state
capacity. The research combines structured comparisons of key variables in Benin and
Ghana with observations of causal processes within each country. Benin and Ghana
were selected in part because they represent countries that are “typical” of different
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types of party African party systems. They also contrast in the size of their private
sectors that might also be considered “typical” for the range of African countries.
This section seeks to test this assertion of “typicalness” to assess the plausibility of
extending the argument to other African countries, or beyond. Given the limitations
of data currently available, the goal of the this analysis is not to provide convincing
evidence that the argument applies broadly or outperforms alternative explanations,
but to merely suggest the possibility of wider application.
My ability to conduct a larger-N analysis involving each piece of the argument
is currently limited by lacking availability of measures of both party financing and
patronage practices. As an initial exploration of the broader relevance of the argument,
I compare average state capacity scores across four categories derived from existing
measures of party systems and private sector activity. I include countries that have held
competitive elections consistently from the time of a transition until 2010.1 I generate
the four categories by simply dividing measures of party systems and private sector
capacity at their medians to create ‘high’ and ‘low’ categories.
The series of two-by-two tables below uses alternative measures of both party
systems and private sector size. The party system measures do not measure party
organization directly, but close correlates. First, I use the effective number of parties,
which weights the number of parties by the number of seats they hold in the legislature,
as calculated by Brambor et al. (2007).2 To my knowledge, this measure is not typically
used as a proxy for party organization, but patterns of party fragmentation in Africa
are widely acknowledged to result not only in a large number of parties, but also in
1
Several of the countries included have since experienced extralegal transfers of power, including
Madagascar and Mali.
2
The construction of this measure follows Laakso and Taagepera (1979), but, according to Brambor
et al. (2007) is corrected to “better take account of the ‘other’ category in official election statistics by using
the least component method of bounds (Taagepera 1997). The method of bounds requires calculating
the effective number of parties treating the ‘other’ category as a single party (smallest effective number
of parties), then recalculating the effective number of parties as if every vote in the ‘other’ category
belonged to a different party (largest effective number of parties), and taking the mean.”
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the prevalence of short-lived, candidate-centered parties with very weak organizations
(Manning, 2001; Riedl, 2014; van de Walle, 2003). Moreover, the effective number of
parties is not closely related to the electoral system in African countries, correlating
with a binary measure of whether an electoral system is majoritarian/pluralistic at .12
for the years 1995-2000.3 For the sample of countries included, the effective number of
parties ranges from 1.67 to 10.38.
The second measure of party organization is Riedl’s measure of party system institutionalization. She uses a variety of elections and survey data to construct measures
of party system institutionalization that approximate Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995)
four-part definition which includes the stability of strategic interactions between parties, stable roots in society, the legitimacy of party competition, and the organization of
political parties. Unfortunately, Riedl does not include specific measures of party organization, but there are theoretical reasons to believe that parties are likely to be better
organized in systems that contain other dimensions of institutionalization. Specifically,
parties are unlikely to have stable roots in society and consistent patterns of strategic
interaction if they do not have the organizations necessary to sustain themselves. The
measure is a 6-point index averaged over the period under consideration in her study,
from the founding elections of the current democratic era to the late 2000’s.4
To measure formal private sector activity, I use statistics on private investment and
private credit from Stampini et al. (2011), both expressed as a percentage of GDP. The
data are averaged over the period from 1996-2008.5 Private investment ranges from 7%
of GDP to 40% of GDP for the countries included, while private credit ranges from 4%
3
The measure of effective number of parties is only available through 2000. In the future, I plan to
extend it past 2000.
4
She actually does not specify the exact period.
5
Ideally, I would use one data point from earlier in the period to ensure that these measures capture
the extent of private sector activity at the beginning of the period under consideration, but I have not
been able to obtain annual figures. The private sector data available in the IMF’s Government Finance
Statistics or the World Development Indicators databases are severely lacking in coverage, something I
plan to explore in more depth in the future.
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Figure 6.1: State Capacity 1

Private Sector Size
(Private Investment)

Party Organization
(Effective Number of Parties)*

Low

High

Low

High

-95
-.76

-.61
-.74

-.85
-.59

-.56
-.33

*Since a high effective number of parties implies lower level of parties organization, the lefthand
column represents high scores on the effective number of parties (low party organization), and the
righthand column represents low scores on the effective number of parties (high party organization)

to 121% of GDP.6 The data for all democratic countries are included in Table 6.1.
In each box of the four tables below, I provide average capacity scores for the group
of countries in each category from 2000-2010. The upper number in each box is the
Hanson and Sigman Capacity score. For the set of countries included, the Capacity
score ranges from -1.98 to .93.7 The lower number in each box is the average WGI
Government Effectiveness score for the same time period. These scores range from -1.5
to .76. Both are continuous measures.
Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show a consistent pattern. Capacity tends to be lowest
for the groups of countries with low levels of party organization and low levels of
formal private sector activity. In all four two-by-two tables, the countries with high
levels of private sector activity and high levels of party organization (those included in
the lower right quadrants) have higher capacity scores on both the Hanson and Sigman
6

In future work, I hope to be able to include a measure of the size of the procurement market, a
measure which is available for a small number of countries.
7
I use the most current standardized version of this measure, not the version from the 2013 paper.
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Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
CapeVerde
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Zambia
2.58
1.67
4.62
4.62
2.74
3.22
4.74
2.16
2.46
2.44

2.84
1.68

2.04
2.13
2.52
2.64
3.51
4.4
2.28

Eff. # of Parties
10.38

PSI
1.2
5.2
4
5.2
3
5.2
2
2.4
1.3
0.4
2.2
1.2
2.4
5
5
1.7
1.7
3.4
4.7
3.2
5.2
5.2
2.4

Priv. Invest. (% GDP)
0.12
0.21
0.09
0.34
0.4
0.16
0.13
0.12
0.29
0.14
0.1
0.14
0.18
0.11
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.07
0.16
0.16
0.13

Priv. Cred. (% GDP)
0.14
0.17
0.14
0.27
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.27
0.25
0.12
0.24
0.16
0.48
0.15
0.29
0.09
0.09
0.18
0.18
0.04
0.18
0.18
1.21

Table 6.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables
Capacity Gov. Eff.
.-.86
-0.46
0.67
0.58
-0.7
-0.62
0.03
-0.94
-0.62
-0.44
-0.06
-1.3
-1.18
-0.47
-0.57
-0.41
-0.28
-0.91
-0.55
-0.92
-0.55
-0.86
-0.61
-0.78
-0.75
-1.02
-0.48
0.04
0.13
-1.11
-0.83
-0.88
-1.01
-0.68
-0.5
-0.26
-1.17
-1.25
0.74
0.57
-0.87
-0.42
-0.59
-0.81

Figure 6.2: State Capacity 2

Private Sector Size
(Private Credit)

Party Organization
(Effective Number of Parties)*

Low

High

Low

High

-1.12
-.91

-.44
-.06

-.74
-.47

-.43
-.35

*Since a high effective number of parties implies lower level of parties organization, the lefthand
column represents high scores on the effective number of parties (low party organization), and the
righthand column represents low scores on the effective number of parties (high party organization)

Figure 6.3: State Capacity 3

Private Sector Size
(Private Credit)

Party Organization
(Party System Institutionalization)

Low

High

Low

High

-1.10
-.85

-.85
-.65

-.55
-.40

-.31
-.16
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Figure 6.4: State Capacity 4

Private Sector Size
(Private Investment)

Party Organization
(Party System Institutionalization)

Low

High

Low

High

-82
-.73

-.54
-.44

-.62
-.35

-.42
-.26

and WGI measures. Differences in means between the upper left-hand quadrants and
lower right-hand quadrants are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in
all but Table 1, thus providing consistent evidence of the plausibility of the theorized
racross the spectrum of African democracies.8
The two-by-two tables are, of course, very limited. They sacrifice information
about the magnitude of party organization and private sector size, do not provide the
opportunity to adjudicate amongst competing explanations, address concerns about
endogeneity or examine the potential applicability of the theory to electoral authoritarian or one-party regimes. I provide some preliminary insight into these questions by
analyzing time-series cross-sectional data on a broader set of African countries. I use
both the Hanson and Sigman and WGI Government Effectiveness measures of state
8

One possible reason that the mean capacity scores are not significantly different is that there are no
data on the effective number of parties for two countries that would likely fall into the upper-lefthand
box: Botswana and Mauritius. Both of these countries are widely regarded as two of the strongest states
in Africa.
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capacity, both measures of private sector activity described above, and the effective
number of parties as the measure of party organization.9 I include controls representing the array of competing explanations described in Chapter 1. Pre-existing levels
of state capacity, measured with lagged values of the state capacity measures, control
for Shefter’s theory about the institutionalization of the state apparatus. I include
Polity’s political competition score (POLCOMP). GDP per capita is used as a measure
of economic wealth. I also include dummy variables for British colonial heritage and
electoral systems that are majoritarian/pluralistic. With the coverage available for these
data, the model comprises 29 countries over 14 years: 1997 through 2010. The data are
summarized in in Appendix C.
Because the data include time invariant variables, I am only able to perform a
random effects regression. Though a fixed effects model would control for the influence
of any country-level variables that are omitted from the model, my ability to include
data for the theoretically relevant alternative explanations provides confidence in the
analysis using random effects. Robust standard errors are used. Model 1 uses private
sector investment as a percentage of GDP as the private sector variable. Model 2 uses
private sector credit as a percentage of GDP as the private sector variable. Models 3
and 4 repeat models 1 and 2 with Government Effectiveness as the dependent variable.
Models 5 and 6 add an interaction term for private sector and party organization to
Models 1 and 2.10 The results are displayed in Table 6.2.
The random effects model implies

9

For the effective number of parties, I impute the 2000 statistics to fill missing data for 2001-2010.
This is not ideal, but serves as a placeholder until I can construct the data myself. Riedl’s measure only
covers a limited number of countries.
10
For the interaction term, I reverse the scale of the effective number of parties such that the interaction
term includes two variables with an expected positive effect on the dependent variable.
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Capacityit = +βprivatesectorit + βpartiesit + βcapacityi1996 + βpolcompit + βbritishit +
βgdppercapit + βelecsystemit + α + υit + it

(6.1)
where Capacityit is the Hanson and Sigman Capacity variable for country i in year t, α is
the random effect that is presumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of
all past, current and future time periods of the same country, υit is the between-country
error and it is the within-country error.
In each of the first four models, the coefficients on private sector size and party
organization are consistently in the expected direction, meaning they are positive for
measures of private sector size and negative for the effective number of parties. The
inclusion of interaction terms in Models 5 and 6 do not appear to provide any additional
leverage in understanding the relationship. In none of these cases are the coefficients
particularly large, which is not surprising given that capacity is theorized to change only
slowly over time. It is difficult to theorize the substantive meanings of the coefficients
since the measures are aggregates of many concepts. A small change in Capacity score is
likely to only reflect the difference between two countries with seemingly similar levels
of state capacity. For example, a difference of .2 difference in the 2010 Capacity scores
represent the difference between Mozambique and Tanzania, India and Colombia, and
Norway and Finland.
The results also shed some incipient light on the performance of the party-financing
argument relative to the alternative explanations discussed in Chapter 1. Earlier levels
of state capacity are, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most powerful predictors of future ca-
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Table 6.2: Effects of Party Organization and Private Sector Size on State
Capacity, 1997-2010
Private Credit (% GDP)
Private Investment (% GDP)
Effective # of Parties
Competition (POLCOMP)
British Colonial Heritage
Majoritarian/Plurality System
Per Capita GDP (Log)
Capacity in 1995

1
0.235
(0.150)

2

0.162
(0.616)
-0.020* -0.018*
(0.011)
(0.010)
0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001)
(0.001)
0.054
0.075
(0.069)
(0.071)
-0.035
-0.021
(0.071)
(0.075)
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.774*** 0.802***
(0.080)
(0.089)

GE in 1996
Priv. Credit * Parties

3
0.199
(0.160)

4

-0.006
(0.010)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.172
(0.130)
-0.195
(0.133)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.381
(0.444)
-0.002
(0.010)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.180
(0.128)
-0.201
(0.135)
-0.000
(0.000)

0.604***
(0.072)

0.609***
(0.081)

5
-1.078**
(0.513)

0.006
(0.014)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.035
(0.072)
-0.012
(0.071)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.768***
(0.081)

N
Countries
R-Squared

0.909
(3.943)
-0.024
(0.019)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.075
(0.073)
-0.019
(0.074)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.803***
(0.090)

0.083**
(0.035)

Priv. Investment * Parties
constant

6

-0.219*
-0.148
-0.238*
-0.264 -0.311***
(0.086)
(0.125)
(0.123)
(0.183)
(0.101)
378
378
297
297
378
27
27
27
27
27
.814
.805
.747
.741
.819
DV for Models 1,2, 5 and 6 is Capacity. Models 3 and 4 are GE
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*p<.1 **p<.05 ***p<.01
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-0.065
(0.246)
-0.135
(0.141)
378
27
.805

pacity, suggesting the strong relevance of historical arguments such as those advanced
by Shefter. Party competition has a substantively small but consistently significant
effect. This finding is not inconsistent with the theory advanced in this dissertation,
since it makes no specific claims about the differences between competitive and noncompetitive polities. That said, it suggests, perhaps, the need to delve deeper into
variation in competition levels in future work. Neither of the institutional variables colonial or electoral - appear to influence capacity outcomes. Finally, the GDP variable
does not outperform the private sector variables, suggesting that economic structure
may be more important than overall levels of wealth.
While the results presented in Table 6.2 neither confirm nor deny the the broader
relevance of the argument, they do shed light on work that could be done to improve
the analysis. First, the data and measures of all variables of interest could be improved,
such as by manually compiling private sector data, extending Riedl’s measure of party
system institutionalization or by developing a finer-grained measure of state capacity
that captures the type of capacity most relevant to the argument (something that is still in
the works). Second, an extension to newer democracies outside of Africa may provide
additional leverage to test the arguments. Finally, as mentioned above, an empirical
strategy that is capable of testing each piece of the argument would provide much
more purchase on the strengths, weaknesses and potential needs for modification. This
will entail the development of patronage measures capable of capturing differences in
patronage at both the elite and public service levels.
The substantively large and consistent effects of prior levels of state capacity point
to the likely possibility that state capacity itself drives the growth of the private sector,
the development of the party system, or both. Only a deeper historical inquiry could
provide the necessary insight into the direction(s) of the causal arrows, which I surmise
are likely to vary over time. In the cases of Benin and Ghana, a couple of important
points stand out. First, state capacity in both countries was highly depleted by the time
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of the transitions in the early 1990s, due to the combination of “Africanization” policies
and severe economic crises. That Rawlings decided to accept economic liberalization
packages earlier than Kerekou is, I believe, not so much a reflection of variation in
state structures, but rather a result of the pressures they faced from economic actors
in their countries. For Rawlings, the biggest threat to his power came from the traditionally wealthy Ashanti traders and their business allies. Although Rawlings made
efforts to purge powerful opposition members and nationalize their private, their dense
international networks enabled them to endure these these challenges. Faced with a
business-dominated opposition, Rawlings’ decision to pursue economic liberalization
was essential to his political survival. By contrast, in Benin, petty traders and public
sector workers posed the most serious challenge to Kerekou’s power (Heilbrunn, 1997).
Economic liberalization would have done little in the immediate term to have calmed
the wave of protest in the late 1980s. Instead, Kerekou’s political survival depended on
his ability to secure distributive resources and pay public sector workers. It is plausible
that these decisions simply reflect the politics that emerged as a result of the deeper
roots of economic structure.
Second, both extant theory and my own observations suggest that party systems are
likely the result of two factors: the availability of private capital (Arriola, 2012), and the
party-building inclinations of post-colonial authoritarian leaders.11 Despite efforts by
post-colonial Ghanaian leaders to seize the resources of the Ashanti and other groups,
their dense network of international ties enabled them to preserve their capital, flee
the country when necessary and re-emerge to influence both business and politics in
Ghana, even though their stints in power were generally short-lived. The Ashanti’s
ability to maintain independent sources of capital continuously posed a threat to their
political foes such as Nkrumah and Rawlings, driving what was likely an isomorphic
11
To some extent this latter statement reflects the argument of Riedl (2014), though she focuses to a
greater extent on authoritarian leaders’ abilities to control the transition to democracy and subsequent
organizational isomorphism.

172

process of state-sponsored party-building in response to this threat. Rawlings was
especially aggressive in this regard, developing local “Defence Committees” that saw to
the provision of goods and services to clientele, and solidifying the structures necessary
to counter the opposition posed by the Ashanti-dominated NPP predecessors. In the
1980s, with the impending fall of the USSR, Rawlings and his inner circle were highly
aware of the imminent need to accept political reforms in order to access the IMF’s
safety net, which was crucial to salvage the economy from its ongoing crisis. Rawlings’
decentralization reforms of this period enabled the President to appoint the leaders
local jurisdictions down to the district/municipality level, as well as appoint one-third
of the seats in local assemblies, thus ensuring their ability to sustain local party/PNDC
structures in a more liberalized political context.
Similar dynamics were present in Benin when Kerekou, a northerner and rival of the
Fon, the group associated with the Kingdom of Dahomey, rose to power in the 1970s.
Kerekou was, arguably, more successful in neutralizing the economic and political
power of the Fon, whose access to capital and international networks was probably
less developed than the Ashanti in Ghana. Although Kerekou was quite successful,
by some accounts, in managing the elite power dynamics throughout the country,
his efforts at grassroots party building were considerably more limited. Though it is
difficult to explain the precise reasons that Kerekou did not invest as much in party
building.
This is not to say that existing state structures were not in some ways responsible
for variation in party building efforts or in support of the economic structures already
in place. But there is little reason to suggest that state institutions in the two countries,
at least as they were developed under colonial rule and then transferred to African
leaders after independence, were a major force in the political dynamics shaping party
building activities in the post-Colonial period.
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6.3

Implications and Future Research

Although a large amount of research focuses on the causes of democratization in Africa,
much less is known about the specific workings of African democracy and its longerterm prospects for democratic consolidation, state building and development. This
dissertation provides important insight into the circumstances and mechanisms that
make democratically-elected governments more effective agents of development. It
does so not by focusing on the question of whether or not mutli-party politics constrain or reproduce neopatrimonialism, but instead by investigating the specific ways
that leaders use patronage in response to the political challenges they face and empirically investigating, rather than assuming, how those patronage practices affect state
institutions.
The dissertation’s findings question the predominant neopatrimonial perspective
in African politics in two important ways. First, contrary to common conceptions,
it shows that patronage is not necessarily ubiquitous in African states. Leaders may
use patronage-based selection of state personnel to advance their electoral interests,
exert control over state resources and make good on campaign promises. But there
are times when political patronage does not necessarily help to achieve these goals. If
we are to better understand the causes and consequences of institutional capacity, it
is incumbent on researchers to sort out how these attributes become melded together
in a hybrid form of bureaucracy. In this sense, this dissertation’s focus on the types
of patronage employed by political leaders provides one step in the direction of better
understanding political sources of neopatrimonial behavior in state institutions.
Second, although the neopatrimonial perspective suggests that patronage practices
are the root of state institutional weakness, this approach overlooks important variation
within Africa. Instead, the project shows that certain types of patronage practices can
lead to more or less effective state institutions. In particular, Chapter 4 shows that, in
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some cases, patronage can lead to stability and cohesion at the apex of government
– two important ingredients for the pursuit of development goals. Importantly, this
finding is consistent with theories of executive capacity from other regions of the world,
suggesting that patronage in African or other neopatrimonial contexts is not necessarily
more or less pernicious than in other regions.
The findings of the dissertation also have practical implications. That multi-party
politics can promote state capacity in contexts of larger private sectors and wellorganized political parties helps us to better understand the prospects for democratic
survival and development. Democracy promotion efforts, for example, could more
fruitfully be targeted to these types of contexts. Additionally, the work sheds light
on where public sector reform programs may encounter the most challenging political
obstacles. Given the importance of procurement contracting for party financing in
Ghana, it is difficult to envision garnering the political will to meaningfully implement
their public procurement reforms. In Benin, the ruling party’s reliance on patronage
in the public service is likely to prove challenging for those advocating for civil service reform. Understanding these types of political obstacles should and could inform
donors’ voluminous investments of time and money.
Finally, the varying modes of linkage between parties, businesses and states explored in this research raises a number of important questions about the future trajectories of economic development in the two countries. If the current trends continue,
the development of a state-dependent private sector is likely to continue to evolve in
Ghana, entailing high costs to private sector actors in terms of investment in the political
establishment to gain access to capital. The future of the private sector is perhaps even
more tenuous in Benin, where only those who can amass major sums of money, usually
through informal channels, will be capable of gaining entry into the more exclusive
party-business-state elite. Future research that draws out the economic implications
of these modes of party financing would be especially welcome, as they are likely to
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contribute to a better understanding of the particular development challenges facing
African countries.
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire

Public Sector Employee Survey
We are collecting data on the views of personnel from across the public services. The information
obtained is for academic research use only. Your participation is voluntary. All responses are 100%
anonymous. We will not ask for your name, nor will we in any way attempt to connect your
responses with you or with the organization in which you are employed. Thank you in advance for
responding to the questions honestly and to the best of your ability.
IMPORTANT: Please read each question carefully and mark your response in the box to the
left. Some questions ask you to rate the importance or frequency of EVERY statement.
1. In what type of organization do you currently work?
Please select only ONE response
District Assembly/Local Government
Central Management Agency (i.e. Ministry of Finance, Office of the Head of the Civil Service)
Municipal/Metropolitan Assembly
Sector Ministry, Department, Agency
Semi-autonomous agency
Other (Please describe: ________________________________)
2. In which policy sector is your current position?
Select only ONE response
Local Government
Health
Education
Social Rights and/or Welfare
Public Administration (Finance, Revenue, Information, Civil/Public Service)
Trade & Industry
Infrastructure
Other (Please describe___________________________________)
3. What is your CURRENT position/grade of employment?
Select only ONE response
National Service
Junior Staff
Mid-level manager
Deputy/Assistant Director
Director
Other (Please describe___________________________________)

1
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4. In what year did you begin working in your current organization? __________

5. Which of the following BEST DESCRIBES how you came to be employed in the public
service?
Please select only ONE response.
A family member or friend helped me get hired.
I was first assigned for National Service
Through involvement in a political party or campaign
I did the exam and interview, but did not have any personal or political connections

6. Which of the following best describes how other staff at your organization get hired?
Please select only ONE response
A family member or friend helped them get hired.
They were assigned to National Service then stayed.
Through their involvement in a political party or campaign
They did the exam and interview, but did not have any personal or political connections

7. Using the scale from 1-4, how important were EACH of the following factors in your
decision to work or continue work in the public service?
1 = Not at all Important
2 = Not important
3 = Important, but not very important
4 = Very important
Please rate the importance of EACH ONE of the following factors
It was the only job available to me at the time.
Job security
I knew I wouldn’t have to work too hard
Good salary, benefits and/or allowances
I would be able to go back to school for a degree
I wanted to serve my community or my country
I felt like I wanted to be part of this organization
I would be able to do other work on the side
I thought I would be able to advance my career

2
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8. If you had the choice between a job in the private sector and a job in the public sector,
and the two jobs had the exact same salaries and allowances, which would you choose?
Public Sector
Private Sector

9. Please briefly explain why you chose public/private sector in the previous question.

10. On a scale of 1-4, please, in your opinion, how important are each of the following
factors to get promotion in your organization?
1 = Not at all important
2 = Not important
3 = Important, but not very important
4 = Very Important
Please rate the importance for EVERY ONE of the following factors:
Years of work in public service
Political party affiliation
Educational qualification
Past work performance
Regional, Family or Ethnic Background
Personal relationship with Director

11. For each of the following statements please mark 1-4, where
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly Agree
Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement for EVERY ONE of the following:
The organization I currently work for has very clear missions and goals.
The mission and goals of my organization are very important for Ghana’s development.
The mission and goals of my organization are an important part of the ruling party’s Manifesto.
The mission and goals of my organization change depending on the party or President in power.
The mission and goals of my organization change depending on the Minister, DCE, MCE or
another official appointed by the President

3
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12. For the following questions please mark 1-4, where
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly Agree
Please rate your level of agreement/disagreement for EVERY ONE of the following:
If I work hard in my current job it will help advance the goals and mission of the organization.
If I work hard in my current job it will help Ghana’s development.
If I work hard in my current job, I will have a better chance of advancing my career
If I work hard in my current job, I will be likely to get a higher-paying job
If I work hard in my current job, it will help the ruling party win the next election.
If I work hard in my current job, it will help the people/clients that our organization serves.
Implementing the ruling party’s manifesto is important for Ghana’s development.

13. In your opinion, how effective is your organization in achieving its goals?
Please select only ONE response
Not at all effective
Not very effective
Somewhat effective
Very effective

14. Since you started working at this organization do you think the organization has become more or
less effective in achieving its goals and mission?

Please select only ONE response
Much more effective
More effective
No Change
Less effective
Much less effective

15. Please explain briefly why you think your organization has become more or less effective as
indicated in the previous question.

4
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16. In your opinion, what are the main problems your organization faces in achieving its
goals?
Please use the following scale for each:
1 = Not a problem at all
2 = A small problem
3 = A problem, but not very serious
4 = A very serious problem
Please rate the level of importance for EVERY ONE of the following:
Lack of competent leadership
Personnel have low level of motivation
Political interference
Lack of resources to perform functions
Rules are too strict or cumbersome, not enough freedom to do our jobs
Personnel lack educational qualifications and/or technical skill
Mission, goals and/or targets change frequently or are not clearly communicated
Labour disputes, strikes
Corruption

17. In your opinion, how serious are the following problems in your organization?
Please use the following scale for each:
1 = Not a problem at all
2 = A small problem
3 = A problem, but not very serious.
4 = A very serious problem
Please rate the level of importance for EVERY ONE of the following:
Appointment of unqualified Chief Director/Director/Executive due to their support for the ruling party
Hiring of unqualified or unmotivated junior personnel because of their affiliation to the ruling party
Qualified personnel get sacked because of their party affiliation
Disputes amongst Ministers, Deputy Ministers, or other politicians
Organizational resources disappear for political party use
Contracts awarded for political support and not to the firm that will get the job done.
Inability to voice opinion or act because it might damage the ruling party.
Frequent changes in leadership

5
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18. Using the scale provided below, please rate the importance of each of the following
factors in explaining the persistence of corruption in the public service?
1 = Not a problem at all
2 = A small problem
3 = A problem, but not very serious.
4 = A very serious problem
Weak enforcement of institutional rules
Corrupt organizational leadership
Lack of government interest to fight corruption
General acceptance of corruption in the society
Low level of salaries
Need to fund political party operations
Other (Please describe briefly______________________________________________)

19. Within the past 2 years, have you or anyone living in your household had to pay a
financial bribe in order to get a service provided by any public organization?
Yes
No
20. Within the past two years, do you know anyone in your organization who accepted a
financial bribe before providing a service?
Yes
No
21. Are you a member of a political party?
Yes
No
22. Did you participate in a political campaign during the last election?
Yes
No

23. Age Group:
a. 20-25
e. 41-45

b. 26-30
f. 46-50

c. 31-35
g 51-55

d. 36-40
h. 56-60

24. Please, what is your level of education?

25. Gender:

Male

Female

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
6
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Appendix B: Survey Demographics

Survey Locations - Benin
Cotonou/Abomey Calavi
(Littoral/Atlantique)
Parakou
(Borgou)
Total

279

48.02%

302

59.98%

581

100%

Survey Locations - Ghana
Accra/Legon
302 58.75%
(Greater Accra)
Kumasi
101 19.65%
(Ashanti)
Navrongo
53 10.31%
(Upper East)
Wa
58 11.28%
(Upper West)
Total
514 100%
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Organization Type

Benin
Ghana

Ministry

Semi-Autonomous
Agency

Territorial/Local
Administration

Other

Total

240
41.67%
228
44.79%

236
40.97%
122
23.97%

81
14.06%
104
20.43%

19
3.3%
55
10.81%

576
100%
509
100%

Years Worked in Current Organization

Benin
Ghana

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Median

8.92
8.02

6.06
6.56

0
0

26
34

8
6

Current Grade of Employment
Natl Service
or Training
Benin
Ghana

34
5.93%
43
8.41%

Junior or
Mid-Level
Entry
Management
141
24.61%
169
33.07%

164
28.62%
172
33.66%

184

Asst/Deputy
Director

Director

Other

Total

130
22.69%
94
18.4%

64
11.17%
33
6.46%

40
6.98%
-

573
100%
511
100%

185

Ghana

Benin

47
8.12%
32
6.26%

Terr.
Admin
66
11.4%
86
16.83%

Health
95
16.41%
166
32.49%

Educ.
32
5.53%
11
2.15%

90
15.54%
157
30.72%

37
6.39%
20
3.91%

Social Central Commerce/
Adv.
Mgmt
Industry
54
9.33%
15
2.94%

Public
Works

75
12.95%
15
2.94%

Justice

Current Grade of Employment

39
6.74%
0
0.00%

Environ.

38
6.56%
1
0.20%

Ag./
Fisheries

Total
6
579
1.04% 100%
8
511
1.57% 100%

Other

Age Category
20-25
Benin

40
7.17%
Ghana
46
9.35%

26-30

31-35

36-40

41-45

46-50

72
12.9%
142
28.86%

98
17.56%
133
27.03%

131
23.48%
73
14.84%

89
15.95%
49
9.96%

65
11.65%
23
4.67%

Gender
Male

Female

Total

199
35.54%
201
43.89%

560
100%
458
100%

Benin

361
64.46%
Ghana
257
56.11%

186

51-55

56-60

Total

55
8
558
9.86% 1.43% 100%
19
7
492
3.86% 1.42% 100%

Appendix C: Descriptive Data for Regression Results in
Table 6.2

Summary Statistics

Capacity
GE
Private Investment
Private Credit
Eff. Number of Parties
Competition (POLCOMP)
British
Majoritarian
Per Capita GDP (log)
Capacity 1995
GE 1996

N

Countries

Mean

SD

Min

Max

378
276
378
378
378
378
378
378
378
378
378

27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27
27

-0.81
-0.71
0.15
0.21
3.59
7.04
0.33
0.52
6.49
-0.76
-0.74

0.53
0.51
0.08
0.23
3.27
2.04
0.47
0.50
1.05
0.55
0.67

-2.17
-1.98
0.02
0.04
1.55
2
0
0
4.13
-2.07
-1.87

0.93
0.69
0.40
1.21
17.37
9
1
1
10.46
0.82
0.88
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